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INTRODUCTION

ver one hundred years ago, Warren and Brandeis decried the
press' invasion of our personal lives and proposed that the law
respond by recognizing a right to privacy.' However, the intervening years have not been kind to the resulting privacy tort and
many scholars celebrated its centennial by declaring it dead.2
While the privacy tort may be dead, calls for the law to protect
privacy are not. A growing number of scholars have suggested
utilizing an action for breach of confidence to prevent invasions of
privacy. This approach seems promising: although no award to a
privacy tort plaintiff has survived the Supreme Court's First
Amendment scrutiny,4 two decisions separated by over a decade
t Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University School of Law (on leave 1993-1995);
Visiting Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law (1994-1995). LL.B. 1981,
University of Glasgow; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. Thanks are due to William Marshall, Peggy Cordray, Dan Kobil, Michael Diamond, Kent Markus and Doug Rendleman for
comments on earlier drafts, and to colleagues at Capital, American University Washington
College of Law, and Washington and Lee who have discussed the Article in informal settings. Research assistance was provided by Virginia Richards and Jason Leif.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).
2. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
3. Randall P. Bezanson, The Right To Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1174 (1992) ("I suggest that the privacy tort be
formally interred, and that we look to the concept of breach of confidence to provide legally
enforceable protection from dissemination of identified types of personal information."); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem For A Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 363 (1983) ("More thought should also be given to
increasing the use of legal sanctions for the violation of special confidential relationships, in
order to give individuals greater control over the dissemination of personal information.").
4. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
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have permitted recovery by those suing for breach of confidence.
In the most recent, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,' the Court rejected
a vigorous First Amendment challenge declaring that "the First
Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to
disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state
law." 7 This Article examines what we mean by breach of confidence and whether it will prove a viable remedy for those who seek
to recover for the unwanted publication of private facts.
The first part briefly traces the evolution of the privacy tort as
the main mechanism to discourage disclosure of private facts. It
summarizes the constitutional problems which now threaten to en-

gulf that tort. This section also explicates English law which, lack-

ing a privacy tort, has created an action for breach of confidence,
breathtaking in scope, if somewhat mystical in origin.8
Part II examines whether an action for breach of confidence
can serve as an effective tool to protect privacy interests in the
United States. It summarizes the circumstances under which
American courts have proven willing to provide a remedy for those
whose confidences have been revealed. Specifically, this section
points out that the courts have used three theories of recoverycontract, 9 fiduciary duty"0 and tort"-to remedy breaches of confi420 U.S. 469 (1975). The Court also has repeatedly overturned judicial orders and state
statutes that prohibit the publication of private facts. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (pretrial order). In false light actions where the plaintiff is required to show falsity, there has
been one recovery. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974)
(award upheld as plaintiff proved that the article was published with actual malice, that is,
knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
(plaintiff's recovery for false light overturned).
5. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding the First Amendment did
not preclude recovery on a promissory estoppel theory by a source whose name was published in breach of a promise of confidentiality); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)
(awarding the CIA injunctive and monetary relief for a former agent's breach of confidence
in failing to submit a book for pre-publication review).
6. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
7. Id. at 672; see also Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3 (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge).
8. See infra part I.C and notes 43-69.
9. See, e.g., Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663 (action based on contract and promissory estoppel);
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507 (action based on theories of contract and fiduciary duty).
10. See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
11. See, e.g., Tele-Count Engineers, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct.
App. 1985) (recognizing the tort of breach of confidence under California law); MacDonald
v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (App. Div. 1982) (recognizing a tort action for breach of
confidence).
This tort is not universally recognized, but several scholars have advocated the creation
of such a remedy. See infra notes 225-67 and accompanying text; Bezanson, supra note 3, at
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dence. It concludes that while contract and fiduciary based actions
may occasionally offer relief to a breach of confidence plaintiff who
seeks to recover for the revelation of the details of her private life,
they have so far proved unattractive remedies, their effectiveness
cramped by formal requirements and inadequate damages. Indeed,
this section posits that these very limitations have driven courts
and commentators to advocate the recognition of a tort action for
breach of confidence which escapes the formalities required in contract and fiduciary law and offers a more generous measure of
damages.
The final part of this Article assesses whether any or all of
these actions can survive First Amendment scrutiny. The Article
argues that, under the standards enunciated by the Court in Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., 12 the least effective remedies (contract and

fiduciary duty versions of breach of confidence) will face the least
constitutional problems-either because state action is absent or
because, even if state action is found, constitutional scrutiny will
be minimal. However, the Article concludes that, even under Cohen's minimal standard of review, the most effective remedy-a
tort based action for breach of confidence-will prove
unconstitutional.
The Article concludes by predicting that the Court will face a
growing number of cases where plaintiffs, injured by the media,
will avoid the traditional speech torts such as libel, false light and
privacy, and instead resort to other common law remedies not originally designed to deal with those injured by speech. Just as Cohen
resorted to breach of confidence,"3 others have resorted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, contract and even property
law. 14 The Court's reaction to these cases has been disjointed, and
1174 (tracing the historical changes in our understanding of privacy, and arguing that a tort
for breach of confidence would better protect today's privacy concerns). Two excellent student comments have also advocated the adoption of a tort action for breach of confidence.
See Alan B. Vickery, Comment, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1426 (1982); G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality:A Measured Response To
the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385 (1992).
There have also been calls for the creation of such a cause of action in specific areas,
particularly doctor/patient relations. See, e.g., Janet A. Kobrin, Comment, Confidentiality
of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1301 (1983) (advocating the creation of a
single tort action of breach of confidence for revelations of confidential information by doctors); Note, Action ForBreach Of Medical Secrecy Outside The Courtroom, 36 U. CIN. L.
REV. 103, 109 (1967) (advocating the adoption of an action for breach of confidence against
doctors).
12. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (suit for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.)
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this Article ends with a call for a unified approach reflective of
First Amendment concerns.
I.

FRAMING THE ISSUE

A. Remedies for Revelations
Every day we divulge information about ourselves. We check
videos out of stores and books out of the library, revealing what
issues concern or entertain us; we drop film off at photomats, revealing our holiday exploits; we disclose our medical history to
doctors, insurance companies and employers; and we confide our
personal successes and failures to friends and family. In each case,
we presume that some combination of love, honor or ethics will
ensure that the information goes no further. Sometimes we are disappointed. This Article considers whether there is a legal remedy
when our confidences are betrayed and personal information is
revealed.
There are two common law mechanisms designed to provide a
remedy when personal information is disclosed-invasion of privacy and breach of confidence.15 Both trace their roots to the same
(utilizing copyright to protect privacy interest), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); see also
Diane L. Zimmerman, Information As Speech, Information As Goods: Some Thoughts On
Marketplaces And The Bill Of Rights, 33 Wzu. & MARY L. REV. 665, 670-73 (1992).
15. Other torts have been used with varying success. For instance, some plaintiffs have
sued for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Morgan v.
Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (dismissing intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim); Doe v. ABC, 543 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. Div.) (affirming the dismissal of an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim by two rape victims whose faces and voices
were recognizable despite promises to the contrary by the television show), appeal dismissed, 550 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1989). Some plaintiffs have also alleged § 1983 actions. See, e.g.,
Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3rd Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of
§ 1983 action when police report of spouse abuse leaked to press), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1171 (1992). On the other hand, others have claimed misrepresentation or fraud. See, e.g.,
Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 Media L. Rep. 1759 (D. Minn. 1992) (dismissing fraudulent
misrepresentation claim); Morgan, 780 F. Supp. at 311 (dismissing claim for intentional misrepresentation for breach of alleged promise to keep certain information in child abuse case
confidential); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing fraudulent misrepresentation claim). These claims have largely failed.
Other possibilities may be property based theories, such as trade secret and copyright
law. See Steven I. Katz, Comment, UnauthorizedBiographiesAnd Other "Books of Revelations": A Celebrity's Legal Recourse to a Truthful Public Disclosure, 36 UCLA L. REV. 815
(1989) (considering the legal recourse open to celebrities who are the subject of unauthorized biographies); Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 670-73 (discussing Salinger's use of a
property based claim for infringement to protect his personal privacy). For an analysis of
privacy as a property concept, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981);
cf. KIM LANE SCHEPELLE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 3642 (1988).
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5

6 This case has
old English case-Prince Albert v. Strange."
spawned two different legacies in two different countries. Although
in England the courts used Albert to create an action for breach of
confidence, 17 in the United States Albert formed one of the building blocks upon which Warren and Brandeis constructed their
claim that a right of privacy was recognized at common law. 8
There are also a growing number of statutory provisions which impose civil or criminal
liability for the disclosure of personal information. Such statutes, which are beyond the
scope of this Article, may reflect the failure of the common law to provide an adequate
remedy for the revelation of secrets. For an interesting discussion of the statutes governing
AIDS related information, see Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the
AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV. 113 (1994).
16. 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849). In 1849, Prince Albert and Queen Victoria were outraged
when an entrepreneur, Mr. Strange, advertised that he was staging an exhibition of etchings
the royal couple had drawn of their family and offered for sale a catalogue describing the
etchings. Strange had apparently obtained the sketches from an employee of the royal
printer who had illicitly made copies of them. Id.
When Prince Albert filed suit, the court had no difficulty in ordering the return of the
etchings on a property theory. However, Prince Albert also sought to enjoin the publication
of a catalogue created by Strange. Id. The court issued the requested injunction, concluding
that it was appropriate not just on the basis of property and contract, but also "for a breach
of... confidence." Id. at 1179. The court reasoned that Strange could only have obtained
the prints from the printer or the printer's employee, both of whom owed an obligation of
confidentiality to the prince. Id. Since Strange's possession "must have originated in a
breach of trust, confidence, or contract" by someone, an injunction against Strange was appropriate. Id.
As a later case explained the ruling: "an injunction may be granted to restrain the publication of confidential information not only by the person who was a party to the confidence but also by other persons into whose possession that information has improperly
come." Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1967] 1 Ch. 302, 333 (1964). Thus, Strange, as
the recipient of information obtained in breach of confidence, was enjoined from publicizing
it further, and the private lives of the royal family were protected, at least for the nineteenth century. But see Vickery, supra note 11, at 1452 nn.131-32 (questioning if breach of
confidence has an even earlier origin in English common law). Prince Albert's case also had
a profound impact on the view that information can be property. See Zimmerman, supra
note 14, at 697 (tracing the impact of Prince Albert's case on the development of property
rights in information).
17. See discussion infra part I.C. England's development of the breach of confidence
action was motivated in part by its refusal to recognize an action for privacy. See, e.g., Kaye
v. Robertson and Another [1991] F.S.R. 62 ("It is well-known that in English law there is no
right to privacy."). Thus, breach of confidence is one of the main vehicles used to protect
private facts. See PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS COMM., REPORT § 659 (1972) ("[I]t is our
opinion that the law of breach of confidence . . . would turn out to be a practical instrument for dealing with many complaints in the privacy field."); PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS CoMM., REPORT § 17.13, at 97 (1990) (recommending against the creation of a tort for
invasion of privacy on the ground, inter alia, of the "availability of other remedies: including breach of confidence"). In contrast, the United States developed the tort of privacy and
thus the action of breach of confidence remained underdeveloped. See infra note 20 and
accompanying text.
18. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 201-05. In their words, the case demonstrated
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Although Warren and Brandeis explicitly rejected the breach
of confidence action, arguing that it was too narrow a remedy for
what they perceived to be an increasing number of invasions of
privacy, 19 they did advocate a wide-ranging tort action for invasion
of privacy. This advice was heeded by the American courts. As a
result, English and American courts have taken opposite paths: the
English have adopted breach of confidence and rejected invasion of
privacy; the Americans have rejected breach of confidence and
adopted invasion of privacy. 20 This Article asks, "Who is right?"
B. The Ill-Fated Privacy Tort
First, let us consider the fate of Warren and Brandeis' privacy
tort: "the right of the individual to be let alone."'" Their expansive, if vague, formulation of a right of privacy was refined and
organized by Prosser.2 As set out in the Second Restatement, the
private-facts tort punishes giving "publicity" to certain defined information; that is, information "concerning the private life of another" which is not of "legitimate concern to the public" and
"would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. '2 3 The grava"a more or less clearly defined perception of a broader principle"--that principle being the
"right to be let alone." Id. at 204-05.
19. Warren & Brandeis described the emergence of breach of confidence as follows:
The courts, in searching for some principle upon which the publication of private
[information] could be enjoined, naturally came upon the idea of a breach of confidence . . . but it required little consideration to discern that this doctrine could
not afford all the protection required, since it would not support the court in
granting a remedy against a stranger.
Id. at 211. They continued:
The narrower doctrine [of breach of confidence] may have satisfied the demands
of society at a time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have arisen
without violating a contract or special confidence; but now that modern devices
afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the law must be placed
upon a broader foundation.
Id. at 210-11; see also Harvey, supra note 11, at 2398 n.69.
20. Vickery, supra note 11, at 1454-55 (arguing that the breach of confidence action
may have been slow to develop in the United States because of the presence of an action for
invasion of privacy); Harvey, supra note 11, at 2398 ("The paucity of breach of confidence
cases was probably due to the rise of the private-facts tort following Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis's seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to Privacy.").
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
22. William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Prosser divided the right of
privacy into four distinct torts: physical intrusion, misappropriation, false light and publication of private facts. Id. at 389. This Article focuses on the final category, the publication of
private facts, and refers to it as the "private-facts tort." See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 652A (1976).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976) ("One who gives publicity to a
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men of the tort is publication, especially by the mass media, 4 of
private information.
Despite the efforts of Warren, Brandeis and Prosser, this tort
has had a far from happy life. The private-facts tort has not been
universally adopted,2 5 and even where adopted the number of successful actions has been insignificant. 26 Moreover, the tort has suffered severe constitutional setbacks. At the heart of the privatefacts tort's constitutional difficulties is its effort to punish the publication of truth.2 7 The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted,
particularly in the libel field, that true speech lies at the heart of
First Amendment protection. 2 For instance, in its 1986 decision of
matter concerning the private life of another is subject to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that: (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.").
24. Id. § 652D cmt. a (commenting that "publicity" requires distribution not to a single
person or small group of persons, but to a large audience, typically via newspapers,
magazines and broadcasts).
25. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50 STATE SURVEY 1989: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN MEDIA LAW AND INVASION OF PRIVACY LAW 964-67 (Henry R. Kaufman ed., 1989) (reporting that 29 jurisdictions have explicitly adopted the private-facts tort); Zimmerman, supra
note 3, at 365 (reporting that 36 jurisdictions appear to recognize the private-facts tort); see
also Harvey, supra note 11, at 2401 n.86.
26. Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 293 n.5 (estimating that fewer than 18 successful

cases had occurred as of 1983);

RANDALL

P.

BEZANSON, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS

97, 115-18

(1987) (empirical study on success rates in private-facts tort cases); see also Harvey, supra
note 11, at 2402. The limited success of privacy tort plaintiffs can be attributed not only to
the constitutional limitations discussed above, but also to the inadequacies of the tort itself.
See Bezanson, supra note 3, at 1172 (concluding that the private-facts tort fails as a tort);
Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 336 (1966) (defense of newsworthiness destroys the tort).
This is not to suggest that all plaintiffs have failed. There are some striking success
stories by plaintiffs who have filed invasion of privacy claims when promises of secrecy are
broken. See, e.g., Doe v. Methodist Hospital, 639 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. App. 1994) (allowing
action for revelation of plaintiff's HIV status to proceed against hospital and its employees
under private-facts theory); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. App.
1994) (affirming judgment against television station for broadcast of AIDS patient's identity
on private-facts theory); cf. Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (W.D. Pa. 1992)
(dismissing private-facts claim for failure to show that information published, a child's allegation of sexual abuse by her police chief father, was not aomatter of public concern).
27. The Restatement does not define the private-facts tort as covering only true speech.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976). However, the harm the tort seeks to remedy, the revelation of personal facts about the plaintiff, occurs only where the facts are true.
If the publication is of false personal facts, then the injury is not the revelation of the intimate details of the individual's life, but rather the creation of a false impression about the
individual. This harm is remedied by the torts of libel and false light. In contrast, where the
published personal details are true, only the private-facts tort is available. Thus, in practice,
the private-facts tort is used only where the publication consists of true facts.
28. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("Truth may not be the
subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned.");
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (justifying the protection of "some
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Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps,29 the Court reaffirmed
that any chilling of true speech was "antithetical to the First
Amendment's protection"30 and held that even a private figure libel plaintiff is constitutionally reqdired to prove that the speech at
issue is false in order to recover.3 1 If the constitutional requirement
of proof of falsity articulated in libel cases is extended
to privacy
32
cases, then the private-facts tort is unconstitutional.
Such an expansion seems imminent. The Supreme Court has
applied the requirement that a plaintiff prove falsity to the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress"3 and to the false light
branch of privacy. 4 While the Court has repeatedly refused requests to declare the private-facts tort unconstitutional, 5 it has
declared that, at a minimum, the press can publish with impunity
any "truthful information" of "public significance" which is "lawfalsehood" in order to protect truth or "speech that matters").
29. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
30. Id. at 777.
31. Id. at 767 (holding "a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also
showing that the statements at issue are false").
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Those who seek to use negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress to remedy breaches of confidence have
generally run into both constitutional and common law problems. As to common law
problems, see Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 Media L. Rep. 1759, 1762 (D.Minn. 1992)
(dismissing intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for publication of obituary in
breach of alleged promise to the contrary as conduct not "so outrageous as to be actionable
under this tort"); Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307, 310 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (dismissing
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as publication of child abuse report not
so outrageous as to state a claim at common law); Doe v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,
543 N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (affirming dismissal of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by rape victims whose faces and voices were not adequately disguised
in breach of defendant TV station's promise to do so because the conduct was not so extreme and outrageous as to meet common law requirements).
As to constitutional problems, see O'Connell v. Housatonic Valley Publishing Co., 1991
WL 258157, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 1991) (dismissing plaintiff's claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress based on the newspaper's alleged breach of promise of confidentiality as to identity of source in reporting on horse cruelty charge as barred by the First
Amendment).
34. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975) (holding "where
the interest at issue is privacy rather than reputation and the right claimed is to be free
from the publication of false or misleading information about one's affairs, the target of the
publication must prove knowing or reckless falsehood") (emphasis added)); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
35. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (noting that in its prior decisions the
Court had "carefully eschewed reaching [the] ultimate question" of whether a "truthful
publication [could ever] be punished"); Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 383 n.7 (finding that the case
presented "no question whether truthful publication ... could be constitutionally
punished").
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fully obtain[ed]. ' 3 6 Some commentators argue that the privatefacts tort may yet survive this constitutional pronouncement,37 but
a majority would declare it dead."s Thus one commentator has already held its "requiem"3 9 while another has declared it to be alive
"only in the minds of academics. ' 40 Given this bleak future, some
have advocated that American courts take a second look at breach
of confidence and assess its ability to protect privacy, 41 especially
in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Cohen that the First
Amendment is no bar to an action for breach of a promise of
confidentiality.4 2
C.

The English Experience

As we have noted, Warren and Brandeis believed that an action for breach of confidence was narrower than their proposed privacy tort because breach of confidence requires the presence of a
36. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97, 103 (1979)) ("[IN a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish the publication of the
information absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."); cf. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469 (holding First Amendment prohibits punishment of the press when
it publishes truthful information contained in official court records open to public
inspection).
37. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Reflections On The Value Of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 699, 702-03 (1991) ("This may mean that the tort of invasion of privacy, in this pure
sense of disclosure of accurate private information, cannot survive New York Times and
Gertz. The Court, however, is quite unlikely to so hold."); see also Susan M. Gilles, All
Truths Are Equal, But Are Some Truths More Equal Than Others, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 725 (1991).
38. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 291; Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v.
Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of JusticeBlack, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1195, 1223 (1990) (arguing
that Florida Star marks the end of the privacy tort); Bezanson, supra note 3, at 1172-73;
Harvey, supra note 11, at 2414 (stating that the Supreme Court's holdings "have adopted an
increasingly inflexible position that ultimately renders a plaintiff victory over the press implausible if not impossible"). Justice White apparently agrees, characterizing the majority
opinion in Florida Star as, in effect, "obliterat[ing] . . . the tort of the publication of private facts." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting).
39. Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 291.
40. Bezanson, supra note 3, at 1169. For a list of lethal epithets which commentators
have heaped on the private-facts tort, see Harvey, supra note 11, at 2402.
41. See supra note 3; see also Harvey, supra note 11, at 2425 (stating that "this Comment advocates the internment of the common law private-facts tort, and the adoption of a
new approach to privacy protection, the proposed breach of confidence tort").
The Court's ruling in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), imposing a
falsity requirement on the emotional distress tort, effectively*precludes privacy plaintiffs
from using this remedy. Thus, if the private-facts tort is declared dead, breach of confidence
may be the only option left for plaintiffs seeking a remedy for the publication of private
personal facts.
42. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
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"contract or special confidence" between the parties. 43 There must
be some relationship between the breach of confidence plaintiff
and defendant, and it is this relationship which triggers liability.
Thus, while the private-facts tort focuses on the nature of the information published, the breach of confidence action focuses on
the parties' obligations to each other.45
Nonetheless, as English law illustrates, the requirement of a
relationship does not make breach of confidence a "narrow" remedy.46 The English courts have held that a duty of confidence can
be created by contract, the pre-existing relations of the parties, or
"the unilateral imposition of such a duty by the confider telling the
confidant that the information is given 'in confidence.' ,47 Where a
breach of confidence is shown, the courts will grant injunctive relief (including a prior restraint),4 s damages or restitution.49
43. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 210-11.
44. A defendant is liable under the private-facts tort if she publishes information which
the tort defines as private. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1976). The
private-facts tort does not require a relationship between the litigants, but permits the
plaintiff to sue a stranger. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213 (describing privacy as
one of the "rights against the world"); see also Robert Post, The Social Foundationsof
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 979 (1989)
("The public disclosure tort regulates forms of communication rather than behavior.").
45. As a British Commission explained, breach of confidence "protects the relationship
rather than the information". PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS Comm., REPORT 33 (1990); see
also Vickery, supra note 11, at 1440 ("Privacy is a right against the public at large .... In
contrast, a right to confidentiality exists against a specific person, who, by virtue of his
relationship to the confider, has notice of the duty to preserve the secrecy of clearly identifiable information.").
46. For summaries of the English law on breach of confidence, see LAW COmm'N,
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE REPORT (1981) [hereinafter LAW ComM'N REPORT]; Tom CRONE, LAW

AND THE MEDIA 83-94 (1991); Gareth Jones, Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of

Another's Confidence, 86 L. Q. REV. 463 (1970); M.P. Thompson, Breach of Confidence and
the Protection of Privacy in English Law, 6 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 5 (1985).
47. Marcel v. Commissioner of Police, [1992] 1 All E.R. 72 ("[A] duty of confidence has
been held to arise from contract, from the relationship of the parties (e.g. husband and wife,
priest and penitent) and from the unilateral imposition of such a duty by the confider telling the confidant that the information is given 'in confidence.' "); see also Attorney-General
v. Guardian Newspapers, [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109 (H.L. 1988) (Lord Goff of Chieveley):
[A] duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to
have agreed, that the information is confidential, with the effect that it would be
just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded from disclosing the information to others.
Id. at 281.
48. See Schering Chemicals Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd., 1982 Q.B. 1 (1981) (restraining television station from broadcasting documentary); Hubbard v. Vosper, 2 Q.B. 84, 95 (1972)
(Denning, M.R.) ("[T]he law will, in a proper case, intervene to restrain a defendant from
revealing information or other like material obtained in confidence."); Duchess of Argyll v.
Duke of Argyll, [1967] 1 Ch. 302 (1964) (restraining newspaper from publishing Duke's ac-
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An express contract of secrecy obviously creates a duty of confidence,5 0 but even where a contract does not contain such an express term, the English courts have sometimes implied such a duty
and punished any revelation as a breach of confidence.51 For instance, when a journalist was hired by a public relations firm to
work on a project (helping a drug company counter negative publicity),5 2 and got the idea for a documentary from that work, he
was held to be bound by an implied promise of confidentiality to
the drug company.5 3 Finding that he had breached that obligation
in making the documentary, the Court of Appeals enjoined its
count of his marital life).
49. In Guardian Newspaper, Lord Goff of Chieveley stated:
The plaintiff may be entitled to either an accounting of the profits or damages.
[Defendant] would be held liable to account for any profits made by him from his
wrongful disclosure ... and, in cases where damages were regarded as the appropriate remedy, the confidant would be liable to compensate the confider for any
damage, present or future, suffered by him by reason of his wrong.
GuardianNewspapers, [1990] 1 App. Cas. at 288.
In cases concerning the publication of private facts, the courts have indicated that an
accounting of profits is appropriate. Id. at 255 (Lord Keith of Kinkel) ("If a profit has been
made through the revelation in breach of confidence of details of a person's private life it is
appropriate that the profit should be accounted for to that person."). Courts have not ruled
on whether damages for emotional distress are available. LAW COMM'N REPORT, supra note
46, at 67-68 (availability of damages for emotional distress is undecided).
50. See, e.g., Mainmet Holdings PLC v. Austin, 1991 F.S.R. 538; ING Numismatic
Group SA v. D'Armenia, (C.A. judgment of Aug. 16, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen library); Guardian Newspapers, [1990] 1 App. Cas. at 109; Seager v. Copydex Ltd., [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923
(C.A. 1967).
51. See, e.g., Initial Servs. Ltd. v. Putterhill, [1968] 1 Q.B. 396 (C.A. 1968) (Denning,
M.R.) (finding obligation of confidentiality implied into every employment contract); see
also GuardianNewspapers, [1990] 1 App. Cas. at 255 (Lord Keith of Kinkel) ("The obligation [of confidence] may be imposed by an express or implied term in a contract.").
52. Schering Chemicals Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd., 1982 Q.B. 1 (1981). The drug company,
Schering Chemicals, had manufactured a drug which was suspected of causing severe birth
defects. Id. at 23 (Shaw, L.J.) To counter negative publicity, Schering retained a public
relations firm, Falkman Ltd., to train Schering executives on how to field questions from the
press. Falkman then hired several broadcasters and journalists to help in the training, including journalist David Elstein. Id. at 24-25 (Shaw, L.J.).
53. Schering Chemicals, 1982 Q.B. at 36-37 (Templeman, L.J.) (stating that even if
Elstein did not make an express promise himself, he impliedly made such a promise when
he agreed to work for Schering). Moreover, a majority of the judges found it irrelevant that
Elstein had re-created all the information he had gained at Schering from outside public
sources:
[T]hough facts may be widely known, they are not ever present in the minds of
the public. To extend the knowledge or to revive the recollection of matters which
may be detrimental or prejudicial to the interest of some person or organization is
not to be condoned because the facts are already known to some and linger in the
memories of others.
Id. at 28 (Shaw, L.J.); see also id. at 37 (Templeman, L.J.).
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broadcast.54 Moreover, just as in Prince Albert's case, the injunction ran not just against the breaching party (the journalist), but
also against the third party recipient of the information (here a
television station which had funded and proposed to air the documentary). 5 The English courts have held that "[e]ven if [the third
party] comes by [information] innocently, nevertheless, once he
gets to know that it was originally given in confidence, he can be
restrained from breaking that confidence." 56
Even when no contract (actual or implied) exists, English law
will imply a duty of confidence from the circumstances in which
the information is communicated. 7 The courts have held that the
communication of information within traditional confidential relations-employer/employee, 5s lawyer/client, 59 doctor/patientO and
priest/penitent61-triggers a duty of confidence.6 2 Beyond this, the
54. Id. at 29 (Shaw, L.J.); see id. at 40 (Templeman, L.J.).
55. Id. at 40 (Templeman, L.J.) ("Thames Television cannot knowingly take advantage
of that breach of duty by Mr. Elstein.").
56. Fraser v. Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349, 361 (Denning, M.R.); see also LAW Comr. REPORT, supra note 46, at 25 ("The third party is liable to be restrained from disclosing or
using the information which he knows, or it would seem, he ought to know was subject to an
obligation of confidence."); Schering Chemicals, 1982 Q.B. 1 (1981) (restraining television
station from showing documentary because breach of confidence led to information used in
its making); Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1967] 1 Ch. 302 (1964) (restraining newspaper from publishing husband's version of the couple's stormy relationship because husband's revelations were in breach of confidence).
57. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109, 268 (H.L. 1988)
(Lord Griffiths) (finding that there is a breach of confidence if "the information ... ha[s]
the necessary quality of confidence about it[, was] imparted in circumstances importing an
obligation of confidence" and is then used to the detriment of the party communicating it).
58. English courts have sometimes suggested that there is an obligation of confidence
inherent in every employment relationship. See Initial Servs. Ltd. v. Putterhill, [1968] 1
Q.B. 396, 405 (C.A. 1967) (Denning, M.R.). The assertion that "in some employments there
is an obligation of confidence" is probably a more accurate statement of current law. Woodward v. Hutchins, 1 W.L.R. 760, 763 (1977). However, the English courts, like the United
States Supreme Court, have consistently concluded that employment in any type of high
level government position triggers an obligation of confidence. See, e.g., Attorney-General v.
Guardian Newspapers, [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109 (H.L. 1988) (holding that secret service agent
owed common law duty of confidence); Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd., [1976] Q.B.
752 (holding that cabinet minister owed an obligation of confidence not to reveal cabinet
discussions).
59. See, e.g., In re A Firm of Solicitors, [1992] 1 All E.R. 353, 359 (C.A. 1991) ("A
solicitor can be restrained as a matter of absolute obligation ... from disclosing any secrets
which are confidentially reposed in him.").
60. See, e.g., In re C (a Minor), [1991] 2 F.L.R. 478 (finding general duty of confidence
owed by doctor to her patient); X v. Y, [1988] 2 All E.R. 648 (Q.B. 1987) (stating that
hospital and its employees have obligation not to reveal that patients, themselves doctors,
had AIDS).
61. Marcel v. Commissioner of Police, [1991] 1 All E.R. 845, 853 (Ch. 1990), overruled
on other grounds, [1992] 1 All E.R. 72 (1991).
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English courts have imposed an obligation of confidence in a wide
variety of relationships where the circumstances of disclosure, in
the courts' view, merit protection. 3 For instance, the courts have
found a breach of confidence in the following situations: where a
husband proposed to reveal his marital secrets; 61 where a woman
disclosed the revelations of a close friend;6 5 and, where a litigant
revealed information produced during discovery in a civil case. e6
Other examples abound. 7
The courts have suggested that the mere receipt of information, once confidentiality is requested and not expressly refused,
triggers a duty not to disclose.6 8 Thus the unrebuffed, unilateral
62. See Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109, 255 (H.L.
1988) (Lord Keith of Kinkel) ("The law has long recognized that an obligation of confidence
can arise out of particular relationships. Examples are the relationships of doctor and patient, priest and penitent, solicitor and client, banker and customer.").
63. Id. at 281 (Lord Goff of Chieveley) (finding that existence of duty of confidence
depends on whether "it would be just in all the circumstances that [confidant] should be
precluded from disclosing the information to others").
64. See, e.g., Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1967] 1 Ch. 302, 329 (1964) (Ungoed-Thomas, J.) ("It thus seems to me that policy of the law, so far from indicating that
communication between husband and wife should be excluded from protection against
breaches of confidence. . . strongly favours its inclusion."). However, one court, in an unreported decision, refused to find a confidential relationship between homosexual lovers. See
Stephens v. Avery, [1988] 1 Ch. 449, 456 (stating a prior court had denied an injunction
where a male barrister sued to prevent a tabloid newspaper, The Sun, from printing the
revelations of his male lover, concluding that an obligation of confidence was not triggeredby what that court characterized as a "transient homosexual relationship").
65. Stephens, [1988] 1 Ch. 449. In this case a womah, after requesting her friend to
keep her story confidential, confided the details of her prior lesbian relationships, including
one with a recently murdered woman. The court held that an obligation of confidence existed, thereby making it an actionable wrong for the friend to relate the story to a newspaper. The case proceeded simply on the allegation that: "The plaintiff prefaced the said discussions with the statement that this was being told to the [defendant friend] in confidence,
and that it was to go no further. The [defendant friend] indicated her understanding and
assent, and purported to be indignant that the Plaintiff should so indicate." Id. at 456; see
also Andersen Consulting v. CHP Consulting Ltd., 1991 Ch. (July 26, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen library) (revelation of information learned in friendship is subject to action for breach of
confidence).
66. Distillers Co. v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1975] 1 Q.B. 613, 621.
67. See, e.g., Marcel v. Commissioner of Police, [1991] 1 All E.R. 845, 853 (1990) (holding that police owed obligation of confidence to owner of seized documents, but allowed to
reveal them in response to subpoena in a civil action); Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape
Ltd., [1976] 1 Q.B. 752 (1975) (holding that cabinet minister owes duty of confidence to
government); Seager v. Copydex, Ltd., [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 (C.A.) (finding obligation of
confidence existed between parties to pre-contractual negotiations); Tournier v. National
Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.) (holding banker owes duty of confidence
to customer); Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, [1919] 1 K.B. 520 (C.A.) (holding that accountant
owes duty to client).
68. Stephens, [1988] 1 Ch. at 456; Marcel, [1991] 1 All E.R. at 845 (finding that a
unilateral assertion that information is given in confidence creates a duty of non-disclosure
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assertion that information is being given in confidence may create
a duty of confidence in the recipient. As one Law Lord has explained, "the law of confidence

. . .

is judge made law and reflects

the willingness of the judges to give a remedy to protect people
from being taken advantage of by those they have trusted with
confidential information."" e
Thus, as molded by the English courts, breach of confidence is
far from the narrow remedy painted by Warren and Brandeis. The
English experience suggests that those complaining of the publication of private facts should consider abandoning the traditional
route of the private-facts tort, and instead pursue the less travelled
road of breach of confidence. The following section discusses the
extent to which American courts have already begun to venture
down this road.
II.

BREACH OF CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES-THREE
THEORIES OF RECOVERY

While the English courts have been generous in granting remedies to breach of confidence plaintiffs, those same courts have
been frugal in their explanation of the basis of that remedy. Most
commentators conclude that breach of confidence, as developed in
England, is in fact a tort, albeit one that has its roots in contract
and fiduciary law.70 This Article contends that American law is in
in the recipient), overruled on other grounds, [1992] 1 All E.R. 72 (1991); see also AttorneyGeneral v. Guardian Newspapers, [1990] App. Cas. 109 (H.L. 1988):
[a] duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to
have agreed, that the information is confidential, with the effect that it would be
just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded from disclosing the information to others.
Id. at 281 (Lord Goff of Chieveley); Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 95 (Denning,
M.R.) ("He who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of
it.").
69. GuardianNewspapers, [1990] 1 Cas. App. at 267 (Lord Griffiths); see also Fraser v.
Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349, 361 (C.A. 1968) (Denning, M.R.) ("[N]o person is permitted to
divulge to the world information he has received in confidence, unless he has just cause or
excuse for so doing.").
70. See, e.g., Vickery, supra note 11, at 1453 (characterizing the English action as a
tort, but admitting that its doctrinal principles have become "somewhat confused"). English
breach of confidence law is a theoretical enigma. Jones, supra note 46, at 463 (stating that
the law suffers from "great conceptual confusion"); LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46
(including a section entitled, revealingly, Uncertainty As To The FundamentalPrinciples
On Which The Action For Breach Of Confidence Is Based). The courts have repeatedly
asserted that breach of confidence is an equitable remedy; nonetheless, one commentator
has noted it rests upon "an amalgam of doctrines drawn from contract, tort and equity."
W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWITZ ON TORT 528 (11th ed. 1979). A growing body of
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the process of recognizing three distinct theories-contract, fiduci-

ary duty and perhaps tort-which can be used to found an action
against a confidant who reveals information.7 1 The following sections do not purport to definitively address all the contract and
fiduciary duty ramifications of a breach of confidence action, but
rather record some of the limitations the courts have faced when
seeking to use these theories to redress breaches of confidence.
A. Contractual Theories of Recovery
1. Introduction. Express written contracts, binding the
signer to hold information confidential, have long been used in the
commercial area, particularly by employers to prevent employees
from revealing business secrets. 72 The last decade, however, has
witnessed efforts to use contract theory to remedy breaches of oral
promises of confidence outside the employment setting-the most
famous being Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 7 3 In Cohen, a source,
scholarly criticism has urged the re-characterization of breach of confidence as a tort. In fact
the Law Commission appointed to examine the law on breach of confidence recommended
that a tort of breach of confidence be created so as to remedy the quagmire of doubt which
surrounds the action, LAW COMM'N REPORT, supra note 46, § 6.5, at 103, but so far neither
the courts nor the legislature have responded.
71. See supra note 9-11 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., 2 RUDOLPH CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES § 14.04, at 25 n.11 & Supp. § 14.04, at 234-35 (Louis Altman ed., 4th ed.

1994 & Supp. 1994). An employee is prohibited from revealing trade secrets by both criminal and civil law even where no contract exists, but a confidentiality contract can be used to
extend this obligation by requiring the employee not to disclose information which does not
rise to the level of a trade secret. Id.
73. 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), affd in part and rev'd in part, 457
N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991), on remand to 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn.
1992). The tortuous passage of Cohen through state and federal courts is worth reciting.
Cohen filed suit in Minnesota state court for breach of contract and misrepresentation. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The jury found in
Cohen's favor on both counts and awarded him $200,000 in compensatory damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages. Id. The award withstood several post trial motions, but the
trial court's opinions are'not reported. The defendant newspapers appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals which reversed the misrepresentation claim, holding that no cause of
action had been made out under state law, but upheld the breach of contract claim. Id. at
252.
The case was then appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court where the court affirmed
the dismissal of the misrepresentation claim and held that no contract claim had been made
out under state law. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990). However, during oral argument the issue of promissory estoppel surfaced. Id. at 203 n.5. The
Minnesota Supreme Court felt compelled to opine that even if such a claim could be made
out by Cohen, it would be precluded by the First Amendment. Id. at 205.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled that the First Amendment did not preclude recovery under a promissory estoppel theory. Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 663 (1991). The Court did not reinstate the jury verdict, but rather re-
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promised anonymity by two newspapers, sued for breach of contract when they published his name. Plaintiff's effort to use pure
contract law to found an action for revealing confidences failed. 4
This section posits that, outside the realm of commercial relations,
contract law will often have little to offer a plaintiff who lacks a
written contract.
While Cohen failed to recover in pure contract, he did recover
under the related theory of promissory estoppel.7 5 This victory has
prompted others to found their claims in estoppel. The penultimate part of this section analyzes how successful such actions have
been.7
2. Breach of Confidence as Breach of Contract. a. When Do
Promises Count as Contracts?A plaintiff who wishes to sue in contract for a breach of confidence must prove a contract exists-that
there was an offer, acceptance and consideration." Where the
court is faced with a written agreement of confidentiality, typically
in the employment scenario, these elements rarely prove a problem
for the plaintiff.78 A classic, if somewhat unusual, illustration is
Snepp v. United States.79 On joining the CIA, Snepp signed a contract agreeing to keep CIA information secret and to submit any
writings to the CIA for review prior to publication." When Snepp

published his book, Decent Interval, without going through CIA
manded the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court for further action. On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Cohen had made out a promissory estoppel claim under
state law and awarded him the $200,000 in compensatory damages which the jury had originally awarded on the breach of contract and misrepresentation counts. Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992).
74. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 199.
75. Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 392.
76. See, e.g., Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 Media L. Rep. 1759 (D. Minn. 1992) (dismissing added claim of promissory estoppel); Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939
F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1991) (permitting the plaintiff to add a promissory estoppel claim
after the Cohen decision came down), vacated, 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Carl
Werner, Note, Collision Without Injury: Three Years After Cohen, Contract Principlesand
Freedom of The Press Co-Exist Nicely, 30 Hous. L. REV. 2085, 2100 (1994) (opining that
Cohen has caused only a "trickle" of promissory estoppel claims for broken promises).
77. See, e.g., JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 17, 18, 72 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
78. See, e.g., CALLMANN, supra note 72, § 14.04, at 25 n.11 & Supp. § 14.04, at 234-35.
Occasionally such suits fail for lack of consideration where an existing employee is asked to
sign a confidentiality agreement and no extra consideration is offered. Id.
79. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
80. Id. at 507-08 (finding that Snepp signed an agreement promising not to "publish
- . . any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his] employment without specific prior
approval by the Agency.").
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clearance, the government sued, inter alia, for breach of contract."1
The Supreme Court upheld the breach of contract claim."2 It concluded that Snepp was bound by his agreement not to publish
without CIA approval and imposed an injunction requiring him to
submit future works to the agency for review.83 In short, the written contract has long been an effective remedy for employers seeking to keep secrets.
The American courts have also reacted favorably to claims
that an existing contract contains an implied guarantee of confidentiality.8 4 Here there is no doubt that a contract exists between
the parties, but the contract lacks any express term requiring the
parties to keep information secret. In numerous cases, courts have
held that doctors' and psychiatrists' contracts with their patients
contain an implied term requiring that information disclosed by
the patient be kept confidential.8 5 Some courts have also implied
81. Id. at 508.
82. Id. at 510 (rejecting Snepp's argument that the breach of contract finding should be
overturned on First Amendment grounds).
83. Id. at 516 (reinstating trial court's judgment which enjoined any further breaches of
the agreement); see also United States v. Snepp, 897 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.) (denying Snepp's
petition to modify the injunction), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990). As discussed infra, the
Supreme Court did not award damages for Snepp's breach of contract because the information leaked was not commercial data but rather unclassified information on the war in Vietnam. As the Court noted: "the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's
generally are unquantifiable [and n]ominal damages are a hollow alternative." Snepp, 444
U.S. at 514.
84. See Vickery, supra note 11, at 1444.
85. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (implying a covenant of confidentiality into the doctor/patient contract); Mull v.
String, 448 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1984) (recognizing that plaintiff patient's complaint stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted because defendant physician's unauthorized disclosures were made to persons other than the defendant hospital and its attorney); Home v.
Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 831-32 (Ala. 1974) (holding that action against doctor who reveals
confidential information can be based on implied contract, as well as on privacy tort and
fiduciary duty); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 113 (Okla. 1988) (noting that "an implied guarantee of confidentiality exists when a doctor and his patient enter into a contract
for medical services," but finding a privilege to report to police); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446
N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that relationship between psychiatrist and patient was "one of trust and confidence out of which sprang a duty not to disclose"); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (noting that "the
physician-patient relationship itself gives rise to an implied covenant of confidence and
trust which is actionable when breached," but going on to assert that the action is better
founded in tort), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1989); Doe v.
Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (noting in the case of a psychiatrist that "a
physician who enters into an agreement with a patient to provide medical attention impliedly covenants to keep in confidence all disclosures made by the patient concerning the
patient's physical or mental condition as well as all matters discovered by the physician in
the course of examination or treatment"); cf. Doe v. Shady Grove Adventist, 598 A.2d 507
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (although not recognizing a cause of action, the court granted an
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such a pledge of confidentiality into a bank's contract with its

depositor."'
Courts will imply a term in fact only when it is within the
actual expectation of the parties (gleaned from the terms of the
agreement, the parties conduct, the course of dealing or usage, and
from consideration of justice).,s In the doctor cases, for example,
the courts have emphasized the unique relationship between doctors and patients and implied an agreement of confidentiality from
the public's widespread expectation that the Hippocratic Oath
binds doctors to silence. 8
order allowing plaintiff to proceed as John Doe where the underlying claim was breach of
confidentiality by therapist who revealed plaintiff patient's HIV diagnosis); Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tenn. 1965) (stating that "the only possible sounding of this
lawsuit would be under allegations that there was an implied contract between the parties
that the results of the examination would remain confidential," but finding this argument
failed because there was no contract since the treatment was given free); Allen v. Smith, 368
S.E.2d 924, 928 (W.Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that "because of the likelihood of vexatious litigation in a profession that already has more than its fair share of lawsuits, we are
reluctant to recognize a general cause of action for the unauthorized disclosure of medical
records in the absence of conduct so outrageous as to shock the conscience," but finding a
cause of action in tort under a West Virginia statute).
86. Constitutional Defense v. Hubert Humphrey, No. 92-396, 1992 WL 164,734, at *6
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (applying Pennsylvania law and refusing a motion to dismiss claim for
breach of implied contractual duty not to disclose confidential records, predicting that
Pennsylvania may recognize such an action); Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that bank has an implied contractual duty not to disclose
customer's financial information) (cited with approval by the Florida Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986)); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367
P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (stating that "it is an implied term of the contract between a
banker and his customer that the banker will not divulge to third persons ... any information relating to customer acquired through the keeping of his account"); Indiana Nat'l Bank
v Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (bank impliedly contracts to keep information secret, but this is subject to an exemption for information given to police); Rush v.
Maine, 387 A.2d 1127 (Me. 1978) (holding that implied contractual term not to disclose
customer's financial data did not extend to disclosure of mortgage data to IRS); Suburban
Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (finding implied contractual
term that bank will keep account information confidential); see also Edward L. Raymond,
Annotation, Bank's Liability Under State Law For Disclosing FinancialInformation Concerning Depositor or Customer, 81 A.L.R. 4TH 377 (1992) (discussing contract, trust and tort
liability for disclosures by banks). For other decisions recognizing a tortious action or simply
declaring that a duty of confidence exists without discussing its source, see infra note 245
for New York cases and infra notes 249-51 for other states' cases.
87. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.16, at 523-25 (1982).
88. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 ("Almost every member of the public is aware of
the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right
to rely on this warranty of silence."); Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 673-74 (citing the Hippocratic
Oath and the medical ethics of the American Medical Association and concluding that an
implied term of confidentiality exists in a psychiatrist's contract with her patient). Banking
cases likewise cite to the ethics of the banking profession, federal regulations limiting disclosure and the public's privacy expectation as the basis for implying such a term. See, e.g.,
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Based on these decisions, perhaps lawyers and other professional care-givers implicitly promise confidentiality when they contract with their clients. However, the courts may well refuse to imply such a term in the absence of a special relationship. The
reported cases emphasize the unique fiduciary relationship of doctor/patient89 Thus, contracts with libraries, video stores or even
employers and insurers will probably not be held to contain an implied term requiring them to keep personal data secret.
While contract claims have succeeded in the limited scenarios
discussed above, if it is to prove an effective remedy for those who
seek to recover for the publication of personal private facts, it
must extend to oral promises of confidentiality made in a wide variety of social settings. For instance, a source promised anonymity
by a reporter,9 0 a murder witness promised confidentiality by the
Peterson, 367 P.2d at 289-90.
89. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 793 (considering contract, tort, fiduciary principles,
public policy and privilege statutes as the source of the doctor's duty not to disclose); Peterson, 367 P.2d at 284 (resting liability on implied contract but also discussing the private
facts tort and agency theories); Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 668 (canvassing implied statutory action, contract and tort law as bases for liability); see Raymond, supra note 86, at 377 (discussing that while most banking cases proceed on an implied contract theory, some rest on
agency or tort grounds); Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician Tort Liability For Unauthorized Disclosure Of Confidential InformationAbout Patient, 48 A.L.R. 4TH 668 (1993) (arguing that these cases demonstrate that an action lies in tort as well as in contract); see also
supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text (discussing a tort action).
90. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), rev'g 457 N.W.2d 199
(Minn. 1990); Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1991)
(dismissing contract action brought by plaintiff, the subject of a magazine article on sexual
abuse, for author's revelation of plaintiff's identity in breach of promise that she would be
unidentifiable), vacated, 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993); Doe v. ABC, 543 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App.
Div. 1989) (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on alleged promise by TV station that plaintiffs' faces would be
unrecognizable during a program on rape victims, allowing the action to proceed on grounds
of breach of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress).
Claims against the media for breaching promises of anonymity or confidentiality seem
to be increasing, but as yet, except for those cited in this Article, they seemingly are not
litigated under a breach of confidence theory. See, e.g., Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp.
307 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs who alleged that a
newspaper breached a promise that statements concerning child's sexual abuse were "off the
record" and sued under private-facts tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
fraud); O'Connell v. Housatonic Valley Publishing, No. 0055284, 1991 WL 258,157 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 1991) (granting defendant summary judgment against plaintiff's claim
based on intentional infliction of emotional distress when newspaper allegedly breached
promise of anonymity); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. App. 1994)
(upholding judgment in favor of plaintiff under private-facts theory who sued after he was
identifiable during a TV show despite the media's promise that he would be unrecognizable); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (involving
newspaper and doctor who allegedly breached promise that photograph of AIDS patient
would not be identifiable; while the plaintiff was successful in his tort based breach of confi-
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police,91 and a woman who reveals that she has AIDS to a trusted

friend, 92 all wish a remedy if these promises are broken. Efforts to
use contract to remedy these breaches of confidence have largely
failed, and it appears that the further we move from the commer-

cial setting, the more difficult it becomes for a breach of confidence
plaintiff to convince a court that an oral promise of confidentiality
constitutes an enforceable contract.
First, the courts have often questioned whether there is consideration where oral commitments of secrecy are made.9 3 In cases
where a reporter is the recipient of confidential information, the
courts have generally held consideration to be present.9 4 Consider-

ation is found in the exchange of promises-the confider offers information, conditioned on confidentiality, and this offer is accepted
dence claim against the doctor and hospital, his claim for invasion of privacy against the
medical defendants and newspaper were dismissed as was the claim for libel against the
newspaper), aff'd, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1989).
91. Keltner v. Washington, 800 P.2d 752 (Or. 1990).
92. This specific factual scenario has not yet arisen. There are however a growing body
of cases where HIV- and AIDS-infected persons file claims, under a variety of theories,
against those who reveal their identity. See, e.g., Multimedia WMAZ, 443 S.E.2d at 491
(upholding recovery by AIDS patient against TV station under private-facts tort for breaching promise to disguise patient's face during broadcast); Doe v. Methodist Hosp,, 639
N.E.2d 683 (Ind. App. 1994) (affirming grant of summary judgment to one of the defendants
in private facts tort action as the defendant's disclosure to two of plaintiff's co-workers that
plaintiff was HIV-positive did riot give "publicity" to his private life); Doe v. Shady Grove
Adventist Hosp., 598 A.2d 507 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (granting closure of court record
to AIDS-diagnosed patient in his lawsuit against hospital and medical personnel to prevent
disclosure of his identity); Anderson, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (affirming denial of motion to dismiss HIV patient's claim for breach of confidence against hospital and its employees when
his face was published by newspaper). For an extensive discussion of the statutory and common law requirements relating to HIV and AIDS related information, see Doughty, supra
note 15.
93. As defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "[tlo constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for," and such a return promise
is bargained for "if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by
the promisee in exchange for that promise." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 71
(1981).
94. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1990) ("A contract, it is
said, consists of an offer, an acceptance, and consideration. Here we seemingly have all
three, plus a breach."), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). Of course, if the plaintiff does not have
information to barter in return for the promise of confidentiality, there is no consideration.
See Anderson, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 831 (noting that a reporter has effectively contracted to keep
the plaintiff's identity secret where "the three dimension4 of contract law, offer, acceptance
and consideration, were all met"). But see Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 Media L. Rep.
1759 (D. Minn. 1992). In Sirany, the court dismissed a contract claim against a newspaper
that had promised not to run an obituary (printed after a feuding family member had ordered it) due to a lack of consideration. In determining the lack of consideration, the court
clarified that "[b]asically, consideration is to an enforceable contract what the orange orb is
to basketball-without it you just don't have a real game." Id. at 1761.
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by the confidant. Consideration to the confider is the promise of
confidentiality, while consideration to the confidant is the promise
of information.9 5 However, other breach of confidence plaintiffs
may be unable to prove this element. 9 For instance, where a plaintiff confides to her "friend" that she has AIDS and the friend
talks, finding consideration is more difficult. As one commentator
remarked: "Conceivably friends could agree at the outset of their
relationship that anything said in confidence between them would
not be publicly disclosed. In that case the mutual exchange of
promises, might, though 9' it7 will not necessarily, satisfy the requirements of consideration.
The courts have also been reluctant to characterize non-commercial promises of confidentiality as offer and acceptance capable
of forming a contract, citing both a lack of intention to contract
and the vague and ambiguous nature of the agreement. It is wellsettled that "[tihe law . . .does not create a contract where the
parties intended none."9 " Thus in Cohen the Minnesota Supreme
95. Timothy J. Fallon, Note, Stop The Presses: Reporter-Source Confidentiality
Agreements and the Case for Enforcement, 33 B.C. L. REV. 599, 610 (1992).
96. For an illustration, see Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 1965). In
Quarles the court denied a breach of confidence claim based on an implied term of confidence where the plaintiff who was injured in a store was treated by the store's doctor. The
court held that because the doctor "was not the plaintiff's doctor nor did [plaintiff] at any
time attempt to compensate him for his services" no contract existed. Id. at 252.
97. See Katz, supra note 15, at 844-45 & n.147; see also Harvey, supra note 11, at 242729 & n.206.
98. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. As with all "hornbook law," the simplistic formulation
hides a wealth of profound disagreement. Older authorities required parties to a contract to
have a subjective intent to enter a legally binding contract. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CLARK,
CLARK ON CONTRACTS § 27, at 53 (4th ed. 1931); SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 4 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 5th ed. 1930). This position is not without its
modern proponents. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems With Contract as Promise, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1027 (1992) (stating that contract is founded on "a manifested intention to be legally bound"). The predominate modern approach, however, set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and advocated by Corbin, Williston, Murray and Farnsworth, argues that subjective intent to create a legally binding arrangement is not an
essential element of contract, except in non-commercial settings. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 21 & cmt. c (1981) ("Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be
legally binding is essential to the formulation of a contract," but "in some situations [social
engagements and domestic arrangements] the normal understanding is that no legal obligation arises, and some unusual manifestation of intention is necessary to create a contract.");
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 34 (1963); FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, § 3.6;
MURRAY, supra note 77, § 20; SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 35, at 229-31 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990).
The scope of the social engagements exception, where even these authors require a
manifestation of intent to be legally bound, is unclear. CORBIN,supra, § 34, at 141 (stating
that the line of division can be "determined only by inductive study and comparison of what
the courts have done in the past"). Corbin advocates assessing whether the subject matter
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Court rejected a source's contract claim because "[w]e are not persuaded that in the special milieu of media newsgathering a source
and a reporter ordinarily believe they are engaged in making a legally binding contract."9 Although promises are exchanged, so far
the courts have viewed the reporter and her source as not intending to agree to a legally binding contract given the non-commercial setting in which the promises occur.' 00
and terms of the agreement are such as customarily have affected legal relations. If not, then
"the transaction is not legally operative unless the expressions of the parties indicate an
intention to make it so." Id. § 34, at 138; see also WILLISTON, supra, § 35, at 230 ("Even
though one requests certain actions or services by another, no contract will necessarily be
created if the latter should reasonably understand from the circumstances that the party
making the request has no intention to contract and is therefore justified in assuming that
no legally enforceable obligations are involved.").
The Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion in Cohen that no contract existed because
the source and reporter had no intention to create a contract may be an assertion of the
older common law rule positing intent as a universally essential element, or it may be a
conclusion that the circumstances of the agreement fell within the "social engagements"
exception to the modern rule and, thus, a manifestation of intent was required. This latter
position is supported by the court's characterization of the circumstances of the relationship
of reporters and their sources as unique. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203 (discussing "the special
milieu of media newsgathering"). Thus, even if we adopt the predominate modern approach,
so long as the courts are willing to characterize the reporter/source relation as a non-commercial one, the contract claim will fail for lack of a manifested intent to create a legally
binding arrangement. See Fallon, supra note 95, at 612 (discussing fact that where parties
did not intend agreement to have legal significance, reporter-source parties could only be
protected by good faith and not contract law).
99. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203; see also Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939
F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991), vacated, 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993). In Ruzicka, the court relied
on the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion in Cohen that "promises of confidentiality
between journalists and sources are not legally enforceable under Minnesota law because
such parties do not intend a binding contract." Id. at 582; see also Fallon, supra note 95, at
612.
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Three problems with the Minnesota
Supreme Court's reasoning may cause other states to reach the opposite conclusion; that is,
that a reporter/source agreement does constitute a contract. First, the Minnesota court may
have made a faulty presumption about the nature of dealings between reporters and their
sources, especially political sources. As one commentator has noted, political sources are
very sophisticated in their dealings with reporters, and "[a] particularized vocabulary has
developed, especially among Washington journalists and politicians, to characterize the different degrees of confidentiality available to sources." Lili Levi, DangerousLiaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in ConfidentialPress-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 622 n.39
(1991). Second, Cohen's adamant refusal to hand over the information until confidentiality
was expressly agreed to by each reporter seems to rise to the level of an "unusual manifestation of intent" to contract which would create a contract even in a social setting. See infra
notes 144-46 and accompanying text. Third, the court's holding may be a self-fulfilling
prophecy-its refusal to enforce the promise as contract, may cause future reporter/sources
not to expect that their promises will be legally enforced. If the court had viewed the
promises as contractually binding, then reporters and sources would rapidly have learned
that their words would be legally binding and thus could be taken to have intended to
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While other courts could arguably reach the opposite conclusion (that reporters and their sources do intend to create a legal
contract when promises of confidentiality are exchanged), the same
cannot be said in the "friend scenario." Where one friend tells another of her exposure to AIDS on condition that it be kept quiet, it
is unlikely that the parties will be found to have the necessary intent to create a legal contract. 10 1 It is in just these social settings
that the courts are most reluctant to conclude that the parties intend to form a binding legal contract. 10 2 Thus, the farther the
plaintiff strays from contract's commercial paradigm, the heavier
the burden on the plaintiff to prove the intent necessary to state a
claim in contract.
An additional problem for some breach of confidence plaintiffs
is the requirement that the terms of the offer and acceptance be
"reasonably certain."'
Even where formal written contracts have
been agreed to-for instance, by those producing a documentary-any ambiguities have been construed in favor of allowing a
flow of information. 04 Where oral promises are concerned, the opportunity for ambiguity is greater. In reporter cases, some courts
have been troubled by a lack of certainty as to what was agreed
to. 05 For instance, while in Cohen the Minnesota Supreme Court
contract whenever a promise of anonymity was made.
101. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.

102. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 21 cmt. c (1981) (stating that

the normal understanding is that no legal obligation arises when parties exchange promises
in social and domestic settings and thus some unusual manifestation of an intent to contract
must occur).
103. The Restatement sets forth certainty as follows:
(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an
offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain. (2) The terms of a contact are reasonably certain if
they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 33 (1981); see also CORBIN, supra note 98, § 95 ("A

court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is."); WILLISTON, supra note
98, § 4.18, at 414 ("It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding,
must be sufficiently definite to enable the courts to give it an exact meaning.").
104. See, e.g., Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 803 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Miss.
1992) (finding a contract by interviewee with broadcasting company ambiguous and construing it in favor of allowing distribution). The court ruled that:
unless the contracting parties have clearly promised to limit the flow of information . . . an ambiguous contract should be read in a way that allows viewership
and encourages debate. This is no more than the basic rule of interpretation found
in the Restatement which favors a reading in the public interest.
Id. at 1177.
105. See, e.g., Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn.
1990), aff'd and remanded by 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). The trial court found that no
breach of contract was proven where the terms were ambiguous. The court, however, based
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found a promise of anonymity clear, 06 a later federal court decision concluded that a reporter's promise that the plaintiff would be
"unidentifiable" was too vague to be enforceable. 107 Thus plaintiffs,
who desire to bind reporters to secrecy, should be explicit as to
which information will be kept confidential. In the friend scenario,
the promises can also be too vague to be enforceable; for instance,
a request to "keep this quiet" is of uncertain scope, especially
when it precedes a lengthy conversation on a variety of topics. Just
what degree of confidence has been promised and about what?
Even if the uncertainty of the terms is not sufficient per se to defeat a claim that a contract exists, it will often strengthen an argu10 8
ment that the contract is invalid for lack of intent to contract.
These barriers are not insuperable. As we have discussed, one
obvious mechanism is to reduce the promise to writing. A written
agreement to keep a confidence seems to preclude any claim that
there was no intent to contract and minimizes the chances that the
terms are vague or unprovable. 10 Therefore, as a practical matter,
if a source/friend wishes to ensure that the remedies of contract
law are available to her, she should draft a formal agreement of
its ruling not on pure contract but on constitutional theory. Construing the contract as a
waiver of First Amendment rights, the court found its lack of clarity to be fatal: "The Court
concludes that, at a minimum, the Constitution requires plaintiffs in contract actions to
enforce a reporter source agreement to prove specific, unambiguous terms and to provide
clear and convincing proof that the agreement was breached." Id. at 1300. Subsequently, on
remand the district court considered what degree of certainty was required for a promissory
estoppel claim. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 303 (D. Minn. 1992),
vacated, 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:An
Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 284 (1971) (noting that, generally, agreements of
confidentiality by reporters are vague in their terms).
106. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990) (stating that "in
this case at least we have a clear-cut promise"), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
107. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 794 F.Supp. 303, 309 (D. Minn. 1992)
(stating that "the court concludes that the promise not to make plaintiff indentifiable was
insufficiently clear and definite to support recovery on a promissory estoppel theory"), rev'd,
999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(3) (1981) ("The fact that one or
more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation
of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.").
109. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 15, at 843-45 (advocating that celebrities request their
employees to sign confidentiality contracts). For an example of a breach of confidence action
based on a written contract, see Huskey v. NBC, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Il. 1986)
(involving an inmate in a federal penitentiary who defeated a motion to dismiss his third
party beneficiary breach of contract claim based on an agreement between the prison and
the television company not to film prisoners without their consent). This would also defeat
any argument that the contract was invalid on Statute of Frauds grounds. See Harvey,
supra note 11, at 2427 n.206 (arguing that a contract based action for breach of confidence
may face Statute of Frauds problems).
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confidentiality. 110 Equally, consumers should pressure libraries,
videostores and photographers to include promises of confidentiality in their contracts. In the absence of such a step, the courts have
so far proved reluctant to conclude that oral promises of confidentiality constitute enforceable contracts, at least outside of the commercial setting.
b. The Remedies Available In Contract. Even when the
plaintiff can make out a claim in contract, the remedies offer little
recovery to breach of confidence plaintiffs whose main complaint is

the publication of private facts."1 The injuries such plaintiffs will

typically suffer as a result of a breach of confidence fall into three
categories: loss of income, loss of reputation, and mental distress." 2 Contract law is peculiarly ill-suited to compensate for
110. Such a move may be eminently impractical. It is hard to conceive of friends writing up a contract before they talk, or even reporters on a tight deadline having the inclination or the time to draft and sign a contract of confidentiality. See Peri Z. Hansen, Note,
According to an Unnamed Official: Reconsidering the Consequencesof Confidential Source
Agreements When Promises Are Broken by the Press, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 115, 164-65 (1992)
("[J]ournalists typically work under strict deadlines. These time constraints make the formation of an explicit contract impractical and unlikely.").
111. See Vickery, supra note 11, at 1445-46 (arguing that contract damages are inadequate to remedy breach of confidence).
112. See Gene Foreman, Confidential Sources: Testing the Readers Confidence, 10
Soc. RESP. Bus. JOURNALIsM L. MED. 24, 27 (1984) (arguing that breaches of confidentiality
usually put at risk the sources' "status in the community, their careers, perhaps even their
lives"); Vickery, supra note 11, at 1435 (suggesting that where intimate information is revealed "[t]he wronged party may suffer ridicule, loss of business or professional reputation
or deterioration of personal relationships").
These injuries are easily illustrated. For instance, in the reporter cases, the sources both
claimed that the revelation of their identities cost them their jobs. See Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991) ("[Cohen] sought damages in excess of $50,000 for a
breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity.");
Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D. Minn. 1992) (involving
plaintiff who claimed that the severe emotional distress caused by the breach of the agreement not to make her identifiable caused a deterioration of work performance which ultimately cost plaintiff her job), vacated, 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993).
A breach of confidence plaintiff may also suffer a loss of reputation. However, this claim
of loss of reputation is radically different from that made in either false light or libel cases.
There the claim is that false words have created a false image of the plaintiff. In breach of
confidence cases, the claim is that the truth has been revealed, destroying the presumably
more favorable, though false, image that society previously had of the plaintiff. Society may
have a much stronger interest in penalizing the destruction of a true public image than the
destruction of a false image.
Finally, in almost all non-commercial scenarios plaintiffs will suffer extensive emotional
distress. See id. at 305 (noting that "[p]laintiff claims that this breach caused her severe
emotional and mental distress"); Keltner v. Washington Co., 800 P.2d 752 (Or. 1990) (involving 14 year-old informant who revealed murderer's identity to police in return for promise of confidentiality and who suffered severe emotional distress when her identity was re-

26

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

these injuries. 115 Distinguishing general and special damages, 114 the
courts limit recovery of the latter to damages that "may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at
the time they made the contract, as the probable result of breach
'
of it.
"'1 5 Moreover, to be recoverable, special damages must be cal-

culable with reasonable certainty."' These two limitations, which7
have always caused contract plaintiffs to be undercompensated,"
vealed to the murderer); see also Vickery, supra note 11, at 1446 (stating that mental
distress is "the major injury in many breach of confidence cases").
113. In contract, the damages are usually aimed at protecting a plaintiff's expectation
interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (1981). That is, the plaintiff's
"interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been had the contract been performed." Id. § 344(a). The Second Restatement's recognition of reliance, in addition to expectation, as an interest underlying contract remedies
is usually traced to the seminal article of Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). For the history of the
growing recognition of reliance in the Second Restatement, see Robert Cooter & Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1432, 1476 (1985); Jay M.
Feinman, PromissoryEstoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV.L. REV. 678, 678-79 (1984);
Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991).
This shift has not been without controversy however, and the debate over whether expectation alone is the proper measure of damages in contract rages on. See, e.g., P. S.
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 754-64 (1979) (suggesting that the
reliance principle be substituted for expectation in the law of damages); Cooter & Eisenberg,
supra, at 1432 (responding to assaults on expectation as the proper measure of damages);
Morton J. Horowitz, The HistoricalFoundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 917 (1974); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 1755 (urging that reliance be abandoned as a measure of contract damages). This Article takes no position on the debate, but notes that because of the limitations
discussed in the text, neither measure of damages is of much utility to the breach of confidence plaintiff complaining of the publication of private facts.
114. On the distinction between general and special damages, see DAN B. DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES § 12.2(3), at 39-44 (2d ed. 1993). Special damages are also called consequential
damages. Id. § 12.2(3), at 38.
115. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854); see also DOBBS, supra
note 114, § 12.2(3); cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, § 12.14, at 873-77; WILLISTON, supra
note 98, § 1344, at 227.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) (permitting no recovery "for
loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty"); WILLISTON, supra note 98, § 1345, at 231-40; FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, § 12.15,
at 881-82.

117. DOBBS, supra note 114, § 12.2(1), at 23-24 (stating that contract law can be characterized as "systematically undercompensat[ing] contract breach plaintiffs unless one defines 'compensation' as only those losses in the contemplation of parties which can be
proved with certainty"); Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61, 64 n.13 (1987) (noting that the foreseeability requirement
frequently causes "significant undercompensation"); John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive And Nonpecuniary Damages In Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving The Objective Of
Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565-66 (1986) (asserting that "[i]t is now almost
common place . . . to recognize that traditional contract damage remedies leave many vic-
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have a particularly severe impact on breach of confidence plaintiffs
seeking to recover for the revelation of private facts.
First, damages for emotional distress (which flow most often
from a breach of confidence) are special damages and thus generally unavailable in contract-based actions.118 While this rule is subject to exceptions 1 9 and may be open to attack, 120 the courts when
tims of contract breach (probably a substantial majority) undercompensated").
This chronic undercompensation has been attributed to the law's concern not to
overcompensate and thus deter or punish breach. Thus these damage limitations have been
supported by those who see a right to breach as founded in the common law's long romance
with laissez-faire. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-96 (1974) (attributing right to breach to nineteenth-century laissez-faire economics and individualism); E.
Allen Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1216
(1970) ("All in all, our system of legal remedies for breach of contract, heavily influenced by
the economic philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a marked solicitude for men who do
not keep their promises."); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv.
457, 462 (1897) ("The duty to keep a contract ... means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else."). Damage limitations have also been
supported by those who believe that economic efficiency requires an occasional breach. See,
e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88-90 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing concept of
efficient breach). Those who see contract as promise, rather than mere transaction, also
seem to support the common law's limitation on damages reasoning that the parties' consent
limits liability to those risks that might reasonably be deemed to be in the parties' contemplation. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).

118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 87, § 12.17, at 894 (stating that courts "generally deny[] recovery for emotional disturbance, or 'mental distress', resulting from breach of contract"); WILLISTON, supra note 98,
§ 1341, at 214 ("Mental suffering caused by breach of contract, although it may be a real
injury, is not generally allowed as a basis for compensation in contractual actions.").
119. The Restatement does permit such an award where "the breach also caused bodily
harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was
a particularly likely result." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981); see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, § 12.17, at 895 ("[E]xceptions have commonly been made
where either the breach also caused bodily harm or was particular likely to result in serious
emotional disturbance."). Cases allowing such recovery usually concern funerals, weddings,
overzealous debt collectors, unresponsive insurance companies and mistaken death notices.
See WILLISTON, supra note 98, § 1341, at 214-23; Sebert, supra note 117, at 1584-85.
120. Contract law's refusal to award damages for emotional distress has been labeled as
a product of Baxendale's foreseeability rule (the parties do not usually contemplate that
emotional distress will result from a breach of contract), a product of the requirement of
certainty in measurement (on the grounds that emotional distress cannot be measured with
any certainty), or a reflection of the law's concern to never overcompensate for breach. JOHN
D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-5(b) (3d ed. 1987) (stating
that bar on recovery for emotional distress while attributed to Baxendale, is better seen as a
"rule of policy defining the limits of business risk"); FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, § 12.17, at
894-95; Sebert, supra note 117, at 1586-91.
Although the categories of cases where the courts have allowed recovery seem fixed, it is
arguable that an action for breach of confidence could fall within these exceptions. At least
one court has adopted this logic. Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. 1ll. 1986). The
court here held that "contracts, not to invade privacy are contracts whose breach may rea-
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considering breach of confidence claims founded in contract have,

with a few exceptions, 121 adopted this limitation and either denied

recovery entirely, 122 or, more commonly, cited the bar on awarding
such damages as a reason to create a tort remedy.1 23 Second, damsonably be expected to cause emotional disturbance". Id. at 1293; see also Humphers v.
First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 529 (Or. 1985) (stating that "contract law may deny
damages for psychic or emotional injury not within the contemplation of the contracting
parties. . . though perhaps this is no barrier when emotional security is the very object of
the promised confidentiality"); Vickery, supra note 11, at 1446 (arguing that some contracts
for confidentiality "might" fall within the exception); cf. Keltner v. Washington Co., 800
P.2d 752 (Or. 1990) (holding that oral promise of confidentiality to informant does not put
contract within the exception such that emotional distress damages are recoverable); Harvey, supra note 11, at 248 n.206 (noting that privacy cases do not usually fall within this
exception); Sebert, supra note 117, at 1586-87 (observing that courts seem to be applying a
stringent foreseeability standard to emotional distress and are unwilling to expand it beyond the stylized situations listed above).
Equally, if the rationale is lack of certainty as to amount, there seems to be no reason
why such damages are easier to measure in the casket cases, than in confidentiality cases.
However, this point can be made with equal strength about a whole series of breaches where
the courts continue to deny emotional distress damages. As stated by Sebert:
The certainty ground . . . fails to provide a satisfactory explanation because uncertainties about the measurement and even the existence of emotional distress
are likely to be similar in both the situations in which case law has traditionally
permitted recovery for emotional distress and those in which this recovery is normally denied.
Sebert, supra note 117, at 1588. Courts seem more willing to allow emotional distress damages in personal as compared to commercial scenarios, but once again the courts have not
come anywhere close to allowing emotional distress damages in all personal contexts. Id. at
1588-90.
Finally, those who contend that emotional distress damages should be awarded in
breach of confidence cases could also argue that the very paucity of the other damages
which such a plaintiff will recover remove any chance of overcompensating the plaintiff and
thus render emotional distress damages appropriate. Id. at 1590-91. While the rationale supporting the refusal to award emotional distress damages seem shaky when applied to breach
of confidence cases, the same can be said of many other types of contracts to which the
courts have been reluctant, despite this logical deficit, to award such damages. CALAMARI &
PEMLLO, supra note 120, § 14.5, at 596 (stating that "there seems to be no tendency of the
courts to enlarge the kinds of cases in which damages for meaningful mental distress are
given").
121. See Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1282 (refusing a motion to dismiss inter alia on the
ground that emotional distress might be recoverable). The Oregon Supreme Court's dicta
that damages "might" be recoverable in Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527,
529 (Or. 1985), presumably has been overruled by its decision in Keltner v. Washington Co.,
800 P.2d 752 (Or. 1990).
122. Keltner, 800 P.2d at 752; Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 Media L. Rep. 1759, 1760
(D. Minn. 1992) (dismissing contract claim in part because "[p]laintiff's complaint seeks
damages for what amounts to emotional distress, which simply are not available under a
breach of contract theory"); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739
(Sup. Ct. 1988) (noting that if an action proceeded in contract, damages would be confined
to economic loss), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1989).
123. See infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
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ages for loss of reputation, as with special damages, are also not
recoverable under contract law.124 Moreover, punitive damages are
125
unavailable unless the breach of contract also constitutes a tort.
124. DOBBS, supra note 114, § 12.5(1) (stating that there should be no award in contract for "intangible damages for loss of reputation"); see also Volkswagen Interamericana,
S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 446 (1st Cir. 1966); O'Leary v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 533 F.
Supp. 1205, 1209 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Skagway City Sch. Bd. v. Davis, 543 P.2d 218, 225
(Alaska 1975); Pryles v. State, 380 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (Ct. Cl. 1975), aff'd, 380 N.Y.S.2d 628
(App. Div. 1976). But see Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 894
(1st Cir. 1988) (en banc) (allowing recovery for "loss of identifiable professional opportunities" due to a breach of contract since it was sufficiently distinct from the "nonspecific allegation[s] of damage to reputation" which contract will not compensate); Christopher J.
Moore, Note, Recovery In ContractFor Damages To Reputation: Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 110 (1988) (analyzing the Redgrave decision
and other cases awarding damages for loss of reputation). As with emotional distress, the
common law's refusal to award damages for injury to reputation has been attributed to Baxendale's requirement of foreseeability, the need for certainty as to amount and the "right"
to breach. Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 892-93 (citing numerous authorities characterizing the rule
as based in lack of certainty or lack of foreseeability); Moore, supra, at 111 n.5, 118-23
(attributing the disallowance of reputation damages to Baxendale's foreseeability rule which
it paints as an outgrowth of the right to breach). Once again an argument can be made that
the damages to reputation are foreseeable in breach of confidence cases (this is the very
reason secrecy is requested) and, to the extent that concrete losses can be proven, recovery
is arguably possible. See Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 888 (finding reputational injury foreseeable
and awarding compensation for specific lost business opportunities). This, however, is
hardly a growing trend. See Moore, supra, at 122; Neil A. Shanzer, Comment, The Loss of
Publicity as an Element of Damages for Breach of Contract to Employ an Entertainer,27
U. MIAMI L. REV. 465, 475 (1973) (bemoaning American courts' refusal to award damages for
loss of reputation caused by the breach of actors' entertainment contracts).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (stating that punitive
damages are unavailable in contract actions "unless the conduct constituting the breach is
also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable"); see also DOBBS, supra note 114,
§ 12.5(2), at 790-91 (stating that "[t]he firmly established common law rule holds that punitive damages are not to be awarded for simple breach of contract"); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 87, § 12.8, at 842-43 (noting that punitive damages are available only if breach of contact "is in some respect tortious"); WILISTON, supra note 98, § 1340, at 209-14 (observing
that punitive damages generally not available in contract actions). But see FARNSWORTH,
supra note 87, § 12.8, at 844 (noting judicial and legislative trend towards greater use of
punitive damages for breach of contract especially in consumer cases and particularly where
insurance companies vexatiously refuse to settle); Randy L. Sassaman, Note, Punitive Damages In Contract Actions-Are Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86
(1980) (arguing that the trend is to allow the award of punitive damages in contract actions); Sebert, supra note 117, at 1596, 1600-47 (reviewing the circumstances where courts
have awarded punitive damages for breach of contract and advocating the award of punitive
damages for willful or bad faith breach). Once again, the common law's refusal to award
punitive damages has been attributed to (1) the 'right' to breach as long as damages are
paid, DOBBS, supra note 114, § 12.5(2), at 790-91, (2) Baxendale's foreseeability requirement and (3) the need for reasonable certainty in amount. Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and
Tort, 74 CAL. L. REv. 2033, 2033 (1986).
Thus neither the CIA nor Cohen were permitted to recover punitive damages. Snepp v.
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Despite the limitations, breach of confidence plaintiffs will be
able to recover for any job loss provided they can meet Baxendale's foreseeability test. Thus, in Cohen the source demanded
confidentiality with the expectation that if his role became public
he would lose his job. In the view of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, damages from loss of employment are usually within the
contemplation of the parties since the court presumes that both
source and reporter know that a breach of a promise of anonymity
will cause loss of a job. 1 26 When his name was reported and he did
lose his job, the loss of income was held recoverable since it was
both of a reasonably certain amount 127 and within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. 2 " Of course, if the
feared loss of job is neither obvious nor communicated, damages
will be denied. 29 In short, breach of confidence plaintiffs who seek
monetary damages have found courts willing to compensate job
loss, but little else. 30 Unless plaintiffs can convince the court to

United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510, 514 (1980); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387,
389 (Minn. 1992) (setting aside Cohen's award of punitive damages); see also Doe v. Roe,
400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (refusing to award punitive damages in the absence of
evidence that doctor's breach of implied contract of confidentiality was motivated by malice
or evil intent); Vickery, supra note 11, at 1446 (noting punitive damages are not available
for breach of a contract unless the breach constitutes a tort).
126. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 261 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The court
held that:
[A] dispatch editor and an expert journalist witness both testified that confidential sources often seek confidentiality exactly because they are afraid they might
lose their jobs. The expert witness testified that editors are or should be well
aware of the reasonable consequences, including loss of employment, which could
occur if the confidences are revealed. The evidence was sufficient to support the
finding that the loss of Cohen's employment was reasonably foreseeable.
Id.
127. Damages for "negative promises," where "the defendant's contract is to refrain
from action," frequently present "difficult questions

. .

. as to the value of

. .

. perform-

ance." WILLISTON, supra note 98, § 1406, at 589. This problem faced the Court in Snepp.
Snepp leaked non-classified data on the war in Vietnam. The Court concluded that "the
actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally are unquantifiable."
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514.
128. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Cohen eventually recovered under
promissory estoppel not contract theory, but the same measure of damages was applied.
Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 387; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
129. Some courts presume that damages for loss of job will generally be unrecoverable.
See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (App. Div. 1982) (recognizing a tort
action for breach of confidence where a psychiatrist revealed his patient's confidences, because a contract plaintiff "would [generally] be precluded from recovering for mental distress, loss of his employment and the deterioration of his marriage") (emphasis added)).
130. Even if we resort to the less favored, alternative measure of contract damages,
reliance, the plaintiff seems to fare little better. Reliance damages consist of the expenditures the plaintiff made in contemplation of the contract being performed and, perhaps, the
lost opportunity of contracting with another. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §344(b)
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31

grant injunctive relief, 131 past cases indicate that recovery, in terms
(1981) (providing that the reliance interest is the plaintiff's "interest in being reimbursed
for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract not been made"); DOBBS, supra note 114, § 12.3(1), at 772-73
(stating that reliance damages consist of pre-contractual expenditures and, perhaps, lost opportunity costs); Kelly, supra note 113, at 1767-69 nn.46-48 (noting the ambiguity of the
courts' usage of the term "reliance damages"). This measure of damages makes little sense
to the breach of confidence plaintiff seeking to recover for the publication of private facts.
Neither friend nor source will have any expenditures, nor will they be worse off because of
the loss of opportunity to contract with others. Rather they are less well off because their
emotions are hurt and their reputations damaged, injuries which contract law under any
theory of recovery will not compensate.
The third measure of contract damages, restitution, is equally unattractive. Typically
used where the contract is either unenforceable or avoided, it grants the performing party
the restitution of the benefits she has conferred on the other in performance of the contract.
Specifically:.
The general principle is that upon the defendant's substantial breach or repudiation of an enforceable contract the plaintiff is entitled to recover restitution of any
benefits he has conferred in performance of the contract, for example, any part of
the price of which he has prepaid, or the reasonable value of any services rendered
as contract performance.
DOBBS, supra note 114, § 12.7(1), at 794. Since the breach of confidence plaintiff will have
neither paid money nor rendered part-performance, restitution seems inapplicable. Restitution, in the sense of disgorgement by the defendant of any profit made is not available for a
simple breach of contract. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss Or My Gain? The Dilemma
Of The Disgorgement PrincipleIn Breach Of Contract,94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341 (1985) (noting that "courts have declined to apply the principle of restitution, holding in effect that a
'mere' breach of contract is not a 'wrong' and allowing the party in breach to keep part of
the gain"). Thus, in the reporter scenario, if the reporter's breach leads to profits for the
newspaper, this enrichment is not recoverable under contract. Id. at 1341.
131. Some courts have proved surprisingly willing to issue injunctions to prevent repeated breaches of contracts of confidentiality. For instance, the Supreme Court enjoined
Snepp from any further publications without CIA review. See Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 516 (1980); see also E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37 (1918) (enjoining
defense contractor from revealing secrets regarding the design of torpedoes communicated
to it by the government and resting decision on both concerns of national secrecy and the
terms of the government's contract); United States v. Snepp, 897 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.) (denying Snepp's petition to modify the injunction), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990); United
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.) (requiring CIA agent to submit all material for
pre-clearance in accordance with his agreement), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
Similarly, in a psychiatrist case, a New York court prohibited further publication of a
book containing details of the patient's private life. See Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 67980 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The court based recovery on contract, tort and privacy theories, but
expressly indicated that the contract remedy alone would justify the issuance of an injunction. Id. at 675 (stating that "[t]here can be little doubt that under the law of the State of
New York and in a proper case, the contract of parties to retain in confidence matter which
should be kept in confidence will be enforced by injunction and compensated in damages").
As a general rule, injunctive relief as a remedy is less favored, but it is generally available where damages would be inadequate to fully compensate the injured party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1981) (stating that "Is]pecific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation
interest of the injured party"); cf. Douglas Laycock, The Death IrreparableInjury Rule,
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of monetary damages, will be minimal."3 2
In summary, breach of confidence plaintiffs who have sought

to use a contract-based theory of recovery have been faced with

two limitations which make the remedy unattractive. First, the

contractual formalities themselves have often precluded the plaintiff's claim (the further the scenario strays from a commercial relationship, the harder the proof will be); and second, unless the court
is willing to grant injunctive relief, based on past cases, the damages, if any, are likely to be inadequate.1 33
103 HARv. L. REV. 688 (1990) (arguing that the inadequacy of the damages rule is fictitious
and masks the underlying policy reasons which motivate courts to deny specific performance). There is a growing body of scholarship arguing that specific performance should be
more readily available in contract cases generally. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, at 1145;
Peter Linzer, On The Amorality Of ContractRemedies-Efficiency, Equity and the Second
Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981); Alan Schwartz, The Case For Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). But see Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for
Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1982).
As we have seen, the damages available to compensate a plaintiff for breach of confidence usually are patently inadequate, and injunctive relief therefore arguably proper. See
Laycock, supra, at 744 ("Money damages cannot replace a reputation once lost, or erase
emotional distress once suffered. Neither can be accurately valued in damages."). However,
any such claim faces immense First Amendment problems and as well as the courts long
common law tradition of hostility to injunctive relief which prohibits speech. Id. at 742.
Thus, despite the inadequacy of damages, plaintiffs cannot presume that injunctive relief,
requiring the confidant to remain silent, will be available.
132. Two cases, with widely divergent facts, are illustrative. In Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507 (1980), because any expectation damages for revelation of government secrets
was unprovable, the contract provided only nominal damages and the government instead
sought and the court permitted recovery on a breach of fiduciary duty theory. Id. Equally,
in Keltner v. Washington, 800 P.2d 752 (Or. 1990), a 14 year-old was promised confidentiality if she identified a murderer. She sued for emotional distress when her name was revealed
to the accused, but since damages are not recoverable, the action was dismissed. Id.
133. There are additional limitations on the use of contracts. Statute of Frauds requirements, inability to sue third parties and statutes of limitation may also make contract an
unattractive remedy in particular cases. The limitation on liability for breach of contract to
the parties to the contract is important. If the plaintiff reveals that she has AIDS and in
breach of confidence her friend reveals the secret to a newspaper, the newspaper cannot be
sued in contract. Instead the plaintiff must found her action, if she has one, in tort-specifically, tortious interference with contract. Such a tort claim would require that the newspaper have known of the confidentiality agreement but intentionally interfered with it (for
instance, by paying the confidant to talk), and that the newspaper's interference was the
proximate cause of actual harm to the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766
(1979); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 (5th ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988). Thus, contract itself does not provide a remedy against a third party
involved in publicizing the confidential relationship but could form the basis for a claim in
tort for interference with contract so long as the stranger intentionally interferes with the
parties' relationship. In comparison, the private-facts tort does not require the newspaper to
know of or intend to interfere with any relationship; the newspaper is liable as soon as it
publishes the private facts. Thus, even the tortious extension of contract remains narrower
than the privacy tort.
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3. Promissory Estoppel As An Alternate Theory. a. Scope of
the Action. While Cohen failed to recover for breach of contract,
he did recover under a promissory estoppel theory,"" and several
plaintiffs have followed suit.'3 5 Promissory estoppel operates to enforce a promise even though the formal requisites of contract are
A promisor is held to her promise if the promisee has
absent.'
37
reasonably relied, to the promisee's detriment, on the promise.
Thus, when the source speaks in reliance on the promise of confi-

dentiality, the court may hold the confidant to her promise of secrecy, despite the lack of consideration or intent to contract. 38
This theory led the Supreme Court of Minnesota to uphold the

award in Cohen, despite the lack of the intention to contract. The

134. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
135. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
136. FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, § 2.19. Promissory estoppel's origin was as a replacement for the consideration required in contract law. See Feinman, supra note 113, at 67996; Yorio & Thel, supra note 113, at 115-29. However, courts have become comfortable with
the doctrine, using it to remedy a wider variety of defects. Feinman, supra note 113, at 680
(noting that promissory estoppel is now used to "remedy defective assent as well as absence
of consideration"). There is considerable dispute as to the role of promissory estoppel. Some
commentators see promissory estoppel as a contract where consideration is replaced by reliance. See, e.g., Yorio & Thel, supra note 113, at 113. Others see promissory estoppel, with
its emphasis on the reliance of the plaintiff rather than on the bargain the parties' struck, as
indicative of a trend to reject consensual based liability in favor of tortious principles. See,
e.g., GILMORE, supra note 117, at 72. This Article's thesis is not dependent on the resolution
of this debate, but it is worth noting that to the extent that promissory estoppel moves away
from contract to tort, and focuses not on the bargain the parties struck but on the injury to
the plaintiff, it moves closer to the aims of the breach of confidence plaintiff suing for publication of her private facts.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or
a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note
120, § 6-1 et seq., at 271-73 (stating that promissory estoppel requires the plaintiff to show:
(1) a promise; (2) the promise must be such that the promisor should reasonably expect it to
cause the promisee to act or refrain from acting; (3) the promisee must reasonably rely on
the promise and act or forbear because of it; and (4) it must be necessary to enforce the
promise to avoid injustice). Jay M. Feinman states:
[T]he typical doctrinal formulation of promissory estoppel holds out as its paradigmatic case a clear promise manifesting a commitment to future action, to
which the promisee responds, as the promisor should have foreseen, by undertaking a specific act of substantial reliance sufficient to ensure that nonenforcement
for the promise would be a manifest injustice.
Feinman, supra note 113, at 689.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see Feinman, supra note 113,
at 680 (asserting that promissory estoppel cures both lack of consideration and defective
assent). It can also cure any Statute of Frauds problems arising from an oral promise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra, § 139 (providing that reliance is a cure for Statute of Frauds problems).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Court reasoned that Cohen relied to his detriment on the reporters' promises to keep his identity secret. 13
This theory seems auspicious since it excuses the technical defects which haunt breach of confidence plaintiffs trying to enforce
commitments of secrecy made in social settings. However, some
limitations on promissory estoppel as a remedy for breach of confidence are worth noting. 140 First, promissory estoppel requires that
a promise was made.' 4 ' Some courts have held that mere statements of desire or of present purpose are insufficient. 4 2 Moreover,

the promise must be of such a nature that the promisor should
reasonably expect it to trigger reliance.1

43

A conversational com-

mitment by a friend to keep information quiet may be insufficient
to found promissory estoppel, because the promisee would not reasonably expect reliance on her casual comment. In Cohen, where
139. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
140. The degree of difficulty a plaintiff will encounter will depend on whether the state
takes a strict or liberal view of the elements of estoppel. As an interesting survey of the
courts' enforcement of promissory estoppel points out, "strict adherence to the ideal model
of the Restatement's definition . . . would unduly restrict the scope of the doctrine," thus
the courts have departed from the model rendering the "definition of actionable reliance
highly uncertain." Feinman, supra note 113, at 689. Feinman reports that "[iun deciding
whether promissory estoppel ought to be applied in a particular case, courts therefore alternate between an attitude of strict fidelity to the ideal statement of the doctrine and a flexible approach that often results in a deviation from it." Id. at 689. The stricter position a
particular state takes, the harder it will be for a breach of confidence plaintiff to make out a
claim in promissory estoppel.
141. Burst v. Adolph Coors Co., 650 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1981); U.S. Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. 1981); see also Feinman, supra note 113, at 690. The Restatement
defines a promise as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified
way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
142. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 69 v. Altherr, 458 P.2d 537, 544 (Ariz. 1969) (holding
that school board's repeated expressions of desire and intent to purchase a building did not
constitute a promise of future action required to support promissory estoppel); CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 120, § 6-1, at 272 n.7; see also Feinman, supra note 113, at 691 ("The
strict view of promise carefully distinguishes promises, which are future oriented, from
statements of belief, which concern only the present."). Feinman records that courts adopting a more flexible approach "infer promises from statements about future conduct or factual representations about present state of affairs." Id. at 692. For these courts, the issue is
"not whether the promisor clearly made a promise, but whether given the context, in which
the statement at issue was made, the promisor should reasonably have expected that the
promisee would infer a promise." Id.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 & cmt. b (1981) (stating that
"[t]he promisor is affected only by reliance which he does or should foresee"); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 87, § 2.19, at 95 (stating that "[e]ven if the promisee relied on the promise, the
promisor is not liable if he had no reason to expect any reliance at all or if he had reason to
expect reliance but not of the sort that occurred"); cf. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 120,
§ 6-1, at 272 (measuring reliance from the promisor's point of view).
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the Minnesota Supreme Court found that a promise was made,,4
the record revealed that Cohen called reporters to his office and
made an explicit demand that they "give me a promise of confidentiality, that is that I will be treated as an anonymous source,
that my name will not appear in any material in connection with
this. 1 45 The response of the reporters was "prompt and unequivocal agree[ment]," and, having obtained this promise, Cohen
handed over the dirt. 46 Thus a plaintiff who wants to be assured
of a remedy in promissory estoppel should make sure that she obtains a formal and explicit promise of secrecy, 4 7 defeating any

claim that the defendant did not foresee reliance on the promise.
The plaintiff also must show that she changed her position in
reasonable reliance on the promise.148 In Cohen, the source's unre144. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992), on remand from
501 U.S. 663 (1991).
145. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
146. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 252. An additional problem may arise where the reporter
gives a conditional promise, such as a-promise of confidentiality conditioned on the editor's
approval. Some courts have held that such conditional promises are unenforceable unless
the condition occurs, even although fulfillment of the condition is in the reporter's control.
See Feinman, supra note 113, at 692.
147. Obtaining an explicit promise should also meet any certainty requirements. A minority of courts take the position that the requirement of certainty is heightened in promissory estoppel-a promissory estoppel plaintiff must show that a "clear and definite" promise was made. Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 Media L. Rep. 1759 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding
that promise must be "clear and definite"); Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391 (stating that "the
promise must be clear and definite"); see also Feinman, supra note 113, at 691 (stating that
"It]he strict view also requires the promise to be definite and unequivocal"); cf. Ruzicka v.
Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 999 F.2d 1319, 1321 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that while Minnesota law does not require a "clear and definite" promise, this requirement is no more
strict than the "reasonable certainty" standard imposed in contract; remanding case for trial
concerning the existence and scope of the alleged promise that plaintiff would be unidentifiable). In these states, a promissory estoppel claim may therefore be difficult to make out.
However, an overwhelming majority of courts, far from requiring a heightened level of
certainty in promissory estoppel, have instead held that the level of certainty is less than
that imposed in contract cases: "There is no requirement of definiteness in an action based
on promissory estoppel." Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 457 N.W.2d 793 (Neb. 1990); cf. Hoffman v.
Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (holding that § 90 of the Second Restatement "does
not require that the promise giving rise to the cause of action be so comprehensive in scope
as to meet the requirements of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the
promisee"); WILLISTON, supra note at 98, § 8.5, at 98 n.3 (stating that the contours of the
promise need not be so certain as might be necessary if the contract were one based on
consideration). Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, the requirement of certainty may or
may not prove an additional block in the path of a breach of confidence plaintiff pursuing a
promissory estoppel theory of recovery.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981) (providing that the promise
must "induce such action or forbearance"); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 120, § 6-1, at
272 n.12 (providing that "the promisee must reasonably rely upon the promise."); FARNS-
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mitting refusal to hand over the documents to any reporter until
after a promise of anonymity had been extracted showed indisputable reliance on the promise. 149 In contrast, many sources might
speak to a reporter even if their request for confidence is turned
down or brushed aside. Equally, friends may well ask for secrecy
but talk even if their request is ignored. As a result, neither could
state a claim for promissory estoppel: "since the reliance must
have been induced by the promise, it cannot consist of action or
forbearance that would have occurred in any event." 150
Finally, a breach of confidence plaintiff is always rolling the
dice when seeking relief under promissory estoppel because of its
equitable basis. Even if promise and reliance can be proven, the
promise will only be enforced "if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." 151 In one newspaper case, a court
concluded that no showing of resulting injustice had been made
where the paper breached an alleged promise not to run an obituary."5 2 In contrast, in Cohen, the Minnesota Supreme Court
treated this requirement as minimal. The court held that denying
the source recovery would be unjust despite the fact that "neither
side holds the higher moral ground." 53 Disagreement about the exWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 87, § 2.19, at 93-94 (stating that "the promisee must actually rely on the promise"); see also Feinman, supra note 113, at 694-95 (noting that courts
taking a strict view of the requirements of promissory estoppel require a showing that the
plaintiff altered her position in reliance on the promise).
149. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 252 (noting that Cohen told reporters that "if you will give
me a promise of confidentiality. . . then I will furnish you with the documents," and then
he only released the documents to reporters from whom he had extracted such a promise).
150. FARNSWORTH, supra note 87, § 2.19, at 94; see also Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20
Media L. Rep. 1759 (D. Minn. 1992) (denying recovery to plaintiff who alleged newspaper
violated promise not to print obituary because, in part, the detriment would have come
about whether or not there was a promise as alleged).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981); CALAMARI & PERILLO,

supra note 120, § 6-1, at 271. As stated in the Second Restatement, the requirement of
necessity to avoid injustice
may depend on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance, on its definite and
substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on the formality with
which the promise is made, on the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary,
deterrent and channeling functions of form are met by the commercial setting or
otherwise, and on the extent to which such other policies such as the enforcement
of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

90 cmt. b (1981).

152. Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 Media L. Rep. 1759 (D. Minn. 1992) (refusing to
enforce an alleged promise not to publish an obituary on the grounds that it was not required to prevent an injustice given that it would not be good policy to force a newspaper to
determine which of several feuding family members represents the deceased's wishes).
153. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992), on remand from
501 U.S. 633 (1991); see also Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 999 F.2d 1319, 132223 (8th Cir. 1993) (vacating district court's holding that there was no injustice where re-
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istence of resulting injustice is not surprising for, as both courts
agree, this element of promissory estoppel calls for the court to
make a policy decision.1 5 Thus, plaintiffs seeking to rely on promissory estoppel always face uncertainty as to whether a court would
perceive that they are entitled to recover as a matter of policy. In
sum, while the chances of enforcing an oral promise of confidentiality seem greater in promissory estoppel than in pure contract,
estoppel is not without its limits.155
b. The Remedies Available In Promissory Estoppel. The
measure of damages in promissory estoppel cases is the subject of
intense debate.1 56 The traditional position that the reliance interest defines the scope of the remedy in promissory estoppel' 57 conforms to logic: promissory estoppel allows recovery because of the
reliance by the plaintiff, thus damages should be measured in
terms of reliance.1 58 As recent studies have shown, however, this
does not conform with the reality of practice-the courts repeatedly award an expectation measure of damages. 59
porter breached alleged promise not to make plaintiff identifiable), vacating 794 F. Supp.
303 (D. Minn. 1992).
154. See, e.g., Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391.
155. One additional limitation is the inability to sue strangers. While the requirement
of a bond between the parties in promissory estoppel may be less rigid than in contract, it is
nonetheless present. Promissory estoppel only allows a suit against the promisor, not some
stranger who made no promise of secrecy. CALAMARI & PERLLO, supra note 120, § 6-1, at
272. Like contract, promissory estoppel provides no remedy against one who publishes private information but has never promised secrecy.
156. The dispute over the measure of damages is still best illustrated by Williston's
classic responses as the Restatement's Reporter. For a full discussion, see Yorio & Thel,
supra note 113, at 116-17. The resulting provision of the Restatement that "[t]he remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires" was a compromise, allowing the full
measure of expectation damages that contract would demand to be limited to the amount
that reliance permits. Id. at 137.
157. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 113, at 686 (recording the "general belief among
commentators that expectation damages should be the normal remedy for breach of a contract supported by consideration, whereas reliance damages should be the normal remedy in
cases of promissory estoppel"); Yorio & Thel, supra note 113, at 137-39 (reviewing the traditional authorities who have advocated that recovery under § 90 is limited to a reliance measure of damages).
158. See, e.g., Yorio & Thel, supra note 113, at 121 (noting that the Restatement
adopts the view that "if the promisee's claim under Section 90 derives from injury to her
reliance interest, the remedy awarded ought to be limited to reliance damages").
159. See Feinman, supra note 113, at 687-88 (observing that "the typical damage remedy applied in promissory estoppel cases is measured by the expectation interest"); Yorio &
Thel, supra note 113, at 130 (stating that "the remedy routinely granted is either specific
performance or expectation damages"); see also Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel
Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131 (1987); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 903, 909
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However, whether the expectation or the reliance measurement of damages is used, a breach of confidence plaintiff (whose
main injuries are emotional distress, loss of reputation and lost
job) can only recover for the latter harm, if at all. As in contract,
the courts have failed to award damages for emotional distress or
reputational loss in promissory estoppel cases.160 The courts may
be more willing to award punitive damages, but a recent study revealed such awards occurred where the action appeared to sound
in tort for misrepresentation,' thus conforming to the contractual
limitation that punitive damages are only available if the breach
constitutes a tort.16 2 As a result, the remedies available to a suc-

cessful promissory estoppel plaintiff are as inadequate as those offered by pure contract.6 3
4. Conclusions on Contract Theories of Recovery. In summary, contract and promissory estoppel have so far proved unattractive remedies for breach of confidence plaintiffs who seek to
recover for the publication of private personal information. Difficulty in proving the requisite elements, coupled with the courts'
unwillingness to grant a meaningful measure of damages, have rendered these remedies ineffective. This Article posits that the limited utility of contract law is not coincidental, but rather reflects a
divergence between the goals of contract law and the remedial
needs of these plaintiffs who seek to use breach of confidence as a
substitute for a tortious action for invasion of privacy.
The aim of contract law is to enforce the bargain the parties
agreed to. Yet, in many breach of confidence cases, the parties will
not have clearly agreed to anything. More fundamentally, the
wrong that contract law seeks to remedy is not that the informa(1985); William Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest In ContractDamages, 1992 Wis. L.
REv. 1755. This, in turn, has led to a challenge to the notion that promissory estoppel is
itself focused on reliance rather than promise.
160. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992) (awarding
Cohen the same measure of damages, his loss of job, as he had recovered under his original
contract claim).
161. Becker, supra note 159, at 162-63 (stating that courts award punitive damages in
promissory estoppel cases where tortious misrepresentation is involved); cf. Cohen, 479
N.W.2d at 389 (limiting Cohen's recovery to actual damages).
162. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
163. The remedy of specific performance is available in promissory estoppel to the
same extent as in contract. See Becker, supra note 159, at 134-35 (discussing that specific
performance is available in donative cases); Feinman, supra note 113, at 687 ("Specific performance (or occasionally other injunctive relief) is awarded in promissory estoppel cases
when it would be available in a comparable cause of action involving bargained-for reliance."); Yorio & Thel, supra note 113, at 151 ("The routine remedy for breach of a section
90 promise is specific performance or expectation damages.").
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tion revealed hurts the confider, but that the revelation is a breach
of the parties' agreement. The plaintiff gets a remedy not because
of the excruciatingly personal nature of the information, but because the defendant breached his agreement not to reveal it. Thus,
while the breach of confidence plaintiff is dismayed by the information communicated and the emotional and reputational injuries
the communication triggers, contract law focuses on the existence
and terms of the parties' bargain.164
Promissory estoppel is, to a degree, a better avenue for these
plaintiffs because the focus of the cause of action shifts from the
contract and its terms to considerations of reliance and unfairness.
The more the action centers on the unfairness of the defendant's
conduct, rather than the bargain struck, the more the plaintiff's
real concerns are in confluence with the cause of action. However,
even promissory estoppel has its limitations because it demands a
promise and measures damages as those flowing from the breach of
that promise. This is, once again, at odds with the plaintiff's focus
on the hurtful speech.
Thus, while contract and promissory estoppel provide remedies in commercial cases and may, as the Cohen case illustrates,
provide a remedy for the non-commercial plaintiff who takes active
steps to imitate the commercial setting, it seems ill-equipped to
serve as a general replacement for the private-facts tort.
B. Fiduciary Theories of Recovery
1. Introduction. The second sense in which American courts
discuss breach of confidence is not to indicate that a contract forbids the revelation, but rather that the revelation would violate a
fiduciary duty which the law imposes on the confidant. Equity has
long designated certain relations as "fiduciary." Where such a relation exists, a fiduciary is under a duty "to act for the benefit of the
other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the
relation."16 This duty, often characterized as the "duty of loy164. This right-remedy discorrelation could mean that the "remedy is wrong in some

way" or that we "have misstated the right." DOBBS, supra note 114, § 1.7, at 25. When the
right and remedy do not correlate, "it looks as if something needs to be changed, but one
cannot determine in the abstract whether the remedy should be changed to match the right
or vice versa." Id.
165. AusTIN W. Scorr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (4th ed.
1987) [hereinafter TRUSTS]; see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
FiduciaryObligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879, 882 ("If a person in a particular relationship with
another is subject to a fiduciary obligation, [the fiduciary] must be loyal to the interests of
[the beneficiary]. The fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige
him to act to further the beneficiary's best interests.").
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0
alty," includes an obligation not to reveal information.'"
This Section analyzes those cases in which courts have held
that a fiduciary relationship exists and also the scope of the obligation imposed on fiduciaries to keep confidences. It concludes that
while fiduciary law offers a powerful remedy to those who can convince a court that a fiduciary relation exists, this remedy will require an uphill battle for many plaintiffs. Moreover, while categories of relationships deemed fiduciary may be expandable, this
Section argues that such an expansion would be deleterious to fiduciary law.

2. Scope of the Fiduciary Theory. All the leading texts repeat the same litany of relationships considered to be fiduciary in
nature-beneficiary/trustee, guardian/ward, agent/principal, partnership, attorney/client, and director/shareholder.17 In addition,
66

there exists the more nebulous world of "confidential relations."

166. Austin W. Scott, The FiduciaryPrinciple, 3 CAL. L. REv. 539, 553 (1949) [hereinafter Scott, Fiduciary] ("A fiduciary in the course of his employment may acquire confidential information. It is a breach of his duty as fiduciary to use this information for his own
purposes, or to communicate it to a third person who may so use it."); see RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY

§ 395

(1958) ("[A]n agent is under a duty not to use or to communi-

cate information confidentially given [to] him by the principal or acquired by him during
the course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as [an] agent, in
competition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or on behalf of another."); DOBBS, supra note 114, § 10.4, at 720 ("The fiduciary must not take secret profits
derived from her position as fiduciary, either at the expense of the beneficiary, or even by
use of the beneficiary's confidential information.").
167. Scott and Fratcher list beneficiary/trustee, guardian/ward, agent/principal, partnership, and attorney/client as relationships. See generally TRUSTS, supra note 165, §§ 216A. Bogert includes "[tihe relations of trustee and beneficiary, executor or administrator
and creditors, next of kin or legatees, guardian and ward, principal and agent, attorney and
client, corporate director and corporation and the like. . . ." GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTS § 482, at 280 (2d ed. 1981). However, as Bogert notes, the courts
have always retained an inherent equitable power to recognize a relationship as fiduciary if
the particular facts of the case warrant-thus the relation of stockbroker/customer, mortgagor/ mortgagee, employer/employee, lessor/lessee, and spouses as to community property or
property interests in a divorce settlement have occasionally been held to be of a fiduciary
nature. Id. § 481, at 272-73.
168. Authorities dispute whether the distinction between fiduciary and confidential relationships is one of substance or simply nomenclature. For Scott, a fiduciary relationship
imposes a higher level of duty and a differing burden than merely a confidential relationship. TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 2.5. On the other hand, Bogert points out that the courts
have used the terms interchangeably, BOGERT, supra note 167, § 482, at 280, although seemingly applying the term "fiduciary" to the settled list of relations, while reserving "confidential" for those relations falling outside the traditional categories, id. § 482, at 281. See
DOBBS, supra note 114, § 10.4 at 720-21 ("Sometimes the courts use the term 'confidential
relationship' as a synonym for fiduciary relationship. Perhaps it is most often used to indicate a relationship deemed analogous to a fiduciary relationship, but having no definite welldefined status, and having less rigid duties.").
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Identifying relationships that qualify as "confidential" is not easy.
As one authority has commented:
Equity has never bound itself by any hard and fast definition of the phrase
"confidential relation" and has not listed all the necessary elements of such
a relation, but has reserved discretion to apply the doctrine whenever it
believes that a suitable occasion has arisen.169

Clearly some actual placing of confidence or trust is necessary to
qualify a relationship for protection under equity. 17 0 In addition,
the factors that courts consider in determining whether a confidential relation exists are the length of time of the reliance, a disparity
in the positions of the parties, and a close relationship between the
parties. 7 1 It is "great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrusting of
power, and
superiority of position" that evidence a confidential
17 2
relation.
The overriding duty imposed on those in fiduciary relations is
a duty to act for the other's benefit. 7 3 This duty of loyalty encompasses the obligation to exclude all self interest and to act solely
169. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 482, at 284-86; see also DeMott, supra note 166, at 879
("Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American law."); Robert
Cooter & Bradley Freedman, The FiduciaryRelationship:Its Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1045 (1991) ("Fiduciary relations have occupied
a significant body of Anglo-American law and jurisprudence for over 250 years, yet the precise nature of the fiduciary relationship remains a source of confusion and dispute.").
170. See BOGERT, supra note 167, § 482, at 287 ("There is always, of course, the actual
placing of trust and confidence on at least one occasion, and often such reliance has been
exhibited through a period of months or years."); see also TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 2.5, at
43 ("A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence
of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind.").

171.

BOGERT,

supra note 167, § 482, at 287-319.

172. Id. § 482, at 281; see also DOBBS, supra note 114, § 10.4, at 721 ("The important
thing is that trust and confidence are actually reposed and that the person in whom they are
reposed knows it.").
Familial relationships, and those between doctor and patient, and priest and parishioner have all been held to be confidential. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 482, at 330-32;
TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 2.5, at 43 ("A confidential relation ... is particularly likely to
exist where there is a family relationship or such a relation of confidence as that which
arises between physician and patient or priest and penitent.").
173. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 543, at 217 ("One of the most fundamental duties of a
trustee is that he must display throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty
to the interests of the beneficiary and must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration
of the interests of third persons."); TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 2.5:
A fiduciary relationship involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to act for the
benefit of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the
relation. A fiduciary is ordinarily under a duty not to delegate to a third person
the performance of his duties as fiduciary. As to matters within the scope of the
relation he is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary.
Id. at 43.
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for the benefit of the beneficiary as to matters within the scope of
the relation.17745 The same duties are triggered by a confidential
relationship.

As part of the duty of loyalty, those in both fiduciary and confidential relations owe a duty not to use or disclose confidential
information of the beneficiary. 1 7 Thus the Restatement of Agency,
discussing the quintessential fiduciary relation of agent to principal, requires an agent to keep the principal's confidences during
the relationship:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired
by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his
duties as an agent, in competition with or to the injury of the principal, on
his own account or on behalf of another, although such information does not
relate to the transaction in which he is then employed, unless the informa1
tion is a matter of general knowledge. "

Likewise, such a duty not to communicate information is imposed
on a trustee vis-a-vis the beneficiary,' director vis-a-vis the corporation,'17 and an attorney vis-a-vis the client. 80
174. See BOGERT, supra note 167, § 543, at 218:
A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary of the trust to administer the trust
solely in the interest of the beneficiary. The trustee must exclude all self-interest,
as well as the interest of a third party, in his administration of the trust solely for
the benefit of the beneficiary.
The fiduciary must also act with the due care, skill, prudence, and diligence of an ordinarily
prudent person when handling the affairs of the beneficiary. Id. at 167.
175. Id. § 543, at 250-54 (stating that both fiduciaries and those in confidential relations are bound by the duty of loyalty). Scott agrees in principle, but argues that, whereas
there is a presumption of invalidity in a fiduciary's dealings with the beneficiary, there is no
such presumption if the relationship is simply one of a confidential nature. TRUSTS, supra
note 165, § 2.5.
176. See Scott, Fiduciary,supra note 166, at 553; DOBBS, supra note 114, § 10.5(1), at
724 ("the fiduciary must neither reveal nor use private, inside, or confidential information
held by the beneficiary"); cf. 5 TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 505, at 543-47:
Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary acquires property
from a third person through the use of confidential information that he obtained
as fiduciary, he holds the property upon a constructive trust for the
beneficiary....
The same principles are applicable even though the parties are not technically in a
fiduciary relation, if one of them acquires confidential information from the other.
(footnotes omitted).
Id.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958); see also id. § 396 (stating duties
after the termination of the agency); 5 TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 505, at 543-53.
178. Scott, Fiduciary,supra note 166, at 553.
179. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 481, at 252 ("In his dealings with the corporation and
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The courts have also enforced the duty to keep confidences in
the broader realm of confidential relations. For instance, the duty
has been imposed in doctor/patient cases, 81 psychiatrist/patient
cases, i8 2 and in familial settings.' The duty not to reveal confidential information is most regularly enforced in the employer/employee scenario. Employees who enjoy positions of trust 8 4 are
bound not just by the terms of a contract, but also by a fiduciary
obligation, including the obligation not to use or disclose confidential information learned during employment. 185 Although a specific
its shareholders, and in any contemplated personal transaction with outsiders, the corporate
director, officer or majority shareholder must not use inside information for his personal
advantage."); 5 TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 505, at 546-47.
180. Zeiden v. Oliphant, 54 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Zeiden is discussed in Scott,
Fiduciary,supra note 166, at 553.
181. See, e.g., Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952, 953 (Ala. 1984) ("Alabama recognizes
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of implied contract resulting from a
physician's unauthorized disclosure of information acquired during the physician-patient relationship."); Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1974) (holding that doctor's obligation of
confidentiality arises from his fiduciary relation with patient). The existence of a fiduciary
relationship between doctor and patient has also been emphasized in many of the cases
which recognize a cause of action in tort or an implied cause of action in contracts. See
Zelin, supra note 89; see also supra note 89 and infra note 249.
182. See, e.g., McDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that
psychiatrist who disclosed patient's information was liable in tort for breach of confidentiality or in implied contract); Doe v. Roe, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 1973) (holding that
action lies against psychiatrist whose book revealed patient's confidences). Ironically, psychiatrists may be liable for resulting harm if they do not breach their duty of confidence and
warn identifiable potential victims of their client's dangerousness. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1965). For an interesting discussion of this "catch 22," see
Venessa Merton, Symposium: Law and Psychiatry Part II: Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff For Psychiatristsand Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J.
263, 301-05 (1982).
183. 5 TRusTS supra note 165, § 505, at 547 (citing Tyler v. Tyler, 172 A. 820 (R.I.
1934)).
184. Some would impose a duty of confidentiality only on employees in whom a high
degree of trust is placed. See, e.g., 2 CALLMANN, supra note 72, § 14.03. Other sources imply
that all employees owe a duty not to reveal confidential information, but that "high-echelon
employees" owe a special duty given the information to which they have access. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH ZAMoRE, BusINEss TORTS § 4.03, at 4-10 to 4-11, 4-16 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
185. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 72, § 14.03, at 21:
A confidential or fiduciary relationship . .. may also arise out of circumstances
which compel the employer to repose an unusual confidence in his employee by
giving him a controlling influence. Thus it has been held that an employee in a
position of authority is under an obligation not to disclose confidential information revealed to him in the course of his employment, and it is immaterial that
such information might not technically qualify as a trade secret. In all such cases
the duties are determined by the particular confidential relationship. The more
confidential the relationship, the more important it is that the trust be respected
and the information be accorded protection.
Id.; see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[An]
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contractual provision requiring secrecy or designating the position
as one of trust or confidence is usual, it is by no means necessary
to create an obligation to keep confidences. i"8
A classic example of utilizing the theory of fiduciary relations
to found an action for breach of confidence is Snepp v. United
States.8 7 When Snepp published a book chronicling his CIA experiences, the Government sued not just for breach of contract,
but also for Snepp's alleged violation of his fiduciary obligations. 1 8
Each court that considered the issue concluded that Snepp did owe
a fiduciary duty to his employer, the CIA."" In the Supreme
Court's view, "Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely high degree of trust."' 9 0 Finding that Snepp had "violated
his trust"'9' when he published his book without agency clearance,
the Court imposed a constructive trust on his profits. 92
As the Court in Snepp emphasized, when the theory of recovery for breach of confidence is founded in trust, the wrong does not
depend on the secret nature of the information revealed-the
wrong is the act of revelation itself, the breach of trust. 93 In fact,
employee possesses fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his employer.
One of these obligations, long recognized by the common law even in the absence of a written employment agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or 'classified' information.");
ZAMORE,supra note 184, § 4.03[2], at 4-15 (citing Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys.,
318 N.W.2d 691, 702 (Minn. 1982), and stating that employees may not disclose information
that they either "knew or should have known was confidential").
186. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 72, § 14.03, at 21:
[Wlhere there is a confidential employment relationship, the qualified right to secrecy arises out of the underlying relationship (unless negated by the parties' mutual understanding) and is required by principles of good faith. The existence of
an agreement is not dispositive; it should be given some weight in determining
whether or not there is a confidential relationship.
Id.
187. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
188. Id. at 508.
189. Id. at 510; see Snepp v. United States, 595 F.2d 926, 929 (4th Cir. 1979); Snepp v.
United States, 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Va. 1978). However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the duty had not been breached because it did not include an obligation to keep
secret non-classified information. 595 F.2d at 935-36.
190. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510. To support this conclusion, the Court cited to the agreement signed by Snepp which explicitly recognized that Snepp was "undertaking a position
of trust in that Agency." Id. at 510-11 n.5. However, the Court concluded that even in the
absence of such a contractual term, Snepp's employment triggered a fiduciary relationship
because of the "nature of Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources."
Id. at 511 n.6. In fact, the Court concluded that "[flew types of government employment
involve a higher degree of trust than that reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties."
Id.
191. Id. at 511.
192. Id. at 516.
193. Id. at 511. The Court held that "[w]hether Snepp violated his trust does not de-
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in Snepp the government conceded that the book contained no
classified material.19 The Court reasoned that this concession did
not undercut the government's right to relief, because the wrong
was not the information released, but the breach of trust in releasing any information.'9 5 Thus Snepp illustrates that where a fiduciary relationship can be established, a breach of confidence plaintiff
has a well-recognized cause of action.
Breach of confidence plaintiffs pursuing a fiduciary relation
theory of recovery must establish that a fiduciary or confidential
relationship exists. As we have seen, the catalogue of traditional
fiduciary relations (trustee, guardian, etc.) is short. If we return to
our scenarios, the only relationship which falls clearly into a recognized category is that of the employee/employer. So long as the
employee's position involves some degree of trust, the employer as
plaintiff, like the CIA in Snepp, can proceed on a fiduciary theory.
Many breach of confidence plaintiffs will be unable to show
that even a confidential relationship exists. For instance, a reporter's one-time promise of anonymity does not seem to meet the
qualities of "great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrusting of
power, and superiority of position" which are required to trigger
the existence of the confidential relation.' 9 6 Equally, friendship
does not seem to be the type of relationship to which the courts
would be willing to extend the status of confidential. The courts
have, it is true, recognized a confidential relationship in some familial settings, especially where there is a disparity of ability between the parties. 97 The courts have been cautious even here howpend upon whether his book actually contained classified information." Id. Of course the
information must be learned as a result of the relationship or its revelation would not be a
breach of loyalty and it cannot be public knowledge. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 114,
§ 10.4, at 720 (stating that fiduciary must not use "the beneficiary's confidential information" (emphasis added)).
194. 444 U.S. at 511.
195. Id. ("Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's
failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust."). The Court did seem
to require proof of a resulting harm, id. at 513 n.8, but it accepted the loss of confidence
which would result if the CIA was unable to guarantee that all employees' revelations would
be pre-cleared as proof of harm, id. at 512. Thus it was not what Snepp wrote, but the
breach of his duty to obtain pre-clearance, that is defined as the harm. Id. at 513 ("Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-classified or not-for prepublication
clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government.").
196. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 482, at 281. Perhaps a ten-year relationship between a
source and a reporter, where the reporter never used the source's name, might come closer
to satisfying this standard. But even here, there seems to be a lack of disparity of power in
the placing of confidence which would accompany the doctor/patient or clergy/parishioner
relationships that have been held to b of a confidential nature.
197. See id. § 482, at 298-300:
Frequently the parties are related by blood or marriage in such a close degree that
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ever, for "[o]ften relatives are hostile to each other or deal at arms
length and act independently and so are held not to have been in a
confidential relation."' 98 The courts have repeatedly rejected the
claim that friendship creates fiduciary duties, and this position has
received scholarly support: "[in]ere long continued friendship
would hardly seem a basis for a finding of a confidential relation." 199 Thus the fiduciary theory of recovery seems limited to
those plaintiffs whose confidences have been revealed by trustees,
agents, guardians, doctors, clergy, and lawyers. While not unimportant, this remedy is, therefore, far from a universal cure.
One option is to urge courts to adopt a wider vision of confidential relations. Given that the limits of both fiduciary and confidential relations lack definition, 00 instead, depending on the particular facts of each case, the courts have room to maneuver if they
wish to expand the types of relationships deemed to be fiduciary.2 0' However, such a step has its drawbacks. First, if we aban-

don the criteria of "great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrusting
of power and superiority of position," it is hard to come up with
criteria that will not impose the heightened obligations of a fiduciary or confidential relation on all relationships. 20 2 In our lives as
the imposition of great trust and the letting down of all guards and bars is natural, and the relationship, possibly coupled with evidence as to trust, the status of
the parties as to health, age, education and dominance may lead a court to find
that a confidential relation existed.
Id.
198. Id. § 482, at 311 n.66 (citing cases where relatives are not deemed to be in a confidential relationship); cf. Katz, supra note 15, at 851 (arguing that courts are reluctant to
interfere in strictly personal relationships).
199. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 482, at 334.
200. For a discussion of "fiduciary relations," see id. § 481, at 274-75 ("[E]quity refuses
to bind itself by an all-inclusive definition. It reserves entire freedom to declare relationships to be fiduciary upon the particular facts of each case."). For a discussion of "confidential relations," see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
201. Such a maneuver would not be unprecedented. Indeed, as one commentator has
noted:
[I]n the past. . . new types of fiduciaries were recognized gradually over the centuries. The 'use' emerged during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in England,
and the trust developed over the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries. Partnerships appeared in the sixteenth century, and evolved into joint stock companies and corporations. Emancipated servants and employees emerged from domestic relations law to become agents and factors. It was therefore sufficient to
describe an arrangement, call it fiduciary, and decide on appropriate rules.
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 805 (1983).
202. Even if we look under this litmus test to the analytical framework of fiduciary
relations, there is little to support a claim of fiduciary relationship by either the reporter or
the friend. While theorists do not agree on a general principle which defines all fiduciary
relations, see DeMott, supra note 165, at 908-16 (rehearsing the various general justifications which have been offered for fiduciary obligation), none support the extension proposed
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social beings we are forced to rely on librarians, police officers,
bank tellers, telephone operators and many more. Do every one of
these relations qualify as confidential? 0 3
A second and related problem is that a confidential relationship triggers a wide array of duties. At the center of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship is a duty on one party to be selfless and to
act in the interest of another.2 04 Yet this is hardly a duty we wish
to impose on a reporter or on a friend. Do we seriously think a
reporter should report only in the interest of her source? Or that a
friend is prohibited from putting herself in a position where her
own and her friend's interests will conflict? Obviously not.20 5 In
here. For instance, the abuse theory of Frankel posits that the two central characteristics of
fiduciary relations are substitution (ie., the fiduciary acts for/performs duties for another)
and the delegation of power (the fiduciary is entrusted with powers by the entruster in order
to perform his/her function). Frankel, supra note 201, at 808-09. But see DeMott, supra
note 165, at 914-15 (critiquing this theory). Frankel suggests that fiduciary law is designed
to cure the danger of abuse of power which substitution and delegation create. Frankel,
supra note 201, at 809. Here it does not make sense to view the reporter as substitute for
the source, or as a recipient of delegated powers from the source.
Scott's "voluntary assumption" theory, positing that the essence of a fiduciary relation
is the fiduciary's voluntary assumption of a position that requires him to further the interest
of another, also requires that the fiduciary "undertakes to act in the interest of another
person." Scott, Fiduciary,supra note 166, at 540. Neither the reporter nor the friend make
any such undertaking. See DeMott, supra note 165, at 910-11 (critiquing Scott's theory on
other grounds).
Finally, those who would justify fiduciary obligations on the grounds that property is
entrusted to the fiduciary leave no room for expansion to relationships where no property
changes hands. See, e.g., J.C. SHEPERD, LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 96 (1981); cf. DeMott, supra,
note 165, at 912-13 (stating that such a justification on the grounds of involvement of property fails to account for many recognized fiduciary relations).
The only theoretical justification for fiduciary obligations that would support the expansion discussed here is the more descriptive approach of Jones, which postulates a fiduciary duty wherever an unjust enrichment occurs. Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the
Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q. REv. 472, 474-75 (1968). But see DeMott, supra
note 165, at 913 (critiquing this justification as simply descriptive). Even under this theory,
while a reporter's breach of confidence might qualify where a profit resulted from the
breach, it seems to fail to cover any case where the injury is a harm to the plaintiff rather
than a benefit to the defendant.
203. See Katz, supra note 15, at 851:
[T]he expansive range of relationships to which a duty of confidence could be
implied deserves close scrutiny before being applied to the issue at hand. Defining
a legally binding confidential relationship broadly enough to include all relationships in which secrets are transferred and in which 'superiority and influence',
exist would, in this context, allow absurdly petty betrayals to be actionable.
Id.
204. See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
205. Outside the area of loyalty, the fiduciary owes a whole range of duties of which it
seems silly to even think of applying to a reporter or friend. For instance, a trustee has a
duty not to delegate, and the duties to keep and render accounts, to furnish information,
exercise reasonable care and skill, take and keep control, preserve the trust property, en-
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other words, the classification of a relationship as fiduciary carries
with it a wide range of duties. If the only duty we wish to impose is
the duty to keep secrets, it seems unsound to call a relationship a
fiduciary one. 06 It seems cleaner to admit the objective, to deter
the revelation of confidences, and to fashion a remedy to achieve
this goal.20 7
3. The Remedies Available in Fiduciary Based Actions.
Where the fiduciary breaches her duty of loyalty, the beneficiary
has several options. First, if the beneficiary learns that a fiduciary
is about to commit a disloyal act, the beneficiary may seek an injunction to prevent the act from occuring. 20 8 Thus, if an employer
discovers that an employee intends to reveal information in breach
of his fiduciary obligation, the court may enjoin the revelation.20
As a second option, presuming the revelation has already occurred, the breach of confidence plaintiff may assert restitutionary
remedies, 10 claiming either the disgorgement of any monetary gain
by the fiduciary211 or the imposition of a constructive trust.212
force claims, defend actions, keep trust property separate, make the trust property productive and pay income to the beneficiary. See generally 2A TRuSTS, supra note 165, §§ 171179, 181-182.
206. However, courts do impose different obligations on different fiduciary relations.
See Scott, Fiduciary,supra note 166, at 541 ("Some fiduciary relationships are undoubtedly
more intense than others. The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the
fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty."); DeMott, supra note 165, at 879
("Although one can identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles
apply with greater or lesser force in different contexts involving different types of parties
and relationships."). For instance, the standard of care and conduct applicable to directors
has been held less exacting than the standard applicable to trustees. BOGERT, supra note
167, § 481, at 231-44.
207. See Frankel, supra note 201, at 805 (condemning the degree to which the courts
have extended fiduciary relations by analogy without explaining why the rules that apply to
the old prototypes do or do not apply to new ones).
208. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 543(V), at 443; 3 TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 199.2.
209. DOBBS, supra note 114, § 10.5(3), at 730 ("Both permanent and preliminary injunctions are issued to protect trade secrets and confidential information."); see Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (reinstating the trial court's order enjoining any further
publications without pre-clearance); see also supra note 131.
210. See DoBBs, supra note 114, § 10.4, at 722. The breach may also amount to a tort,
for instance, fraud, in which case tortious damages are available. Id. It is important to distinguish such a claim from the restitutionary remedy. Tort "damages" focus on the injury to
the plaintiff-beneficiary, whereas restitution, even when awarding a monetary sum, focuses
on the unjust benefit to the defendant fiduciary. Id. § 4.1(1), at 369 ("Restitution measures
the remedy by the defendant's gain and seeks to force disgorgement of that gain. It differs
in its goal or principle from damages, which measures the remedy by the plaintiff's loss and
seeks to provide compensation for that loss."). As Dobbs notes, courts often confuse the
terminology. Id. § 4.1(1), at 369 n.8.
211. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 543, at 267; DeMott, supra note 165, at 888. This ac-
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These restitutionary remedies focus on the wrongdoing of the fiduciary rather than the loss to the beneficiary. 21 3 Thus the plaintiff
need not prove any financial loss-the measure of the remedy is
the fiduciary's benefit from the breach of duty.21 4 For example, in
Snepp, after the government proved that Snepp breached his duty
of loyalty by not submitting his book for CIA pre-clearance review,
it was entitled to a constructive trust of the profits from sale of
Snepp's book.21 5 In the Court's view, such a constructive trust was
the "natural and customary consequence of a breach of trust. '21 6
To obtain a constructive trust the plaintiff must point to some
res which is to be the subject of the constructive trust.1 7 Moreover, there must be some proof of causation. The breach of trust
must in fact have caused the benefit which is to be disgorged.
However, proof of causation seems a minimal requirement.21 8 In
Snepp, the Court required no proof that the profits from the book
were attributable to the breach, as opposed to the possibility that
they were due to Snepp's writing skills or to the efforts of his pubtion for disgorgement of monetary gain proceeds in equity. 3 TRUSTS, supra note 165,
§ 199.3; see BOGERT, supra note 167, § 862 ("[F]or each breach of trust a trustee may be
directed to make a payment of damages to the beneficiary out of the trustee's own funds,
either in a suit brought for that purpose or on an accounting where the trustee is surcharged
beyond the amount of his admitted liability.").
212. DOBBS, supra note 114, § 10.4, at 723 ("Quite frequently the remedy asserted [for
revelation of confidential information] is the constructive trust."); 5 TRUSTS, supra note 165,
§ 462. This remedy is also available even though the parties are simply in a confidential
relationship. Id. § 505. Some states limit the remedy of constructive trust to cases where
there is a fiduciary or confidential relationship. See DEBORAH A. DEMorr, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS: AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 45 (1991). But cf. DOBBS, supra note 114, § 4.3(2) (stating that the remedy of a constructive trust is no longer limited to breach of fiduciary duty).
213. DOBBS, supra note 114, § 4.1(4), at 379 ("Restitution is measured by the defendant's benefits in the relevant transactions."); DeMott, supra note 165, at 888 (stating that
measure of recovery in breach of fiduciary obligation cases is the benefit to the defendant
fiduciary).
214. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 481, at 279 (noting that it is unimportant whether the
disloyalty caused a financial loss to the beneficiaries of the relationship); DOBBS, supra note
114, § 10.4, at 721 ("[P]rinciples against unjust enrichment require a fiduciary to disgorge
any improper gains he has received as a result of the relationship, even if the beneficiary has
no corresponding loss."); DeMott, supra note 165, at 888 ("Even if the fiduciary's action has
not injured the beneficiary, and even if the beneficiary has in some sense gained as a result
of the fiduciary's act, the fiduciary must account to the beneficiary for its profits."). This is
consistent with the overall aim of fiduciary law which is to focus on and regulate the conduct of the fiduciary. See supra part II.B.
215. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980).
216. Id.
217. BOGERT, supra note 167, § 471, at 9 ("[I1n order to obtain a constructive trust the
plaintiff must identify specific property as the res of the trust.").
218. Farnsworth, supra note 130, at 1356-60 (critiquing the lack of a requirement of
causation in disgorgement).
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lishing company to promote the book. It simply presumed that the
remedy would only reach funds attributable to the breach itself.""0
With its minimal requirements of causation, a constructive
trust can be a lucrative remedy where the confidant has profited
from his wrongdoing. 2 0 However, the plaintiff may find the remedies of fiduciary law less satisfactory if the defendant has not profited, but inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff. Although a
loss to the trust estate has traditionally been recoverable, the cases
speak to a loss suffered by the res of the trust, not of a harm to the
219. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515-16. For criticism of the Court's presumption that the profits represented the result of the breach, see DOBBS, supra note 114, § 10.4, at 723-24 (characterizing Snepp as an extreme and unusual case); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1979
Term: Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 n.31

(1980). But see

GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION

§2.11, at 142 (Supp. 1988) (agree-

ing with the result in Snepp).
220. Presuming a confidential relationship could be established, a source could seemingly recover some of the profits from a newspaper's edition on the theory that these profits
represent the ill-gotten gains of the newspaper's unlawful revelation. For similar thoughts,

see

KENNETH

H.

YORK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES

624-28 (5th ed. 1992)

(discussing restitution for defamation); Cox, supra note 219, at 11; cf. DOBBS, supra note
114, § 12.7(3), at 797 (explaining that defendant's collateral benefits are not recoverable in
restitution).
In addition, unlike contract, fiduciary law may allow for direct recovery against the
third party-or at least those who collude with a fiduciary in committing the breach of duty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 312 cmt. d (1958) ("A person who intentionally causes

a servant or other agent to violate a duty to the principal is subject to liability in tort for the
harm he has caused the principal or in a restitutional action for any profit derived from the
transaction."); 5 TRUSTS, supra note 165, § 506 at 549 ("Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another violates his duty as fiduciary, a third person who participates in the violation
of duty is liable to the beneficiary."). This liability can be asserted under a tort theory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 (1977). It may also be asserted on an equitable basis
for restitution of ill-gotten profits. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 138(2) (1936) ("A third
person who has colluded with a fiduciary in committing a breach of duty and who obtained
a benefit therefrom, is under a duty of restitution to the beneficiary.").
Some degree of notice of the fiduciary obligation is essential. 5 TRUSTS, supra note 165,
§ 506, at 550; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra, § 312 cmt. c. Thus in the employer/employee scenario, a competitor who knowingly induces an employee to reveal confidential information in breach of trust is liable for the profits made thereby. In the friend
scenario, presuming that a fiduciary relationship could be established, if the newspaper published a story knowing that the friend breached her fiduciary duty by revealing the information to it, under a trust theory the newspaper is responsible for any harm or resulting profits. Thus, Cox speculates that the publisher of Snepp's book could be held liable presuming
it knew of the existence of his pre-clearance obligation to the CIA. See Cox, supra note 219,
at 11:
Might not a publisher likewise be charged with participation in the wrong? The
argument would be strongest when the publisher induced the violation; weaker
when the publisher induced the violation; weaker when the publisher was a passive recipient; and probably untenable in the unlikely event that the publisher
bad no notice of the agreement.
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individual beneficiary. 221 Although there is a dearth of authority on
this point, one court has held that so long as the allegation is a
breach of fiduciary duty and not a tort, the plaintiff is limited to
an equitable measure of loss which does not include emotional distress.222 Punitive damages are available only if the breach amounts
to a tort.223 Thus, a plaintiff who suffers only emotional damages
has a slim chance of recovery under current law.
4. Conclusions on the FiduciaryTheory of Recovery. In conclusion, a breach of confidence plaintiff who has suffered only personal injury will have to convince the court that equity allows an
award of emotional distress damages in order to recover. However,
as Snepp illustrates, where the defendant has profited from the
unauthorized revelation, a constructive trust provides a powerful
remedy that often will far exceed contract damages and sweep
claims of lack of causation aside.
While the fiduciary theory is attractive for this reason, it is a
hard row for most plaintiffs to hoe because of the need to fit into
one of the fiduciary categories. Those who seek to sue their em221. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §

205(a) (1959) (stating that "[i]f the trus-

tee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with (a) any loss or depreciation in value of
the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust"); BOGERT, supra note 167, §157, at 560:
The measure of liability is usually not a question of great difficulty. The beneficiaries are entitled to have the trustee restore to the trust the amount that the
trust would not have lost if the trustee had properly performed his duty. They
may demand that they be placed in the same financial situation as if the wrong
had not been committed.
Id.
The courts will award the lost profits that a trust would have made if it were not for the
breach. See, e.g., S & K Sales Co. v. Nike Inc., 816 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1987) (awarding employer compensation for lost sales when employee violated his duty of confidentiality); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra, § 205(a) (stating that breaching trustee is
chargeable with "any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there had been
no breach of trust").
222. Kohler v. Fletcher, 442 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty are exclusively equitable and "precludes recovery of
damages for alleged emotional distress resulting from such breach"); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 197 (1959) ("Except as stated in § 198 [which allows actions at law
for a trustee's failure to pay monies owed and failure to transfer chattels], the remedies of
the beneficiary against the trustee are exclusively equitable."); cf. Lash v. Cheshire County
Say. Bank, 474 A.2d 980, 982 (N.H. 1984) (denying recovery of emotional distress damages
where a bank had breached its fiduciary duty on the grounds that the fiduciary relationship
was analogous to a contractual dispute).
223. Punitive damages are only awarded if fraud or malice is shown. BOGERT, supra
note 167, § 862, at 41 (stating that "exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded where
malice or fraud is involved"). For a criticism of any award of punitive damages even when
disguised as a surcharge, see Richard V. Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal
Fiduciaries-IsRothko Right?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 95, 96 (1978).
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ployees, their professional care-givers (doctors, lawyers, priests) or
their legal representatives (guardians, trustees, agents), often have
an overlooked remedy if their confidences are revealed. However,
those who seek to sue friends or businesses lack a remedy altogether as current plaintiffs cannot be assured of a remedy outside
the traditionally recognized relationships. While some expansion
may be possible, this article argues such growth would be unwise.
Once again these limitations highlight the differences between
the goals of a fiduciary theory and those of a plaintiff seeking to
utilize breach of confidence to pursue a claim for revelation of private facts. Fiduciary law focuses on the relationship of the parties
and aims to severely penalize any failure to maintain the high
standards equity demands for those with fiduciary power.2 24 The
plaintiff gets a remedy not because of the excruciatingly personal
nature of the facts revealed, but because the relationship was violated when the information was revealed. Fiduciary law focuses on
policing the behavior of those entrusted with power. Unless the
plaintiff can point to one of the recognized relationships which the
law polices, a revelation, no matter how personal and how egregious, goes unremedied.
C.

Tortious Theories of Recovery

1. Scope of the ProposedBreach of Confidence Tort. Several
commentators have advocated the recognition of a breach of confidence tort.22 5 They define the tort as the disclosure of information
learned in a "confidential relationship" '2 6 or after a contractual
224. One of the main aims of any equitable remedy for breach of loyalty is to "act as a
deterrent to the commission of similar acts by the trustee in question and by other trustees
in the future." BOGERT, supra note 167, § 543(V), at 441; cf. Frankel, supra note 201, at 819
("IT]he focus of the law remains on the fiduciary's performance of his services to the
entruster.").

225. See Harvey, supra note 11, at 2425; Vickery, supra note 11, at 1455. Other recommendations have been less specific, simply advocating a tort but failing to define it. See, e.g.,
Bezanson, supra note 3, at 1174 (calling for the adoption of a breach of confidence action);
Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 665 (advocating the consideration of an action based on
breach of confidence).
Both Vickery and Harvey advocate the creation of a tort, but also argue that the courts
in the United States have already begun to allow recovery in tort where a disclosure in
breach of confidence occurs. See Vickery, supra note 11, at 1428-34 (arguing that existing
caselaw demonstrates that courts are recognizing an action for breach of confidence); Harvey, supra note 11, at 2399 (arguing that the breach of confidence cause of action has experienced a "renaissance in American common law").
226. See Vickery, supra note 11, at 1455 (discussing "the unconsented, unprivileged
disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a
confidential relationship") (emphasis added)). Vickery would limit the tort to disclosures
by nonpersonal confidants, e.g., doctors, lawyers and bankers. Id. at 1460 (stating that "an
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commitment to silence.227 Thus, fiduciary or contract law define
the tortious duty not to disclose.
This approach is replicated in real life. Only two states, California 228 and New York, 229 recognize a separate but limited tort of
breach of confidence. 23 0 Both use contractual and fiduciary concepts to define the tort. The California courts define it as occurring
actionable duty of confidentiality should attach to nonpersonal relationships customarily
understood to carry an obligation of confidence"). In addition, Vickery would recognize several defenses to the proposed action. Id. at 1462-66.
227. See Harvey, supra note 11, at 2425 (arguing that "a legally enforceable duty of
confidentiality should attach whenever a person [discloses] . . . personal information that
she/it has explicitly and voluntarily agreed to hold in confidence") (emphasis added)).
228. Several California appellate court decisions have recognized the tort. See Balboa
Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 789 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that
"several California courts have recognized an independent tort of breach of confidence");
Tele-Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating that California "has recognized a cause of action for breach of confidence" although the
"parameters of the breach of confidence action have not yet been well defined"); Faris v.
Endberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (Ct. App. 1979); Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 88
Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970). The Supreme Court, however, has reserved judgment on the
issue, refusing to state whether such a cause of action exists independent of a contract-based
claim. Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Cal. 1975).
The Davies case is a curious creature. Because the case had been twice appealed and
the California Supreme Court had denied review, the court on the third appeal took it as
"law of the case" that a cause of action in tort existed. However, it refused to decide if,
generally, such an action would be recognized. Id. at 1164. Instead, the court dismissed the
action as untimely after performing the nigh supernatural task of resolving what statute of
limitations applied to "a theory of liability never acknowledged or rejected by this court."
Id. Later courts understandably have been confused as to the meaning of this decision.
Compare Rokos v. Peck, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that Supreme
Court's "language raises considerable doubt as to whether such a cause of action should be
countenanced") with Faris,158 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (citing Davies for the proposition that "we
have no difficulty in concluding that a cause of action for breach of confidence is recognized
in California, including in the Supreme Court").
229. The Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, has not ruled on the issue, but
several of the state's lower courts and a federal court have recognized such a tort. See, e.g.,
Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New
York law and stating that "[b]reach of confidence is a relative newcomer to the tort family"); Harley v. Druzba, 565 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279-80 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that revelation
of social worker/client communications is "actionable as a tort even though it arises from a
contractual relationship"); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (Sup.
Ct. 1988) (noting that breach of doctor/patient obligation of confidentiality sounded in tort),
afl'd, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1989); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (App.
Div. 1982) ("We believe that the [doctor/patient] relationship contemplates an additional
duty springing from but extraneous to the contract and that the breach of such duty is
actionable as a tort.").
230. Cases from other jurisdictions that recognize or at least discuss the possibility of a
tort action in particular fact scenarios are listed by subject matter. See infra notes 249-51.
In many of these cases, the courts canvas numerous theories, almost always including tort,
contract and fiduciary duty, and frequently rest liability on an amalgam of those theories.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
when "an idea ...

[Vol. 43

is offered to another in confidence, and is vol-

untarily received by the offeree in confidence with the understanding that it is not to be disclosed to others."2 31 An essential element
is "an understanding between the parties that an idea is offered
upon a condition of confidence" and the defendant's "voluntary assumption of a relationship of personal confidence.

' 232 Thus

in most

of the California cases, a majority of which concern the revelation
of an idea for a show or movie,2 33 tort mimics contract, requiring
an agreement to confidentiality as an essential element. 234 Moreover, these cases seem more akin to efforts to protect a "property"
interest in ideas than intimate personal information. 35
New York so far has recognized a tort for disclosure of confidential information only in cases where arguably either a fiduciary
relationship or an implied contract already exist. The New York
appellate courts first recognized the action where psychiatrists revealed the confidences of their patients. 36 The appellate courts
231. Faris, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 712; accord Balboa, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (citing Faris);
Tele-Count, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (citing Faris).
232. Tele-Count, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 281; see also Faris,158 Cal. Rptr. at 713. (emphasizing that the actual, not constructive knowledge that an idea is offered in confidence is required, and that the defendant must have an opportunity to reject the disclosure).
233. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (explaining that Anderson claimed his concept of an East/West boxing confrontation was used
in Rocky IV); Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1161 (Cal. 1975) (explaining that Davies
alleged he had submitted his written story "Love Must Go On" to the defendant in confidence, and that defendant incorporated the idea into his successful play Who Was that
Lady I Saw You With); Rokos v. Peck, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480, 482-83 (Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that plaintiff's semibiographical writings on teenage suicide were allegedly used in ABC
movie of the week); Faris v. Endberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 704 (Ct. App. 1979) (arguing that
his ideas for a television sports quiz were allegedly incorporated into quiz show).
Other cases concern the alleged theft of information by employees. See, e.g., Balboa,
267 Cal. Rptr. at 787; Tele-Count, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
234. Tele-Count, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 280 ("The tort of breach of confidence is based upon
the concept of an implied obligation or contract between the parties.").
235. See, e.g., Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters. Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970)
(stating that breach of confidence protects the "right of plaintiff's work to protection by
reason of sufficient novelty and elaboration of the accessible idea"). In fact, the tort seems
to have evolved from a relaxation of the definition of theft of a trade secret allowing recovery where confidential information not amounting to a trade secret is revealed. See Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 310 P.2d 436, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (allowing recovery for
disclosure of confidential idea not amounting to a trade secret). The only case concerning
private information, where a bishop revealed the details of the sexual relationship of congregation members, involved an express promise not to reveal the information communicated.
See Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 264 Cal. Rptr. 640, 647 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that bishop's revelation of plaintiff's extramarital affair after promise of confidentiality
was obtained could give rise to a cause of action in tort, but remanding for consideration of
whether the communications were for religious purposes and thus shielded by religion
clauses of the First Amendment).
236. Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Some courts have traced the
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seemed to rest liability on a variety of theories including contract,
the parties' fiduciary relationship, implied statutory duty and
tort.2 37 In later cases the appellate courts made clear that the action sounds in tort,2 3 s but failed to define its elements. 23 9 The tort,
however, seems to require the revelation of information in violation
of an existing fiduciary relationship, 240 contract 241 or, perhaps
both.2 42 Beyond the numerous doctor and psychiatrist cases,2 43 the
New York courts have extended the disclosure tort only to social
workers, 244 bankers 245 and a reporter. 246 In Vitelli v. GoodsonTodman Enterprises,a reporter expressly promised not to disclose
the identity of the family featured in his article, "Tormented By A
origins of the New York tort even earlier. See, e.g., Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460
(Sup. Ct. 1985) (tracing the origin of the breach of confidence tort to two earlier New York
cases-Felis v. Greenberg, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1966)); and Clark v. Gerraci, 208
N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960)).
237. See Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
238. See Young v. United States Dept. of Justice, 882 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1989); Harley v.
Druzba, 565 N.Y.S.2d 278 (App. Div. 1991); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804
(App. Div. 1982) (finding that breach of the duty of confidentiality "is actionable as tort");
Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 542 N.Y.S.2d
96 (App. Div. 1989); Fedell, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (citing cases which establish a separate
action of breach of confidence); see also supra note 229.
239. See, e.g., Young, 882 F.2d at 641 (remarking that "still in its infancy the breachof-confidence cause of action is still experiencing growing pains").
240. See Young, 882 F.2d at 640 ("[Breach of confidence] like the law of privilege is
rooted in the concept that the law should recognize some relationship" as confidential to
encourage uninhibited discussions between the parties."); Fedell, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 462 ("In
order to sustain a cause of action for breach of confidence, the court must find as a component that there was a confidential relationship which has not been waived.").
241. Harley, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 279 (finding that cause of action "arises from a contractual relationship").
242. MacDonald,446 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (stating that "defendant's breach was not merely
a broken contractual promise but a violation of a fiduciary responsibility").
243. See, e.g., Ace v. State, 553 N.Y.S.2d 605 (App. Div. 1990) (psychiatric records released by state); MacDonald, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (psychiatrist); Fedell, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460
(physician); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (Sup. Ct. 1988)
(physician, nurse and hospital), afl'd, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1989); Doe v. Roe, 400
N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (psychiatrist).
244. Harley v. Druzba, 565 N.Y.S.2d 278 (App. Div. 1991).
245. Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1989) (predicting, somewhat hesitantly, that the New York courts would recognize an action for breach of
confidence against banks despite the lower level of relationship when compared with doctors); Boccardo v. Citibank, 579 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (refusing to recognize a
duty of confidence between a banker and a borrower, but noting that New York courts have
suggested such an obligation may lie between a bank and its depositors); Graney Dev. Corp.
v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 1978) (ruling not on a tort action, but recognizing that customers have an expectation of privacy in
their bank records). For bank cases from other jurisdictions, see supra note 86 and infra
note 250.
246. Vivelli v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 558 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1990).
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Drug Crazed Daughter." The plaintiffs sued after several persons
had identified them, claiming tortious breach of confidence. 4 7 The
court indicated such an action would lie, but dismissed the claim,
citing state constitutional guarantees of free speech.248
Other states have toyed with recognizing a tort action for
breach of confidence. Once again however, these states have done
so only in scenarios where a revelation violates either a promise of
confidentiality or some type of special relationship. Thus, like New
York, numerous states have imposed tortious liability where doctors (including psychiatrists) 2 9 and bankers 2 0 have revealed their
247. Id. The plaintiffs did not bring a contract claim, perhaps because the court in
Fedell indicated that the breach of confidence tort is now the sole remedy, replacing contract. See Fedell, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (stating that "the courts have ruled appropriate the
tort of breach of confidence, and as inappropriate malpractice, breach of contract, breach of
privacy and prima facie tort").
248. Vivelli, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
249. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinkel's, 492 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("We
hold that the breach of a physician-patient relationship is an actionable tort."); Alberts v.
Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) ("We hold today that a duty of confidentiality
arises from the physician-patient relationship and that a violation of that duty, resulting in
damages, gives rise to an action sounding in tort against the physician."); Brandt v. Medical
Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Mo. 1993) ("[A] physician has a fiduciary duty of
confidentiality not to disclose any medical information received in connection with the
treatment of the patient. . . . [and] that if any such information is disclosed [without a
previous waiver], the patient has a cause of action for damages in tort against the physician."); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962) ("We conclude. . . that ordinarily
a physician receives information relating to a patient's health in a confidential capacity and
should not disclose such information without the patient's consent, except where the public
interest or the private interest of the patient so demands."); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (recognizing an implied contract action
and that "[t]he unauthorized revelation of medical secrets, or any confidential communication given in the course of treatment, is tortious conduct which may be the basis for an
action in damages"); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985) (holding doctor's estate liable for revelation of patient's information); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d
814, 817 (Utah 1958) (recognizing a cause of action "if the doctor violates that confidence
and publishes derogatory matter concerning his patient").
Other courts have, in dicta, indicated a willingness to entertain the possibility of an
action based on tort or otherwise. See, e.g., Dotson v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 090017, 1990
LEXIS 656 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 1990) (stating that "the court recognizes that there
may be a cause of action for breach of confidentiality" but that any confidence was waived
in the pending case); Wenninger v. Musing, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Minn. 1976) ("We note
without deciding that a physician who discloses confidential information about his patient
to another in a private interview may be subject to tort liability for breach of his patient's
right to privacy or to professional discipline for unprofessional conduct."); Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("We do not find that this case [involving
doctor's revelations after malpractice action filed] warrants establishing a new cause of action."); Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 141 (Wash. 1988) ("We recognize without deciding
that a cause of action may lie against a physician for unauthorized disclosure of privileged
information" (citing dicta in Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917))). But see Creamer
v. Danks, 700 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (D. Me. 1988) (holding rule of evidence precluding testi-
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clients' confidential information. Many of these cases hover between resting liability on fiduciary
duty in implied contract and
2 51
recognizing a new tort action.
mony "does not establish that Maine recognizes a tort remedy for breach of. . .confidentiality"); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (holding "there is no confidential relationship between doctor and patient or hospital and patient in Georgia").
Still others have found a private right of action implied by a state statute. See, e.g.,
Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974) (finding private right of action for breach of
confidence based on South Dakota statute imposing duty of confidentiality on physicians);
Allen v. Smith, 368 S.E.2d 924, 926 (W.Va. 1988) (recognizing that statute creates private
right of action, although action was barred by statute of limitations).
For a list of these cases, see Zelin, supra note 89; see also Harvey, supra note 11, at
2399 n.75; Vickery, supra note 11, at 1428-30.
250. See, e.g., Rubenstein v. South Denver Nat'l Bank, 762 P.2d 755 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988) (recognizing tort action for bank's disclosure of confidential information); Milohnich
v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that complaint was
sufficient to state a cause of action based on implied contract, concurring judge recognizing
a tort); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (basing liability
on implied contract as well as tort); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1979) (resting opinion ostensibly on implied contract, but suggesting that action
may be one in tort since it discusses whether the "negligent" disclosure is the proximate
cause of injury and permits recovery for reputational injuries); cf. Djowharzadeh v. City
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that bank owed
obligation to loan applicant to keep and not exploit confidential information, despite absence of any relationship or contract between them).
Other courts have indicated, in dicta, that an obligation lies but have not defined the
nature of that duty. See, e.g., People's Bank v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914, 917 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(recognizing that banks owe an obligation of confidentiality in regards to information contained in customer records); Richfield Bank and Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648, 651
(Minn. 1976) (noting that "a bank is generally under a duty not to disclose the financial
condition of its depositors"); Roth v. First Nat'l State Bank, 404 A.2d 1182, 1184 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1979) ("It must be conceded that there is a generally recognized obligation of
confidentiality in respect of a depositor's financial relationship with a bank."); Peck v. Liberty Fed. Say. Bank, 766 P.2d 928, 933 (N.M. 1988) (stating that "we too are mindful that a
bank generally has a duty to its customers not to disclose the customers' financial condition
to third parties"); Vaughan v. Taylor, 718 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (assuming
that "the bank had an implied contractual or fiduciary duty not to disclose that information
except under proper legal compulsion"); Torkarz v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656
P.2d 1089 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding "general rule is that a bank is under a duty not to
disclose the financial condition of its customers"); see also Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Bank's Liability Under State Law For DisclosingFinancialInformation Concerning
Depositor Or Creditor,81 A.L.R. 4TH 377 (1992) (collecting bank disclosure cases, and noting that while majority of cases proceed under an implied contract theory, some appear to
sound in tort); Harvey, supra note 11, at 2401 n.79; Vickery, supra note 11, at 1430-31
(analyzing banker cases); cf. Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666, 671-73 (Neb. 1989) (citing the authorities supporting such a cause of action but concluding that there was no such
duty where the statements were made in an effort to enhance the creditor's position);
O'Coin v. Woonstocket Inst. Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263, 1266 (R.I. 1988) (rejecting claim because no legally cognizable damages proven but refusing to decide whether a cause of action
existed and whether that cause of action would sound in contract or tort).
251. See, e.g., Humphers, 696 P.2d at 536 ("[P]laintiff may proceed under her claim of
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In sum, a number of courts have recognized an action for
breach of confidence sounding in tort. However, neither the courts
nor commentators seem willing to advocate or adopt a tort that
defines information "given in confidence" in a way radically different from the type of conduct that contract and fiduciary law already covers.252
2. Reasons to Create A Tort Remedy. Since the gravamen of
the tort seems to replicate fiduciary or contract law, it is sensible
to question why courts and commentators believe another theory
of recovery is needed. This Article posits two main reasons: first,
the different measure of damages available in tort; second, a desire
to escape the formalities of contract and fiduciary law.
As we have seen, the measure of damages in both contract and
fiduciary law seems inadequate because it ignores the mental suffering that a plaintiff typically endures. However, in tort, "the
traditional theory is that.

. .

awards for personal injury are aimed

at compensating the victim or making good the losses proximately

resulting from the injury. '2 5 3 Where there is injury to a person,

tort law allows the recovery of compensatory damages for both the
bodily harm and the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff.25 4
Emotional distress damages compensate both for the "disagreeable
emotion experienced by the plaintiff"2 55 and for "humiliation, that
is, a feeling of degradation or inferiority or a feeling that other
breach of confidentiality in a confidential relationship.").
252. One additional source of a tort action for breach of confidence which may expand
the scope of action is where a private right of action is seen as flowing from statute. These
statutes sometimes criminalize disclosure, particularly by government agencies. Some courts
have also considered utilizing the evidentiary privilege statutes to find private actions where
confidences are disclosed. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671-73 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(concluding that state's evidentiary statute and education act did create a private right of
action when psychiatrist revealed information).
253. DOBBS, supra note 114, § 8.1, at 647; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 901 cmt. a (1977).
254. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 924 (1977) ("One whose interests of personality have been tortiously invaded is entitled to recover damages for past or prospective (a)
bodily harm and emotional distress; (b) loss or impairment of earning capacity; (c) reasonable medical and other expenses; and (d) harm to the property or business caused by the
invasion."). Compensatory damages for bodily harm and emotional distress may be awarded
without proof of pecuniary loss. Id. § 905.
255. Id. § 905 cmt. c; see also DOBBS, supra note 114, § 8.1(4), at 652:
Where the tort is established, the pain for which recovery is allowed includes virtually any form of conscious suffering, both emotional and physical. Recovery is
not limited to suffering or distress directly resulting from the tort; it may include
pain or distress resulting from subsequent medical treatment so long as it is a
proximate result.
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people will regard him with aversion or dislike.

2 56

59
Injury to repu-

tation is also permitted for most intentional torts and would presumably extend to this new tort for breach of confidence.2 57 Tort

law also permits the recovery of punitive damages where there is
outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant. Such recovery
acts to deter the defendant and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 5 8
Commentators advocating a breach of confidence tort have
2"59
noted the more generous damages awarded under a tort theory.
The courts also seem driven to tort law because of the damages
they wish to award. New York courts have expressly acknowledged
such a motivation: "if plaintiff's recovery were limited to an action
for breach of contract

. . .

he would generally be precluded from

recovering for mental distress, loss of employment, and the deterioration of his marriage.

' 26 0

Other courts allowing recovery in tort

256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. d (1977).
257. Most courts considering this issue have held that reputational damages are recoverable for intentional torts. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 306
S.E.2d 340 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that claims for injury to reputation are "recoverable
only in actions alleging intentional or wanton misconduct, for example, libel and slander,
malicious prosecution or malicious arrest"), aff'd, 311 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1984); Grieves v.
Greenwood, 550 N.E.2d 334 (Ind.App. 1990) (allowing reputational damages for intentional
torts).
As one interesting Comment discusses, however, while some courts have permitted recovery for reputational injury based on simple negligence, other courts have applied the rule
in a restricted fashion, allowing recovery for reputation only in defamation actions. See
Kate Silbaugh, Comment, Sticks and Stones Can Break My Name: Nondefamatory Negligent Injury To Reputation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 870-71 (1992).
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977); see also DOBS, supra note 114,
§ 3.11(1), at 316-17:
[The punitive award is not necessarily appropriate in every case of conscious
wrongdoing, but if the facts otherwise warrant the award may be made in a variety of tort cases, both intentional and negligent, and including civil rights torts
. . .Lawyers perhaps traditionally thought of punitive damages awards most commonly in cases of physical harms to person or property. But punitive awards may
also be made for violations of intimate rights such as those of privacy.
Id.
Tort law will also allow injunctive relief if appropriate to the facts of the case. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1977); see also Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 679 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (issuing injunction permanently enjoining defendants from further circulation of the
book which contained details of their patient's private lives learned during therapy); DoBBs,
supra note 114, §§ 7.2 & 7.3(4), at 632-33, 638 (discussing that while courts traditionally
refused injunction in defamation or other dignitary tort cases on the ground that equity
would not protect personal as distinct from property rights, this limitation is obsolete today
and the courts may issue injunctions subject to free speech limitations).
259. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 11, at 2428 n.207 (citing the deficiency of contract
damages as a reason to create tort action); Vickery, supra note 11, at 1445 (arguing that
inadequacy of contract damages is reason to create tort).
260. Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (noting
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have also expressly acknowledged this advantage.216

The second reason that appears to motivate courts and commentators advocating the adoption of a tort action, is the freedom
it allows to expand the cause of action. In contract, for instance,
we have seen that some courts are willing to use promissory estoppel to grant a remedy where a formal contract is lacking. Transforming the contract claim into a tort gives even more creative
freedom. Thus California's breach of confidence tort does not require a "contract," but rather liability is triggered when the recipient voluntarily receives the information with the understanding
that it is not to be disclosed to others.2 62 Equally, English law allows recovery where there is an unrebuffed, unilateral assertion
that the information is given in confidence. 6 3
The courts are also free to expand the category of relations
that trigger a duty of confidence without impacting general fiduciary law. Thus the courts have been willing to recognize a tort action for breach of confidence by banks, while admitting that this
relationship is not usually a fiduciary one.264 Likewise, English
courts permit recovery in a broad range of relationships which are
that if an action proceeded in contract damages it would be confined to economic loss and,
therefore, the court allowed a tort claim), aff'd, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1989); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (App. Div. 1982).
261. See also Young v. United States Dept. of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1989)
("Recovery in contract, unlike recovery in tort, allows only for economic loss flowing directly
from the breach."); Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. 1969) (Pearson,
J., concurring) (advocating recognition of a tort and criticizing majority who would base
action in contract, and yet award tort measure of damages), overruled by Barnett Bank v.
Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986); Harley v. Druzba, 565 N.Y.S.2d 278, 289-80 (App. Div.
1991) ("[A] breach [of confidence] is actionable as a tort even though it arises from a contractual relationship. The damages sought here include such injuries as mental distress, loss
of employment and deterioration of plaintiff's marriage. These are beyond contract damages."); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 529 (Or. 1985) (noting that pursuing a contract-based claim prohibited recovery of emotional distress damages and instead
based action in tort); see also Vickery, supra note 11, at 1445-46 (discussing benefits of a
tort measurement of damages when compared to contract).
262. Balboa Ins. Co. v. Transglobal Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 798 (Ct. App. 1990)
(finding that duty arises where information is "offered in confidence and is voluntarily received by the offeree in confidence with the understanding that it is not to be disclosed by
others . . .

"

(quoting Faris v. Endberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (Ct. App. 1979)); Tele-

Count Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1985) (contract is
not required, but simply an understanding that the information is to be treated
confidentially).
263. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., Rubenstein v. South Denver Nat'l Bank, 762 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1989) (stating that while "there is no per se fiduciary relationship between a borrower
and lender," bank did have a "duty not to disclose the financial condition of its customers
and depositors").
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not regarded as fiduciary. 65 By recognizing a tort that punishes
only the revelation of information, the courts can impose a duty of
confidence on novel relationships without the need to explain why
the other duties that typically attach to a true fiduciary relation
are not triggered."'8 Thus the recharacterization of breach of confidence as a tort offers the opportunity to transform it from an action of limited utility to one of startling scope.287
265. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. An obligation of confidence has
been recognized between husband and wife (although not between "transient" homosexual
lovers), social friends, parties in the pre-contractual stage of business negotiations, the recipients of information produced during discovery in a civil case and, if they seize documents in a criminal investigation, police owe an obligation of confidence to the documents'
owner.
266. See, e.g., Andersen Consulting v. CHP Consulting Ltd., (Eng. Ch. July 26, 1991)
(LEXIS, Enggen library):
[N]ot every relationship which imposes an obligation in equity is a fiduciary relationship. . . . If for example one friend confides to another friend in circumstances where the communication is plainly intended to be (and therefore kept)
confidential an idea, a piece of knowledge, or something which can be turned to
advantage. If the friend to whom the communication was made seeks to go off and
turn that information to his own advantage, equity will no doubt and rightly restrain him. But the relationship of friend is not a relationship having a fiduciary
nature and the obligation is not a fiduciary obligation: it is simply an obligation of
equity imposed in conscience.
Id.
267. A final possible advantage of transforming breach of confidence into a tort is the
ability to sue strangers. Transformation into tort, as illustrated by English law, offers the
possibility of an easier threshold to recovery against third parties. See supra notes 55-56
(discussing that English law will enjoin revelation of confidences by third parties who acquire information innocently once they learn of its confidential origin). An American tort
need not adopt this feature and indeed one of the Comments advocating a tort rejects this
characteristic of the English action. See Harvey, supra note 11, at 2430 ("[T]he proposed
duty of confidentiality attaches only if an individual is bound by an explicit agreement, no
obligation will attach to parties who receive information subject to an obligation of confidence, but who have not explicitly assumed this obligation themselves.").
American case law has not yet reached the point of allowing recovery against third parties. The closest case on point is Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 573 N.Y.S.2d 828
(Sup. Ct. 1991). There an HIV-positive patient agreed to a request by his doctor and a
newspaper to photograph his treatment only on the condition that he would be unrecognizable. Id. at 830. When he was recognized in the photo by family and friends, he sued and
recovered against the doctor and hospital for tortious breach of confidence. Id. at 829. He
filed only libel and invasion of privacy claims against the newspaper, both of which were
dismissed. However, the doctor and hospital raised contribution and indemnity claims
against the newspaper. Id. at 830. The court held that only the contribution claim could
proceed. Id. While this would suggest that an action against third parties might be possible,
such a wide reading would be erroneous. The Anderson court clearly felt that if the plaintiff
had raised a breach of contract action against the newspaper there would have been liability
because the newspaper did contract to make the plaintiff unrecognizable. Id. Thus the court
does not actually regard the paper as a third party recipient of the information, but rather
one of the parties to the promise of secrecy.
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While the tort of breach of confidence seems to borrow from
the already existing actions for breach of contract and fiduciary
duty, it actually represents a shift in the definition of the underlying wrong. For a breach of confidence plaintiff proceeding in either
contract or fiduciary duty, the wrong focused on is the breach of
the fiduciary duty or the contract, respectively. The harm is the
breach. If the fiduciary breached the duty of loyalty by self-dealing
with the estate, the wrong would be the same-a betrayal of the
power entrusted to the fiduciary. Equally in contract law, contract
cares little what the breach is-a breach of contract by failing to
pay for a car is as much a breach as the revealing of confidences.
The act that constitutes the breach is immaterial.
In contrast, the tort can be committed in only one way: communication. It is narrower and more focused than either the contract or fiduciary based actions. Both contract and fiduciary law
seek to remedy all breaches of the contract or trust relationship. In
contrast, the tort seeks to punish only one type of wrongdoing:
speech. Thus the change from contract and fiduciary law to tort
law marks a change in the nature of the wrong being penalized.
This change in the wrong is reflected in the different measurement of damages. The injury that the tort of breach of confidence
seeks to remedy is not the betrayal of trust or promise, but the
hurt that forbidden speech causes. The focus of the tort remedy is
not the defendant's breach but the injury the speech causes to the
plaintiff. Thus the tort measures the injury to the plaintiff's emotional state and reputation, one injury that both fiduciary and contract law have so far proved unwilling to compensate.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A. Introduction
This Article has posited that interest in the breach of confidence action is prompted by the apparently impending demise of
the private-facts tort.2" ' Yet if the privacy tort is unconstitutional
because of its impact on free speech, can the breach of confidence
action withstand a similar First Amendment challenge? This Section of the Article records how the Supreme Court has responded
to actions for breach of confidence and predicts the Court's future
holdings. It then offers my view of the constitutional implications
for breach of confidence.
268.

See supra part I.B.
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The Supreme Court and Breach of Confidence

1. State Action And the First Amendment. It is axiomatic
that the limitations of the First Amendment are only triggered by
state action.26 9 Since its decision in New York Times Co. v Sullivan,27 0 the Supreme Court has unwaveringly held that a state
court's application of the state-created torts of defamation, privacy
and emotional distress in a manner that restricts free speech constitutes state action.2 7 1 A tort action for breach of confidence will
presumably trigger the same finding.
The Supreme Court has also found state action in a state
court's enforcement of a promise of confidentiality under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In Cohen, the Court reasoned that
enforcement of promissory estoppel constituted state action because the state court was imposing a contract that the parties had
never formally made:
In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that if Cohen could recover
at all it would be on the theory of promissory estoppel, a state law doctrine
which, in the absence of a contract, creates obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties. These legal obligations would be enforced through the
to
official power of the Minnesota courts. Under our cases, that is enough
27 2
constitute "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

While the Court in Cohen made it clear that a breach of confidence
action founded in promissory estoppel meets the state action requirement, it was equally careful to leave open the issue of whether
a pure contract action would do so. Contract, because it enforces
obligations "explicitly assumed by the parties," arguably does not
involve the same degree of state activity and thus would not trig269. The First Amendment states "Congress shall make no law ... abridging freedom
of speech or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). As Professor Tribe
points out, state action is strongly tied to the substantive constitutional right at issue. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1699 (2d ed. 1988). This Section therefore
focuses on the Court's treatment of state action in the First Amendment arena.

270. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("It matters not that law has been applied in a civil action
and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute.. . . [t]he test is not the

form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has
in fact been exercised.").
271. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) ("Our cases teach that the
application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citations
omitted)); see also TRIBE, supra note 269, at 1711 ("In the line of decisions which begins
with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court, at least in reviewing the results

of state court adjudications, has shown no hesitation whatsoever about subjecting common
law defamation and privacy rules to first amendment scrutiny.") (citations omitted)); Levi,
supra note 100, at 647.
272. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668.
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ger First Amendment scrutiny at all.2 73
This distinction between state action in contract and promissory estoppel presumes that the latter is the imposition of governmental policies on the public, but in the former the parties create
the agreement and the law simply enforces their bargain.2 7 4 As several authors have pointed out, this distinction is unsatisfactory because the decision to enforce a contract is as much a policy decision as is a state court's decision to enforce promissory estoppel or
even tort.275 However, the Court's careful wording in Cohen suggests that, unsatisfactory or not, the Court may utilize this distinction to find that court enforcement of a contract does not constitute state action. If so, an action for breach of confidence founded
on pure contract will entirely escape constitutional review because
of a lack of state action.
Such a result is also possible for the fiduciary-based cause of
action. In equal protection cases, the Supreme Court has hinted
that a state court's application of "general principles" of state law
to a testamentary trust does not constitute state action. 2 7 The Supreme Court could reason that where parties voluntarily agree to
assume fiduciary roles there is no state action in enforcing the resulting obligations. However, given the degree of discretion a state
court enjoys in determining whether a fiduciary relation exists and
the scope of the resulting duties, the Supreme Court could find
state action by characterizing a state court's imposition of a fiduciary duty as the enforcement
of "legal obligations never explicitly
2 77
assumed by the parties.
273. Id.; cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that grant of injunctive
relief by state court to litigants seeking to enforce privately negotiated racially restrictive
covenants was state action).
274. TRIBE, supra note 269, at 1713-14 (stating that argument presumes rules of tort
law are plainly government rules, but that "contract law, so it is said, consists simply of
rules by which courts identify enforceable contracts; the substance of the agreements which
the courts enforce is the product of the parties' will and not the state's"); Fallon, supra note
95, at 616-22 (discussing the Court's holdings on the issue of state action in Cohen).
275. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 269, at 1714 ("In an era in which contract and tort
merge, however, the distinction is hardly satisfactory."); Levi, supra note 100, at 647-48
(rejecting the distinction as unsatisfactory).
276. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970) (holding that decision to hold trust
failed, rather than reform it by removing its racially restrictive nature, was not state action
since "in ruling as they did the Georgia courts did no more than apply the well settled
general principles of Georgia law to determine the meaning and effect of a Georgia will");
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966) (finding state action where city was a trustee and
was only nominally replaced by private trustees, but indicating in dicta that "[i]f a testator
wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race only and in no way implicated the
State in the supervision, control or management of that facility, we assume arguendo that
no constitutional difficulty would be encountered").
277. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (emphasis added).
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In short, the tort and promissory estoppel versions of breach
of confidence easily fall within the Court's prior findings of state
action. In contrast, the contract and perhaps fiduciary versions
may avoid any constitutional scrutiny for lack of state action.
2. The ConstitutionalFate of Breach of Confidence. a. The
Court's Treatment of Breach of Confidence Claims. The Court has
decided two breach of confidence claims: Snepp v. United
States278 in 1980 and Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 27 9 in 1991. On
both occasions the Court has allowed recovery, rejecting the application of the First Amendment precedent which would 2smandate
0
both strict scrutiny and presumptive unconstitutionality.
Snepp came before the Court on Snepp's claim that any enforcement of his confidentiality contract was unconstitutional and
on the government's conditional cross petition arguing that a constructive trust should be imposed.2 81 In Snepp, most of the Court's
opinion is devoted to explaining why a constructive trust is the appropriate remedy. 282 Snepp's First Amendment argument, "that
his agreement is unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected
speech," is dismissed in a footnote.28 3 In that note, the Court first
analogized Snepp's claim to government employee cases where the
Court has held that the government is entitled to impose reasonable restraints upon its employees. 2 8 4 The Court then reasoned that
the government has a compelling interest in "protecting both the
secrecy of the information important to our national security and
the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operations of our foreign intelligence service. ' 28 5 Characterizing these
interests as "vital," the Court concluded that the agreement signed
by Snepp was enforceable as a reasonable means for protecting
these concerns.28 6
278. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
279. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
280. See infra notes 329-38 and accompanying text (discussing this precedent).
281. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507 (1980). The Fourth Circuit had held
that Snepp had breached his confidentiality contract with the CIA when he published a
book without pre-clearance. Snepp v. United States, 595 F.2d 926, 929 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd
in part, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). But the court rejected the CIA's request for a constructive
trust finding that no breach of fiduciary duty had occurred. Id. at 929 ("[W]e think that it
was not shown on this record that defendant breached a fiduciary obligation, and it was
therefore improper for the district court to impose a constructive trust on the monies earned
from publication of the book.").
282. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510-16.
283. Id. at 509 n.3.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. The Court went on to find that a breach of confidence, in the fiduciary sense,
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Given the paucity of the opinion, it is hard to determine what
test, if any, the Court was applying when it upheld both the contract and fiduciary versions of breach of confidence in the face of

Snepp's First Amendment challenge. On one hand, it may be that
the Court did apply some high level of scrutiny and found the asserted interest in security to be so "vital" a concern as to outweigh
Snepp's free speech interest.""
On the other hand, the Court simply may have put Snepp in
the "speech by government employees box" where, without a lot of
explanation, it has repeatedly held that the rules of the First
Amendment are inapplicable or at least watered down.2"" The final
explanation for the Court's ruling in Snepp is that the majority
analyzed Snepp's argument as he phrased it, that is, that the preclearance agreement was a prior restraint.281 9 Having concluded
that the agreement was not a prior restraint, the Court may well
not have questioned whether punishing the speech after publication was also a First Amendment violation.
The Court and the commentators seemed content to treat
Snepp as an oddball-and, for one or more of the reasons articulated above, did not regard it as indicative of the Court's approach
to actions alleging breach of confidence. 2 0 However, Snepp's permissive approach to breach of confidence actions re-emerged in the
majority's opinion in Cohen.29 1 Cohen involved reporters' promises
had also occurred and to impose a constructive trust without perceiving, or at least discussing, any First Amendment problem. Id. at 510-16.
287. This reading, which treats the decision as a national security case, is undermined
by the government's own admission that none of the information released in the book was
classified. Id. at 510. Thus, the secrecy interest is reduced to a claim that CIA agents and
other security forces might be wary of dealing with the CIA if they believed that former
agents could publish freely. Id. at 512-13. It seems curious that the Court would conclude
that this vague security concern could outweigh the free speech interest, when in prior cases,
most notably in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (also known as the
Pentagon Papers Case), the Court rejected stronger showings of a threat to national security as insufficient. While admittedly a prior restraint case, the New York Times Court indicated that a national security interest was not sufficient to justify preventing publication of
the truth. Indeed, the Court recently confirmed that national security does not always
trump truth, citing New York Times as illustrating cases in which "the right of the press to
publish truth overcame asserted interests other than personal privacy." Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 524 n.6 (1989). Such assertions make it questionable whether the Court
in Snepp really concluded that the limited security interest at stake outweighed the free
speech interest.
288. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
289. See supra notes 283 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., TRINE, supra note 269, at 967 (treating Snepp as a national defense case).
291. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). The procedural history of Cohen
is set out in supra note 73. The Court voted five to four that the First Amendment did not
bar the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. Justice White's majority opinion was joined by
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of anonymity to Cohen, a political activist. Cohen wished to keep
secret that it was he who was leaking information on the opposing
political candidate fearing, apparently correctly, that if his dirty
tricks became known it would cost him his reputation and his
job. 292 When the newspapers published his name, reasoning that
his efforts to tarnish the opposing candidate were part of the news
that the public should know, 293 Cohen sued for breach of contract
and misrepresentation. 294 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that, under Minnesota law, neither a misrepresentation nor breach
of contract action had been made out,295 but theorized that a claim
for promissory estoppel could exist. The court, however, citing to
2 96 concluded that such an action would be
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
barred by the First Amendment's protection of true speech.2 97
The Supreme Court rejected the First Amendment challenge.
It held that the promissory estoppel-based claim for breach of confidence should proceed 298 and refused to apply the strict standard
of review developed in its libel and privacy decisions.2 9 9 Rather,
the Court utilized the concept of "neutral" or "generally applicable
laws" which it had previously applied to business regulations impacting on the press.3 00 According to the Court, the world of laws
impacting on true speech can be divided in two: neutral and nonneutral.30 1 Once a law has been determined to be neutral, its enChief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy. Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, O'Connor and Souter dissented. Id. at 664.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 633
(1991), remanded, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992) (holding in favor of plaintiffs on promissory estoppel theory).
296. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
297. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S 524 (1989)).
298. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672 (remanding case for further proceedings to determine
whether a claim of promissory estoppel had been made out under Minnesota law). On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the defendants were liable on grounds of
promissory estoppel. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
299. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669:
This case ... is not controlled by [the Florida Star line of cases] but, rather, by
the equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.
Id.
300. Id. at 669-70. The majority uses the phrase "laws of general applicability," id. at
670, but the dissent utilizes the phrase, "neutral law of general applicability," id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting, quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990)).
301. Id. at 670. This Article utilizes the term "neutral" purely for convenience, since
the phrase "non-neutral" is easier to coin than the phrase "not a law of general
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forcement against the press "is not subject to stricter scrutiny than
would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations. ' 302 Despite a "neutral" law's impact on true speech, there is
no First Amendment scrutiny.30 3 In contrast, non-neutral laws that
seek to punish or prevent the publication of truth are subject to
the strict scrutiny and presumptive unconstitutionality dictated by
the Court's libel and privacy rulings. 4
Thus, concerning the constitutionality of the various versions
of breach of confidence this Article has unearthed, the Court's conclusion will seemingly turn on whether it regards them as neutral
or non-neutral laws. If the Court views a version of breach of confidence as neutral, it will face minimal constitutional scrutiny. If,
however, the Court views a version of breach of confidence as nonneutral, that version will repeatedly go down to defeat under strict
scrutiny. In order to predict which forms of breach of confidence
will earn an easy ride through constitutional review, one must examine what the Court meant in Cohen when it characterized promissory estoppel as a neutral law.
The Cohen Court declared that there "can be little doubt"
that Minnesota's promissory estoppel law was neutral, 30 5 and yet
its opinion is replete with sometimes contradictory statements as
to what it means to be a neutral law. When the court defined neutral laws it spoke of "generally applicable laws"3 06 which have "incidental effects on [the press's] ability to gather and report the
news; ' 30 7 of laws which "do[] not target or single out the press" 308
but rather are "generally applicable to the daily transactions of all
applicability."

302. Id.
303. Equal protection concerns or federal preemption could also cause the law to fail.
The Court makes clear however, that for a neutral law there is no First Amendment barrier
that the law must pass. Id. at 670.
304. Id. at 669-70 (noting the two lines of caselaw which apply to state laws regulating
publication of true speech). This two-track analysis may account for the Court's treatment
of property cases too. As Zimmerman has observed,
efforts to control the use of information or ideas by others will generally
be doomed from the outset if the claim is classified as an attempt to
interfere with freedom of speech. If, however, a claimant can march the
same basic dispute onto the field and successfully raise the standard of
property rights her likelihood of success will improve markedly.
Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 669 (noting that the courts, when faced with property claims
to information, refuse to apply the strict standards one would expect in a free speech case).
305. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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69

the citizens of Minnesota;"3 0 9 and of laws where the "State itself
[does not] define[] the content of publications that would trigger
liability." 310 Far from painting one image of what it means to be
neutral, the Court seems to identify three different ways a lack of
neutrality can be detected, any one of which forces the law onto
the strict scrutiny track.
First, the Court notes that a law that penalizes only the press
would not be neutral.3 1 ' This is hardly new. For instance, if a state
statute placed a $4.00 tax on raw paper, but only when used by
newspapers, the tax would not be neutral. 312 Rather than applying
to all citizens, it would, in the Court's words, "target or single out
the press."31
However, even if a law were neutral in this sense, the Court
indicated that it would still be non-neutral if "the State itself defined the content of publications that would trigger liability." 314 In
Cohen, it was the parties, not the state, who selected the information that was to be kept secret.31 5 Thus, in the Court's eyes, when309. Id. at 670-71.
310. Id. at 671.
311. Id. at 670 (finding that Minnesota law applies generally and does not single out
the press). Such a law might well also face equal protection problems.
312. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r, 460 U.S. 575
(1983) (finding tax on use of paper and ink by newspapers was invalid in part because it
"singles out the press").
313. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. The Court has often applied this same principle-that the
press alone cannot be singled out for punishment-under the nomenclature "under inclusiveness" or "insufficiently tailored." Thus it has struck down statutes as insufficiently tailored to meet the government's claimed interest when the statute punished only the press
and not other speakers. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) ("When a
State attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful publication in the name of
privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime disseminator as well as the media giant."); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979) (holding that statute was not narrowly
tailored when it penalized only the print media); see also TamE, supra note 269, at 963
("[T]he press is protected at least from invidious discrimination.").
314. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
315. Id. at 671 ("The parties themselves, as in this case, determine the scope of their
legal obligations, and any restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truthful
information are self-imposed."). Some have read the Court's reference to "self-imposed"
restrictions as holding that the reporters had waived their First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., Harvey, supra note 11, at 2457-58 (arguing that all contractual based claims for breach
of confidence will pass constitutional scrutiny because the defendants have waived their
First Amendments claims). As the dissent points out in Cohen, the Court has always imposed a high standard for waiver of constitutional rights, a standard which is simply not met
in Cohen. 501 U.S. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The waiver argument is also unsatisfactory because the First Amendment extends protection to not only the speaker's right to
communicate but also the public's right to hear. The speaker can sometimes waive the former, but not the latter. Id. at 677-78.
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ever the state law selects a particular message and punishes the
publication of only that message, the law is non-neutral because it
is selecting between different truths.316 Such a form of non-neutrality is hardly new to our constitutional world, nor is the result-the application of strict scrutiny followed, seemingly inevitability, by a finding of unconstitutionality.3 1 7 Thus, when the Court
in Cohen declared that Minnesota's promissory estoppel law was
neutral, it was making at least three assertions: that (1) the law did
not target the press, (2) it did not target a particular message, and
(3) to be neutral, the law must be aimed at non-speech or, as the
Court phrases it, the law must be "generally applicable."318 Suppose, for example, a state statute forbade anyone from singing on a
Tuesday. The law is neutral in the first two respects, since it does
not target the press (no one can sing) and does not target a particular message (all singing is prohibited regardless of whether the
selected melody is "Amazing Grace" or a Led Zeppelin song). However, it is not neutral in the third sense because it is speech focused. In contrast, when we sue to enforce contracts in which we
have all agreed not to sing on Tuesdays, the law focuses on the
transactions we have made, not the speech we agreed to silence.
While the enforcement of the contract obviously impacts speech,
the Court apparently is not willing to impose strict scrutiny because of such "incidental, and constitutionally insignificant"
results." 9
316. This distinction allows the majority to distinguish Cohen from Florida Star. For
the Court, in Florida Star the state selected one piece of information, a rape victim's name,
and penalized its publication. By contrast, in Cohen the parties selected the information
that was to be kept secret, and the state's only act was to force the parties to keep the
bargain they had made. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670-71.
317. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). On the distinction between contentneutral and content-based restrictions, see, Paul B. Stephan III, The FirstAmendment and
Content Discrimination,68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral
Restrictions,54 U. Cm. L. REV. 46 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content Neutral]; Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.& MARY L. REV. 189 (1983)

[hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation].
318. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672 (finding that enforcing Cohen's right to bring a claim under
promissory estoppel would merely have an "incidental, and constitutionally insignificant"
impact on truthful reporting).
319. Id. The court utilized this sense of neutrality when it listed as neutral tax laws,
antitrust laws and labor laws, all of which regulated not communication itself but other
transactions such as tax payments, mergers, and hiring and firing. Id. at 669. In the Court's
words, these regulations may have "incidental effects on [the press'] ability to gather and
report the news," but the effect was secondary and not primary. Id.
The Court also cited to copyright law which presumably it regards as regulating property rather than speech. Id. at 671. For an interesting discussion of the court's conflicting
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This final distinction permits the Court to separate Cohen's
promissory estoppel claim for breach of confidence from its previous privacy and libel decisions. Libel is neutral in that it punishes
all false speakers and in that the government does not define the
content of the prohibited message. However, it is not neutral in
that its aim is to penalize the act of speaking. The heart of the
wrong is the communication and the injury that communication
causes.3 20 Thus, libel is not neutral in this final sense because the
wrong it seeks to remedy is communication. 21
In comparison, the promissory estoppel-based breach of confidence action is neutral. A promise can be broken without speaking.
Failure to deliver a car that has been purchased, failure to make a
scheduled payment, or building a defective house are all examples
of broken promises. The cause of action focuses not on speech but
on the parties' promise, and only incidentally punishes speech
when the subject of the promise is non-speech. Thus the Court saw
promissory estoppel law as regulating promises and not speech:
"the First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard
promises that would otherwise be enforced
'322
law.
state
under
The line that Cohen seems to suggest the Court will draw3 is
23
between speech focused actions and non-speech focused actions.
Any law that falls into the former category will receive strict scrutiny; any
law falling into the latter will receive only minimal
24
review.
b. Application of "Neutrality" to Breach of Confidence.
This Section points out that if the Court applies Cohen, both the
contract and fiduciary versions of breach of confidence will be
found to be neutral and therefore constitutional. It also concludes
that the Court will view the tort version of breach of confidence, as
approach to property claims in speech,* see Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 665.
320. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 558-59 (1977). As the comments emphasize,
"communication is used to denote the fact that one person has brought an idea to the perception of another." Id. § 559 cmt. a; see also Silbaugh, supra note 257, at 867
("[C]ommunication is a required element of a defamation action.").
321. See supra note 320. The tort actions for false light and private-facts are also nonneutral. While they both punish speech that hurts in different ways, both include speech as
an essential element of the tort. Thus, the Restatement defines both torts as imposing lia-

bility on "one who gives publicity." See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TORTs § 652D cmt. a

(1977) (false light); see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
322. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672.
323. For a discussion of the possible justifications for such a distinction, see infra part

IV.C.
324. One decision, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), which does not
fit into this analysis, is discussed infra part IV.C.
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it is currently emerging in American law, as non-neutral and presumptively unconstitutional.
The key to favorable constitutional scrutiny is to be characterized as neutral. The Cohen Court stated that the promissory estoppel theory will receive minimal, if any, constitutional scrutiny because it is neutral. 25 The closely related version of breach of
confidence based in contract will almost automatically face a similar fate. It is neutral in all three ways: it does not target the press,
the message or communication. Rather, contract enforces all
promises. 26
The same easy passage through the constitutional rapids
seems to await the fiduciary version of breach of confidence. Thus
Snepp, far from being an isolated case, is indicative of the general
treatment that fiduciary-based claims will receive. Once again, the
action for breach of fiduciary duty is neutral in that it does not
target the press, a particular message or communication. Fiduciary
law penalizes any breach of the duty of loyalty-self dealing, working for a competitor, and revealing confidential data-in the same
way. To paraphrase the words of the Court in Cohen, this breach
of confidence action simply requires the defendant to comply with
the fiduciary law like any other citizen of the state. Thus Snepp
and Cohen indicate that the breach of confidentiality32 7 action
founded in fiduciary law will pass constitutional scrutiny.
The final version offered here is the proposed breach of confidence tort. While the proposed tort has several forms, all define it
as the wrongful disclosure of information. This Article predicts
that the Court will characterize such an action as non-neutral, and
subject the action to strict scrutiny that it cannot survive. The
breach of confidence tort is apparently neutral in the first two
senses. It does not target the press, but rather any individual who
has contracted or entered a relation of confidence; and, it does not
target any particular communication since the parties, not the
state, select the message that will be kept confidential. However,
the emerging breach of confidence tort does fail the third sense of
neutrality espoused by the Cohen Court: it is a tort that targets
325. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672.
326. I do not read Cohen to indicate that all possible contract based actions are neutral.
For instance, if a state altered its contract law to allow recovery without proof of consideration only if the contract was for confidentiality, such a "speech only" rule would trigger a
finding of non-neutrality and strict scrutiny.

327. Once again this is not an assertion that all fiduciary actions are necessarily neutral
in the Cohen sense. If a state were to evolve a fiduciary relationship whose only duty was
not to disclose information, such a relationship would presumably be speech focused and
subject to strict scrutiny even after Cohen.
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only speech. 328
Like libel, false light and the private-facts tort, speech is a
prerequisite to tortious breach of confidence as the American
courts have defined it. However, unlike contract or fiduciary law,
which seek to punish any breach of contract and any breach of
fiduciary duty, the tort of breach of confidence seeks to punish
only the communication of information. Thus this tort is a speechfocused tort.
Once the breach of confidence tort has been identified as nonneutral, it faces almost automatic unconstitutionality. In the libel
area, the Court has repeatedly held that any punishment of true
speech runs afoul of the First Amendment. 29 Since the breach of
confidence tort punishes the publication of true information, it
cannot meet a constitutional standard that requires proof of

falsity.
Even if breach of confidence is not unconstitutional per se, the
Court's decisions seem to mandate strict scrutiny. While the Court
has left open the issue of whether a state may ever punish true
328. Presumably, not all torts would fail the neutrality test. For instance, misrepresentation allows recovery whether it is perpetrated by spoken words or by other forms of deceit.
The representation which will serve as a basis for an action of deceit, as well as
other forms of relief, usually consists, of course of oral or written words; but it is
not necessarily so limited. The exhibition of a document, turning back the odometer of an automobile offered for sale, drawing a check without funds or a wide
variety of other conduct calculated to convey a misleading impression under the
circumstances of the case maybe sufficient.
KEETON ET. AL, supra note 133, § 106, at 736. Likewise, if all breaches of fiduciary duty are
made tortious, the Court would presumably view the resulting tort as neutral since all fiduciaries are held to the same standard regardless of whether their breach of duty is speaking
or self dealing. Id.
329. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (finding
that private figure libel plaintiffs are constitutionally required to prove falsity); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (holding that public figure libel plaintiffs
cannot recover absent proof of falsity); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("Truth
may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions."); see generallysupra notes 2740 and accompanying text.
This ban on tortious liability for true speech has been expanded beyond libel. First, in
false light cases, while asserting that it was not engaged in the "blind application" of libel
law, the Court imposed the requirement of proof of falsity on a public figure suing for false
light invasion of privacy. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249 (1974);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967). As the Court later explained, falsity must be
proven regardless of whether the asserted action is libel or a false light action for invasion of
privacy. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975) ("[W]here the interest at
issue is privacy rather than reputation and the right claimed is to be free from the publication of false or misleading information about one's affairs, the target of the publication must
prove knowing or reckless falsehood.") (emphasis added) (summarizing the ruling of Time,
Inc., 385 U.S. at 387-88)).
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speech, 330 it has repeatedly applied an impossibly strict test which
must be met before true speech can be punished. As set out in
FloridaStar, a plaintiff wishing to found an action on lawfully obtained 3 ' true speech of public significance33 2 must show that "a
state interest of the highest order" is at issue.3 33 The Court in Flor330. Those who argue that a breach of confidence action is not constitutionally barred
point to the fact that the Court has refused to declare that true speech can never form the
basis of a tortious action. Instead, as illustrated in a series of private-facts tort cases, the
Court, while striking down the challenged law, has continued to assert that "in a proper
case, imposing civil sanctions for the publication of [private true facts] might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance these interests as to satisfy the [applicable constitutional]
standard." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989). Since Cox Broadcasting, the
Court's first private-facts case, it has consistently refused to rule on whether the First
Amendment prohibits recovery for an action based on true speech. See id. at 491; Time Inc.,
385 U.S. at 383 n.7 (not presenting issue of whether truthful publication of private facts was
constitutionally proscribed).
331. The Court indicated that recovery might be allowed if the speech were based on
information unlawfully obtained. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536. This factor seemingly offers
a means to distinguish breach of confidence cases from the privacy cases in which the Court
requires such a high level of state interest in order to pass constitutional scrutiny. The argument would run that any information obtained in breach of confidence was obtained unlawfully. The Court flirted with this approach in Cohen, noting that "it is not at all clear that
respondents obtained Cohen's name lawfully in this case, at least for purposes of publishing
it." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991).
Such a scrupulous reading of "lawfully obtained" conflicts with prior case law. For instance, in Florida Star, the Court held that the rape victim's name was lawfully obtained
when it was copied from a police report, despite the fact that state law prohibited any duplication and a notice to that effect was on the police room wall. FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 546
(White, J., dissenting) ("As the Star's own reporter conceded at trial, the crime incident
report that inadvertently included B.J.F.'s name was posted in a room that contained signs
making it very clear that the names of rape victims were not matters of public record, and
were not to be published."). Similarly, the Court has held that monitoring police broadcasts
to garner information did not constitute unlawful obtainment. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 (1979) (involving newspaper that had "learned of the shooting by
monitoring routinely the police band radio"); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding that First Amendment protection extended despite a
state law that made it criminal for anyone to disclose content of the proceedings); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits a prior restraint on publication of the pentagon papers despite the fact that they were
illegally taken by Ellsburg who supplied them to the newspapers).
332. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536. This limitation is not as narrow as the language
implies. The Court in Florida Star held that a rape victim's name was of "public significance" because, though immaterial itself, it was part of a newsworthy story. Id. Under this
standard most information will be "of public significance."
It is, clear, furthermore, that the news article concerned 'a matter of public significance'. . . in the sense in which the Daily Mail synthesis of prior cases used that
term. That is, the article generally, as opposed to the specific identity contained
within it, involved a matter of paramount public import: the commission, and investigation, of a violent crime which had been reported to authorities.
Id.
333. Id. at 533; Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) ("[Ilf a
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ida Star denied recovery to a rape victim whose name was published in violation of a state statute providing that rape victims'
names were not a matter of public record. The Court acknowledged that a law penalizing the publication of a true fact might be
justified if there was a compelling state interest.3 34 However, the
Court has never found an interest sufficiently compelling in these
circumstances. It has rejected the privacy interests of an accused
(including juvenile accused), " the privacy interest of a rape victim
(despite uncontested evidence that the victim faced not only extreme trauma but also continuing threats to her safety) ,338 and the
interest in keeping secret the initial investigation of judicial misconduct.3 31 In no case in which it has applied the FloridaStar test
has the Court permitted recovery. 8
Since a breach of confidence plaintiff would be asserting a

similar privacy interest, the Court seems unlikely to find it sufficiently compelling to pass the standard set out in Florida Star. In
short, presuming the Supreme Court follows Cohen, the tortious
action for breach of confidence faces either automatic unconstitutionality or a scrutiny so strict that no plaintiff can recover.

newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need
to further a state interest of the higher order.").
334. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 553.
335. See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 97.
336. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528. The Court described the victim's trauma:
At the end of a day long trial, B.J.F. testified that she had suffered emotional
distress from the publication of her name. She stated that she had heard about
the article from fellow workers and acquaintances; that her mother had received
threatening phone calls from a man who stated that he would rape B.J.F. again;
and that these events had forced B.J.F. to change her phone number and residence, to seek police protection, and to obtain mental health counseling.
Id.
337. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (setting aside the
conviction of a newspaper editor who accurately reported the status of an inquiry pending
before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission in violation of state statute
making such proceedings confidential).
338. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537 (characterizing the privacy interest of the victim,
the physical safety of the victim and the goal of encouraging victims to report their crime as
"highly significant," but finding that none of this justified the legislation passed by Florida
in the circumstances of the case); Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 97; Landmark Communications,
435 U.S. at 829; Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). In some of
these cases the Court's evolution of the Florida Star test was not yet complete, but the
Court applied an earlier version of this test.
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C. Towards a Unified Approach
1. The Court's Confusion. Cohen represents the Court's effort to deal with a growing wave of cases in which those injured by
the media avoid the traditional "speech torts" such as libel, false
light and privacy, and instead resort to other common law remedies not originally designed to deal with those injured by speech.
Thus while Cohen resorted to contract and promissory estoppel,
others have sought recovery for infliction of emotional distress 33 1 or

even property violations.340 This has forced the Court to examine
how the First Amendment affects causes of action that impact on
communication though their terms are not directed at communication.

41

The Court's response has been markedly inconsistent.

Seemingly torn between a desire to protect free speech and the belief that the press should not be exempt from general rules, the
Court has vacillated between two extremes, either subjecting such
laws to strict scrutiny or refusing to apply any review at all. Cohen
represents one extreme: the refusal to apply any First Amendment
scrutiny to such laws despite their impact on speech. The opposite
42
approach is illustrated by Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell,
where the Court imposed the strict scrutiny analysis evolved in its
speech tort decisions
to an action for intentional infliction of emo3 43
tional distress.
In Hustler, Falwell alleged that the defendant's publication of
a parody that portrayed him as having had an incestuous drunken
liaison with his mother in an outhouse, constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. 3 44 The Supreme Court overturned
the plaintiff's jury verdict, holding that the plaintiff was constitu339. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Plaintiffs have also
started to seek recovery for reputational injuries using simple negligence actions. See
Silbaugh, supra note 257, at 865.
340. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 890 (1987) (utilizing copyright to protect privacy interest); see also Zimmerman,
supra note 14, at 670-73 (discussing Salinger).

341. This issue is distinct from the speech/conduct distinction that has long haunted
constitutional law. In speech/conduct cases involving, for example, the burning of draft
cards at issue in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the government attempts to
regulate "conduct." The speaker argues that the conduct is in fact speech and entitled to

First Amendment protection. The Court must decide if the government is regulating conduct, speech or both. In the Cohen and Hustlercases, there is no dispute that the defendant
is speaking. The newspaper in Cohen and the magazine in Hustler were sued not for con-

duct but for publishing true information. The dispute is not speech/conduct, but whether a
law in which speech is not an element should be treated like a speech-focused law, e.g., libel
or the publication of private facts, when it is applied to speech.
342. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
343. Id. at 50-56.
344. Id. at 48-49.
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tionally required to prove falsity in order to recover.34 5 The Court
treated the case not as the application of a neutral law, but as an
attempt to punish speech, and applied strict scrutiny as it had in
the libel cases. 46
Hustler conflicts with Cohen. Hustler involved an action for
emotional distress, a non-speech focused action.3 47 The tort of
emotional distress neither targets the press nor focuses on a particular message or speech. This tort can, for example, can compensate
those who have viewed car crashes, found the wrong body in the
family crypt, or received excessive attention from debt collectors.
Like the promissory estoppel action at issue in Cohen, speech is
not an essential element of the emotional distress tort.348 The Hustler Court nevertheless imposed the strict level of scrutiny it had
developed in the speech tort cases.3 49 Thus the Court's refusal in
Cohen to apply any constitutional scrutiny to actions for breach of
confidence is at odds with the Court's decision only three years
earlier in Hustler, which did apply strict scrutiny to a neutral law.
Even in the absence of such conflict, the Court's analysis in
Cohen raises important concerns. First, the opinion often smacks
of formalistic labelling. Cohen sometimes seems to suggest that if
an action can be labelled as contract or possibly property, then the
First Amendment is cast aside. In contrast, if the action acquires
the label of tort, it faces strict scrutiny and presumptive unconstitutionality. Such an approach is easily critiqued for its simplistic
350
view of contract, a view into which the court occasionally slips.
345. Id. The Court concluded:
public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue
without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with 'actual malice' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was
false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.

Id. at 56.
346. Id. at 50-56.
347. Virginia law, the state law at issue in Hustler, defined the action for emotional
distress as requiring the plaintiff to show that "defendant's conduct (1) is intentional or
reckless; (2) offends generally accepted standards of decency or morality; (3) is causally connected with plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) caused emotional distress that was severe." Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50 n.3 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974)).
348. As the Fourth Circuit stated, intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
"concern itself. . . with statements per se." Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1276 (4th Cir.
1986), rev'd sub nom., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
349. See supra notes 329-37.
350. The Court vacillates on its characterization of contract law. For instance, the
Court, in its discussion of the First Amendment issues, characterizes promissory estoppel as
"the parties themselves . . . determin[ing] the scope of their legal obligations" and, therefore, "any restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truthful information are
self-imposed." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991). This characterization
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Even more troubling, however, is the Court's refusal to recognize the impact that neutral laws have on communication. As the
dissent in Cohen points out, the net effect of the Court's ruling is
that Cohen is permitted to recover against a newspaper that published the truth about a matter of extreme public importance,
namely, the conduct of a gubernatorial election 51 Does it really
matter that Cohen cast his action in the form of breach of promise
rather than injury to reputation or invasion of his privacy, if the
result-the deterrence of free speech-is the same? One could
equally ask if it makes sense that Cohen predicts little, if any, constitutional s~rutiny for a contract based claim for breach of confidence, but would impose strict scrutiny if the claim is framed as a
tort. Thus the Cohen decision rests uneasily, disturbed by precedent and concerns of formalism.
2. Towards An Understanding Of Impact On Communication. However, if Cohen does not present the answer, it does pose
the right question. The Court recognizes, though it does not solve,
the problem of how the First Amendment governs laws that do not
on their face regulate communication, but the application of which
has a profound impact on free speech. The Court's distinction between speech focused and non-speech focused law is not new.
Many scholars have noted the distinction between laws aimed at
communication itself and those where352 the government restricts
speech while not aiming at it directly.

of promissory estoppel law as simply enforcing the parties' own bargains conflicts with the
Court's discussion of estoppel regarding state action. There the Court views estoppel as "a
state law doctrine which, in the absence of a contract, creates obligations never explicitly
assumed by the parties." Id. at 668. Thus, perhaps unknowingly, the Court seems torn between two visions of contract law, one in which contract is a private ordering of relations
between parties and one in which the state plays an active role in selecting which promises
to give effect to.
As weak as the Cohen opinion is, I do not believe that it falls into the trap of presuming
that all contract law is exempt from scrutiny, nor that all tort law triggers it. See supra
notes 326-27.
351. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 677 (Souter, J. dissenting) ("There can be no doubt that the
fact of Cohen's identity expanded the universe of information relevant to the choice faced
by Minnesota voters in that State's 1982 gubernatorial election, the publication of which
was thus of the sort quintessentially subject to strict First Amendment protection.").
352. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 269. Most notably, Professor Tribe writes:
Government can 'abridge' speech in either of two ways. First, government can aim
at ideas or information ....
Second, without aiming at ideas or information in
either of the above senses, government can constrict the flow of information and
ideas while pursuing other goals.. . . The Supreme Court has evolved two distinct
approaches to the resolution of first amendment claims; the two correspond to the
two ways in which the government may 'abridge' speech. If a government regulation is aimed at the communicative impact of an act, analysis would proceed along
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While the Court is correct that laws focused wholly on communication pose a more direct threat to free speech, the Court's
conclusion in Cohen, that non-speech focused laws require no First
Amendment scrutiny, is erroneous. The Court's conclusion is supported only by its complete denial of the impact that neutral laws
can have. The Court may be correct that a contract to stop singing
on Tuesdays is not speech focused, while a law prohibiting such
singing would be. It is undeniable, however, that the result is the
same. Under both, no one can sing on Tuesdays. This refusal to
acknowledge the severe First Amendment ramifications caused by
the enforcement of seemingly neutral laws ultimately undermines
the Court's opinion in Cohen. To permit laws to escape First
Amendment scrutiny because on their face they do not regulate
speech is to invite governments and plaintiffs to recharacterize
their complaints about speech as non-speech actions.s 5 s
Breach of confidence illustrates how easily such a recharacterization can occur. An action for breach of confidence based in tort

will fail constitutional review, but the same action phrased as a
contract or fiduciary claim can survive. Breach of confidence demonstrates that if we are serious about protecting free speech, the
simple dichotomy between speech focused and non-speech focused
actions cannot be allowed to excuse the latter from First Amendment scrutiny." 4
what we will call track one. On that track, a regulation is unconstitutional unless
government shows that the message being suppressed poses a 'clear and present
danger,' constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or otherwise falls on the unprotected
side of one of the lines the Court has drawn to distinguish those expressive acts
privileged by the first amendment from those open to government regulation with
only minimal due process scrutiny. If a government regulation is aimed at the
noncommunicative impact of an act, its analysis proceeds on what we will call
track two. On that track a regulation is constitutional ... so long as it does not
unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas. On track two the 'balance'
between the values of freedom of expression and the government's regulatory interest is struck on a case by case basis guided by whatever unifying principle may
be articulated.
Id. at 789-92; see also Stone, Content Neutral, supra note 316, at 99 ("Content neutral
restrictions generally fall into one of two categories: either they expressly restrict only communcative activities, or they expressly restrict only noncommunicative activities but have an
incidental effect on free speech.").
353. See Stone, Content Neutral, supra note 316, at 105-06 (noting that it is difficult to
justify drawing a sharp distinction between laws restricting communicative activity and
those having only an incidental effect, given the ease with which both laws can have "precisely the same restrictive effect").
354. Id. at 107-08. After reviewing aruments that laws having an incidental effect on
communication should be immune from First Amendment review, Stone concludes that
although these arguments have some force, they are not sufficiently powerful, either singly or in combination, to support the conclusion that laws having only an
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It is not within the scope of this Article to present a new theory of review for laws that impact speech though not so directed. 3
However, this breach of confidence analysis suggests a starting
point for assessing when a law's impact on free speech should trigger heightened First Amendment scrutiny. One difference between
Hustler and Cohen is the Court's willingness to stand in the
speaker's shoes and assess the chill that allowing recovery will
have. Without analysis, the Cohen Court simply declared that any

chill on truthful reporting was "constitutionally insignificant.

' 358

In Hustler, however, the Court eulogized the role that cartoonists
have long played in American public life, 357 and concluded that to
permit recovery without meeting the high standards enunciated in
its libel cases "reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate 'breathing
space' to the free'358
doms protected by the First Amendment.
First Amendment analysis has long assessed the impact that
laws have on speech in determining their constitutional acceptability. In the libel field, ever since New York Times v. Sullivan, we
have asked whether a speaker will be chilled if we allow a plaintiff
to recover for another's speech.3 5 9 Such an inquiry is a useful starting place for an analysis of non-speech focused laws. For instance,
if one asks how much chill a speaker will feel when faced with the
various breach of confidence actions, one gains a new perspective
on the three claims.3 6 0 The contract version of breach of confidence
incidental effect on free speech should be beyond the scope of First Amendment
review. The potential restricitve effect of such laws is simply too great to disregard
them entirely. The problem then, is to decide how to analyze the problem of incidental effects.
Id.
355. For an effort to reconcile the case law in this area, see id. at 108-14. Stone concludes that the Court exercises a "general presumption" that incidental restrictions do not
raise First Amendment problems, but waives that presumption where a restriction has a
"highly disproportionate impact on free expression or directly penalizes expressive activity."
Id. at 114.
356. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).
357. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53-55 (1988).
358. Id. at 56.
359. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964) (noting the size of
the damages awarded, the Court concludes that "[w]hether or not a newspaper can survive a
succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would
give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms
cannot survive"); see also Frederick Schauer, Fear,Risk and the First Amendment: Unravelling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978).
360. This Article does not mean to suggest that the potential chill is the only variable
which should be considered in assessing First Amendment protection against breach of confidence claims. Clearly, claims to have information kept secret vary in strength. For example, a rape victim's claim to have her condition kept secret seems stronger than Cohen's
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offers an easily quantifiable chill. When the reporter agrees to keep
Cohen's name confidential, the scope of liability is clear. The terms
of the newspaper's obligation not to speak have been spelled out.
By bargaining the terms of the contract, the defendant can assess
with certainty what speech will trigger liability. If the terms are
vague then there is no contract. 6 1
Moreover, the damages exposure is both low and certain. Special damages in contract are limited to those which may "reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties,
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it." 36 2 Emotional and punitive damages are not available."' 3 The potential recovery is therefore limited to economic loss,
and even this must be a loss foreseeable to the defendant. Thus,
while the threat of liability may chill some speakers from revealing
information they contracted to keep secret, those speakers can predict with a degree of certainty when liability will be triggered and,
therefore, the scope of damages is restricted.3 6 4 Other speakers,
those not party to any contract,
have no reason to fear liability and
3 65

should not be chilled at all.

claim to keep secret his identity as the source of dirt on an opposing candidate. Society's
interest is also far from monolithic: in some cases it will support secrecy and in others demand disclosure. Thus in Cohen, society had a strong interest in knowing the campaign
tactics of its gubernatorial candidates. In other scenarios, the public's interest may demand
silence. When a doctor/patient or lawyer/client relationship is involved, society has long
asserted an interest in confidentiality in order to promote an individual's resort to medical
and legal care. Moreover, "who" asserts a breach of confidence action and "what" is published will likewise affect the result of any balancing. The Court has always recognized that
the identity of the plaintiff (public or private figure), and the information at issue (matters
of public concern or of purely private interest) impact on First Amendment analysis.
361. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
364. This is not to imply that this chill will be acceptable. When other factors are considered, any recovery may be constitutionally impermissible. See supra note 360 (discussing
other factors which a balancing test may entail). In fact, given the nature of the speech at
issue, society's interest in disclosure and Cohen's relatively low privacy interest, I agree with
the dissent in Cohen that the plaintiff's recovery should not have been permitted to stand.
365. There will, of course, be a decrease in the information available to the public, or at
least a decrease in the sources from which it is available. This itself triggers First Amendment concerns. To illustrate, if a newspaper, as in Cohen, contracts not to speak, its speech
is chilled by fear of a breach of confidence suit. However, if the contract to secrecy is between two private persons, the newspaper is not bound but is free to speak. However, the
newspaper's ability to speak will be lessened because the information is harder to obtain
and the source, bound by an agreement of confidence, will often keep quiet rather than risk
liability. See Harvey, supra note 11, at 2461 (stating that the First Amendment protects the
flow of information to the public, and the press' role in informing the public). This chilling
of the press would be even greater if an action was allowed against the press itself for either
tortious interference with contract, see supra note 133, or in the case of the other causes of
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In comparison, a speaker's fear of unexpected liability increases in the case of promissory estoppel. While the level of damage exposure remains the same, the degree of doubt as to liability
increases. For example, a defendant can be held liable for disclosure even though no bargain was struck if the court concludes that
the interests of justice dictate this result.36 6 Thus promissory estoppel may impose liability on an unsuspecting defendant, causing
speakers to remain silent rather than risk exposure to liability.
This degree of uncertainty and resulting chill is further increased if the action is one for breach of confidence based on fiduciary duty. Here, recovery is not limited to those who have bargained to remain silent. Rather, the law imposes liability on
anyone it perceives to be in a fiduciary relationship.3 67 The law's
refusal to define which relationships count as fiduciary, beyond the
well-recognized list of doctors, lawyers, etc., 6 8 may chill many potential speakers unsure of whether disclosure will trigger liability.
Although the unavailability of emotional or punitive damages lessens this chill to a degree, 6 9 the potential recovery of all a defendant's profits through a constructive trust will deter those who seek
to profit by their revelations.3 1 0
The chill caused by the tort based action, however, is by far
the greatest. Unless the duty not to disclose is strictly defined,7 1
the speaker will be unable to assess whether she is in fact bound
by a duty not to disclose. This degree of uncertainty greatly increases the speaker's fear of speaking. Moreover, since the damages
available in tort include both emotional distress and punitive damages,' 3 exposure to large damages becomes possible3713 and the
action, for inducing a breach of fiduciary duty, see supra note 220, or participating in the
breach of the tortious duty to keep confidences, see supra note 267.
366. See supra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 176-207.
368. See supra notes 181-86.
369. See supra notes 222-23.
370. See supra notes 215-20.
371. This trend is not apparent in either New York or California, the two states so far
to have recognized the tort. See supra notes 228-48. Recognizing the constitutional
problems that the tort action will face, those who advocate its adoption have defined it very
narrowly, attempting to minimize the chilling effect of such an action. See supra notes 22527. Thus, Vickery would limit the action to nonpersonal relations such as bankers, lawyers
and doctors, see supra note 226, while Harvey would limit the tort to explicit and voluntary
agreements of confidentiality, see supra note 227. Even if the courts were to limit the tort in
this way, the chilling effect of such an action remains great given the ability to recover
punitive and emotional distress damages.
372. See supra notes 253-61.
373. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. For example, Cohen recovered only
$200,000 on the promissory estoppel theory, not the additional $500,000 the jury initially

1995]

BREACH OF CONFIDENCE

83

ability to predict the size of any recovery decreases. In sum, a tort
action for breach of confidence poses a far greater chance of chilling speakers than a contract or even fiduciary version of the
action.
The Cohen Court may have been reaching for this distinction
when it distinguished Hustler. It pointed out that unlike the plaintiff in Hustler, Cohen was not "attempting to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim [and was] not seeking damages
for injury to his reputation or to his state of mind. 37 4 The Court's
recognition that Cohen sought only limited damages may have led
it to conclude that the chilling effect of allowing recovery was constitutionally insignificant.1 5 This concept needs to be furthered
developed, but this Article urges the Court to look beyond its distinction of neutral and non-neutral laws and recognize that the latter can just as effectively silence speech. Even where neutral laws
are at issue, the Court must look to the chilling effect that permitting recovery would cause and apply First Amendment limitations
to give speech sufficient breathing space to survive.

awarded him as punitive damages under the tort. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d
387, 392 (Minn. 1992); see also supra note 73.
374. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991); see also id. at 668 (stating
that compensatory damages are simply the cost of doing business and do not raise First
Amendment concerns). The first rationale, seemingly turning on the plaintiff's motive for
selecting a particular cause of action, is highly problematic. Given the Court's lack of
psychic power, how is it to determine a plaintiff's motivation?
As one author has pointed out, the Court may have already failed to detect such a
motivation, since there is evidence that Cohen may have been seeking to recover for injury
to his reputation while disguising his claim as one in contract. See Kurt Hirsch, Note,
Throwing the Book at Revelations: First Amendment Implications of Enforcing Reporters'
Promises, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 161, 180 (1991) (reporting that Cohen's brief
repeatedly emphasized the emotional and reputational injury he had suffered).
375. Alternatively, it may be that the Court is using a claim for emotional distress damages, including reputational damages, as shorthand for a speech-focused action. If the plaintiff seeks damages for injury to reputation or to state of mind, the Court is willing to presume that the aim is to recover for the impact of speech. In contrast, where the damages
sought are for breach of contract where, by definition, emotional distress and reputational
harm cannot be elements of the recovery, the Court is willing to believe that the plaintiff is
not disguising a non-neutral, communication-focused claim for an apparently neutral one.
This conclusion is supported to a degree by Zimmerman's noteworthy article on the
Court's treatment of property claims in information. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 735. She
concludes that one principle to be drawn from such cases is that "property rules should
apply to communicative material only insofar as they are necessary to remedy actual economic loss or the realistic threat of it." Id.
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CONCLUSION

This Article argues that breach of confidence will not prove an
effective replacement for the ailing private-facts tort. The two versions that will survive constitutional scrutiny, the contract and
trust based actions, offer low chances of recovery and minimal
damages to a plaintiff complaining of the revelation of private
facts. By contrast, the tort version does offer an attractive alternative, but its very attractiveness dooms it to constitutional
destruction.

